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0.Introduction 
Whenever a language user judges whether a description of a perceptual 
event or a scene is correct or not he has to find a way how to compare 
the linguistic utterance with the perceptual event. Analogously, 
whenever he gives a description of a perceptual event he has to find a 
way how to map the relevant aspects of the perceptual event onto 
language. The former problem of the language user has been extensively 
studied for descriptions of the relative locations of two objects in 
space, as well as the relative locations of two objects on dimensions 
of physical extent. These domains have been of particular interest 
since the judgmental dimensions underlying these descriptions (e.g. 
big, small) seem to be asymmetrically organized. 
The most extensive series of studies on comparing such 
descriptions against corresponding pictures has been conducted by Clark 
and colleagues in so-called picture-sentence verification experiments. 
The production of descriptions for the same type of pictures, however, 
has been almost completely neglected in experimental research. 
The language user's ability to compare a sentence against a 
picture has been described by so-called verification models. These 
verification models are built around two central aspects, a 
representational and a semantic aspect, respectively. As to the 
representational aspect, the models assume that the picture and the 
description have to be coded in a common propositional format. Only 
then can they be successfully compared in order to arrive at a judgment 
about the truth of the description. This assumption has had a 
substantial revival in modern linguistic and cognitive theory, the most 
recent version being Jackendoff's (1983) "conceptual structure 
hypothesis' which states that "there is a single level of mental 
representation, conceptual structure, at which linguistic, sensory, and 
motor information are compatible" ( Jackendoff, op cit., 17). 
In the present study the semantic aspect is concerned with the 
concept of semantic markedness of locatives and dimensional adjectives. 
Although there is no linguistic theory that accounts for semantic 
markedness in a systematic way, there seems to be no doubt that pairs 
of antonyms like bio: small are asymmetrical; the two members of such a 
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pair are not just opposites of each other. Rather, the marked member of 
such a pair (e.g. small) appears to be semantically more complex than 
the unmarked member (e.g. big). On the empirical level this is 
reflected in easier comprehension and processing of unmarked terms over 
marked ones. Such results have been found in verification studies (e.g. 
Clark & Chase,1972, 1974; Glushko & Cooper, 1978) as well as in studies 
on two- and three-term series problems (e.g. Clark, 1969a,b; Noordman, 
1979), memory studies (e.g. Clark & Card, 1969) and studies on the 
verification of sentences against the content of semantic memory 
(Carpenter, 1974). λ general formulation of these findings has been 
given in Clark's (1973a) so-called "comprehension hypothesis" (which 
states that the unmarked member of a pair of antonymous adjectives or 
locatives should be processed faster than the marked member). 
Furthermore, the markedness asymmetry also seems to be reflected in the 
order of acquisition, the unmarked member of a pair of antonyms being 
acquired before the corresonding marked one (e.g. Bartlett, 1976; 
Brewer & Stone, 1975; Donaldson & Wales, 1970; Wales & Campbell, 1970; 
see also Carey (1978, 1982) for a critical discussion of this work). 
The representational and the semantic aspect of the verification 
models are not seen as independent from each other. Rather, it is 
assumed that the semantic asymmetry of unmarked and marked lexical 
items is also reflected in a preference for coding a picture by means 
of the unmarked relation if other influences are absent. The 
theoretical foundation of this assumption is given in Clark's (1973a) 
so-called "correlation hypothesis" which states that there is a close 
parallelism between the structure of perceptual space as experienced by 
man, and the concept of space underlying spatial terms in language. 
Against the background of these introductory remarks the goal of 
the present study is twofold. First, to give a critical evaluation of 
Clark's verification model on the basis of some new data, in particular 
with respect to the assumption of a preference for mental 
representations of the relation between two pictorially given objects 
in unmarked terms. Second, to show which influences play a role in the 
production of descriptions of the pictures typically used in 
picture-sentence verification studies. In particular, the issue is 
raised whether the markedness effect usually found in comprehension 
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also appears in the production of descriptions. 
In Chapter 1 the linguistic background of the concept of semantic 
markedness will be discussed. A short discussion of the psychological 
interpretation of markedness in terms of corresponding asymmetries in 
the structure of perceptual space is also included. The final part of 
Chapter 1 discusses the theory of gradation as developed by Bierwisch 
(19Θ4, see also Bierwisch et al. 1984). This discussion shows that the 
conceptual structure of comparison is a crucial aspect underlying the 
concept of semantic markedness of dimensional adjectives and locatives. 
Chapter 2 discusses in some detail the verification models of 
Clark and colleagues (Clark & Chase, 1972, 1974; Clark, Carpenter & 
Just, 1973). Also, a picture-sentence verification experiment is 
reported which shows that the assumption of a preference for mental 
representations of pictures in unmarked terms is not correct, whereas 
the 'comprehension hypothesis" can be supported. 
Chapters 3 and 4 address the question whether there is evidence 
for a 'production hypothesis' which parallels Clark's "comprehension 
hypothesis'. In the experiments to be reported in Chapter 4 subjects 
had to name the relation between two pictorially presented objects (on 
the dimensions size and length). These experiments can be viewed as a 
production variant of the typical verification experiments. The results 
provide evidence for a 'production hypothesis', i.e. they show faster 
naming of relations by means of unmarked than marked dimensional 
adjectives. Further, it is shown that this effect is most probably due 
to lexicalization processes. 
However, indirect evidence from the pattern of errors observed in 
these experiments suggests that two types of information about the 
perceptual event play a role: (1) information on the absolute size of 
each of the two stimuli displayed together on a trial, and (2) 
information on the size relation between these two simultaneously 
displayed stimuli. 
In Chapter 5 a model will be proposed which integrates these 
notions. The predictions of this model for an experimental situation in 
which absolute and relative information are brought into conflict with 
each other will be contrasted with the predictions of three other 
models which rely exclusively on one type of information (either 
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absolute or relative). 
The results of the corresponding experiments in Chapter 6 show a 
pattern of congruity effects which can be best explained by assuming 
that both types of information are available in the conceptual 
representation and that congruity effects are due to interference of 
these types of information. Furthermore, the results suggest that 
congruity effects and markedness effects are independent from each 
other. 
Finally, the general implications of these results for the concept 
of semantic markedness will be discussed. 
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1. Semantic markedness: Linguistic background and psychological 
interpretations 
The concept of markedness has its origin in the phonological theory of 
the Prague School. Markedness usually labels an opposition of an 
unmarked element, considered as the normal case, and a marked one, 
considered as the more special case (cf. Bechert 1971). The difference 
between an unmarked-marked opposition and a binary +/- opposition for 
the case of phonological theory has been formulated by Schane (1970, 
p.287) as follows: 
"The marked segment is phonologically more complex since it is 
equivalent to the unmarked element plus something additional. In this 
system, /d/, for example, is considered to be more complex than /t/. In 
the binary system, on the other hand, segments, such as voiceless and 
voiced, are treated as being of equal complexity. They are opposed to 
each other as opposite values of a given attribute. In evaluating the 
number of features in a matrix, pluses and minuses are counted equally. 
However, in the system of markedness only m's (marked) are counted in 
determining complexity." 
So, the main difference between an unmarked-marked opposition and a 
binary 4-/- opposition is given by the assumption of a difference in 
complexity of two elements for the first type of opposition, but not 
for the second type of opposition. 
According to Lyons (1977), three types or categories of markedness 
can be distinguished in the domain of markedness of lexical items. 
These three categories are not completely disjunct. 
The first category concerns morphological markedness. 
Morphological markedness is present if two lexemes that are in an 
antonym relation to each other differ in the presence of a certain 
morpheme (e.g. antonymous adjectives as happy. unhappy : consistent. 
inconsistent). In these cases one member of a pair is marked by an 
additional morphological feature (in the examples given above іщ and 
in). This has to be distinguished from pairs where both members are 
morphologically marked (e.g. meaningful, meaningless). 
The second category can be labeled semantic markedness. A 
semantically marked lexeme (like small) is more specific in meaning 
than the corresponding unmarked lexeme (like big), but the two members 
of the opposition do not differ by the presence of a morpheme. Instead, 
it is assumed that the unmarked member of the opposition is 
semantically less complex than the marked one. In the domain of 
dimensional adjectives this is expressed for example by the fact that 
in so-called neutralizing contexts (e.g. measure phrases like 'A is χ m 
long/short" or questions of the type "How long/short is A?") unmarked 
adjectives take a neutral meaning (addressing the whole underlying 
dimension) whereas marked ones take a contrastive meaning (addressing 
only a specific part of the underlying dimension). In contexts like 'A 
is big/small", in contrast, unmarked as well as marked adjectives take 
a contrastive meaning. 
Furthermore, the stem morpheme of the semantically unmarked 
adjective is usually at the same time the stem morpheme of the name of 
the underlying dimension (e.g. thickness, thick:thin; cf. Greenberg 
1980, for a discussion of criteria to distinguish semantically unmarked 
adjectives from semantically marked ones). 
The third category can be labeled distributional markedness. Since 
semantically marked adjectives are more specific in meaning than 
unmarked ones they are at the same time distributionally marked; 
frequency of occurrence in natural language is higher for semantically 
unmarked adjectives than for the corresponding semantically marked 
adjectives. However, the converse implication does not hold; 
distributional markedness does not necessarily imply semantic 
markedness. 
In the following "markedness' is always to be read as "semantic 
markedness" if not otherwise indicated. 
Until now we have primarily been concerned with the linguistic 
background of markedness. But Clark's (1973a) 'correlation hypothesis' 
illustrates a way of how this asymmetry in pairs of antonymous 
adjectives can be viewed as anchored in corresponding asymmetries of 
the structure of perception. The correlation hypothesis states that the 
structure and properties of the perceptual space of man (the so-called 
P-space), which are determined by his perceptual apparatus and 
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properties of the surrounding world, should be closely paralleled by 
corresponding properties of the concept of space underlying spatial 
terms in language (the so-called L-space). Without going into all the 
details of the analysis, the properties of P-space can roughly be 
described as follows: there are three "reference plains" with three 
associated directions perpendicular to these plains, namely: (1) the 
horizontal ground level with the vertical as associated direction, (2) 
the vertical left-to-right plain through the body with the 
forward-backward direction, and (3) the vertical front-to-back plain 
through the body (reflecting the basic left-right symmetry of the 
external organs, in particular the symmetry of the perceptual 
apparatus) with the horizontal left-right direction. Since man's 
perceptual apparatus is primarily equipped to perceive objects above 
the ground level and in front of him, the directions associated with 
the 'reference plains" (1) and (2) are assumed to be asymetrically 
organized, with forward and upward being positive directions and 
backward and downward being negative directions (and man himself and 
groundlevel being natural zero points or origins for these perceptual 
dimensions). In contrast the left-right direction is symmetrically 
organized. 
According to the correlation hypothesis L-space should have three 
corresponding reference plains with associated directions. Furthermore, 
the asymmetries of the vertical direction and of the horizontal 
forward-backward direction is paralleled by the markedness of the 
corresponding prepositions and spatial adjectives, with prepositions 
and spatial adjectives referring to positive directions being unmarked 
(i.e. semantically less complex), and their counterparts referring to 
negative direction being marked. 
It is important to note that the correlation hypothesis does not 
spell out the mechanisms by which the assumed parallelism of P-space 
and L-space comes about (Clark 1973a, p. 2Θ). This makes it impossible 
to judge in how far P- and L-space constitute two independent, but 
parallel, structures, or whether they are just two sides of one and the 
same structure which mediates between language and perception. 
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Despite these problems a look at the structure of dimensions of 
physical extent reveals an asymmetry which parallels the markedness 
asymmetry in the corresponding pairs of antonymous adjectives. So, for 
physical objects, for example, the dimension of size extends from a 
natural zero point (meaning "no size") infinitely outwards. A similar 
point has been made by Lehrer (1974) who states that an object can be, 
for example, so small that it approaches some zero point in extent, but 
that there is no such natural limit on how big a thing might be. This 
property distinguishes dimensions of physical extent from dimensions 
underlying evaluation adjectives like good, bad which appear to have 
some neutral middle point, the "bad"-part of the dimension lying below 
this point and the "good"-part lying above this point. This difference 
between the structures of the dimensions underlying evaluation 
adjectives and adjectives referring to physical extent is in fact 
assumed by the theory of gradation proposed by Bierwisch (1984, see 
also Bierwisch et al. 1984). 
Until now the discussion of the linguistic aspects of semantic 
markedness has been restricted to a more or less descriptive level, in 
particular to enumerating criteria (most of the time distributional 
criteria) for distinguishing the unmarked from the marked member of 
pairs of antonyms. Although there seems to be no linguistic theory 
explicitly accounting for markedness asymmetries in a way which goes 
beyond the level of intuitions (cf. for a similar statement Bierwisch, 
1984, p. 77), a look at theories of the semantics of gradation gives an 
idea of how markedness asymmetries could be explained in a more 
systematic fashion. 
The discussion here will be restricted to Bierwisch's theory of 
gradation (1984; see also Bierwisch et al. 1984) , which seems to be 
the most recent and advanced theory, incorporating many aspects of 
preceding theories. Furthermore, the discussion will be restricted to 
the domain of relative dimensional adjectives (hereafter D-adjectives), 
i.e. to comparison on dimensions expressing physical extent. These 
dimensions are conceived of as extending from a natural zero point 
outwards (see above). 
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As a starting point, Bierwisch discusses a number of comparative 
and positive constructions with respect to their grammaticality, 
acceptability and normrelatedness. A construction is normrelated (+NR) 
if it presupposes an implicit norm or standard of comparison. 
(1) A is big (+NR) 
(2) A is small (+NR) 
(3) A is bigger than В (-NR) 
(4) A is smaller than В (-NR) 
(5) How big is A? (-NR) 
(6) How small is A? (+NR) 
(7) A is 2 m long (-NR) 
(8) ? A is 2 m short (+NR) 
Bierwisch et al. (1984) suggest that the acceptability of certain 
continuations of sentences (1) through (8) provides a test of their 
normrelatedness; if a continuation with the antonymous adjective is 
acceptable (e.g. 'A is bigger than B, but both are small') then the 
corresponding construction is not normrelated. 
The norm N can be conceived of as determined by a situationally 
relevant comparison class C. Then, N is established as the mean of the 
values of all the elements in С on the relevant dimension of comparison 
(cf., Bierwisch et al., 1984). With attributive use of adjectives, as 
in "this table is high", the noun table seems to be a main determinant 
in the establishment of C. However, if nouns induce a comparison class 
C, it is possible that sentences like (3) turn out to be normrelated 
with respect to the 'continuation-test'. This is most obvious in cases 
where the nouns occupy extreme high or low positions in the relevant 
comparison class (e.g. 'The World Trade Center is higher than the 
Empire State Building, but both are low'). This problem with 
Bierwisch's conception of normrelatedness will be taken up below. 
The examples (1) through (8) show that normrelatedness has much in 
common with the concept of neutralizing contexts as used by Lyons 
(1977, see above). More specifically, neutralizing contexts seem to be 
contexts in which the use of +pole adjectives (as bio, long etc.; for 
the domain of D-adjectives the distinction of + vs -pole adjectives 
coincides with the distinction of unmarked vs marked adjectives) 
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implies normneutrality, whereas the use of -pole adjectives inplies 
either normrelatedness (e.g. (5) vs (6)) or reduced acceptability (e.g. 
(7) vs (Θ)). However, comparative constructions liXe (3) and (4) are 
examples of expressions in which neither use of +pole nor of -pole 
adjectives is normrelated. 
This shows that the normrelatedness of -pole adjectives is not 
independent of the type of gradation construction in which they occur. 
Thus, normrelatedness cannot be taken as the defining property of 
markedness. In particular, most experimental studies on the 
•comprehension hypothesis" refer to comparative constructions as (3) 
and (4), i.e. to cases where neither unmarked nor marked comparatives 
are normrelated. Furthermore, most developmental studies on the 
'complexity hypothesis" are based on children's performance in 
answering questions like "Which one is the tall/short one?". Again, 
normrelatedness vs normneutrality cannot be taken as an explanation for 
performance differences between unmarked and marked lexical items (cf. 
Carey, 1982, p.362 for a similar point). So, if it were normrelatedness 
that accounts for markedness effects, then these effects should not 
have shown up in these studies. 
Bierwisch conceives of D-adjectives as assigning a degree d(A) 
(with A being a property) to an individual 2. However, d(A) is further 
analyzed as being composed of a standard of comparison 2 and a 
difference £. This gives relative adjectives the status of a three 
place predicate which relates an individual 2, a standard of comparison 
χ and a difference £. The property A is viewed as a dimension which 
extends from a zero point in positive direction. This diverges from 
conceptions which regard A as consisting of two dimensions, e.g. length 
and shortness, with two inverse orderings. 
If the values of objects a and b on the dimension of length, for 
example, are symbolized as L(a) and L(b), the conceptual structure 
underlying comparatives, positives and measure phrases can (in 
imitation of Bierwisch et al. 1984, p.502) roughly be formalized as 
follows: 
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(1) a is long 
Ma) 
(2) a is short 
L(a) 
L(a) 
LU) 
(5) a is 1.50 m long 0 1-
1.50 
•> L(a) = 0 + 1.50 m 
LU) 
(6) ? a is 1.50 m short г^Г>_о > LU) = 0 - 1.50 
1.50 
It is easy to see that normrelatedness is captured by the standard 
of comparison у taking the value N (which is a norm defined by the 
relevant comparison class). If the expression is a measure phrase, χ 
takes the value 0, and £ the value specified in the measure phrase 
itself. If the expression is a comparative sentence, у takes the value 
of the complement (L(b) in (3), L(a) in (4)). у always takes one of 
these three values. It is clear, then, that comparative sentences like 
(3) and (4) cannot be normrelated because the value of у is already 
specified by the complement of the comparative sentence and thus not 
open any more for specification by a norm N. On the other hand, 
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positive constructions like (1) and (2) are based on an implicit 
comparison, the standard of comparison being provided by a contextually 
determined norm. Finally, measure phrases like (5) take 0 as value of γ 
since they determine absolute values of extent ( specified by £). By 
giving ν the value 0 it is further clear that (5) is not normrelated. 
However, the fact that (6) seems less acceptable than (5) (though 
having a clear interpretation which can be paraphrased as "a is 1.50 m 
long, and that is short"; cf. Bierwisch et al., 1984, p.501) is still 
in need of explanation. 
The examples given above suggest that in comparisons certain 
intervals on the underlying dimension are "passed through* and 
"concatenated". However, the examples differ, among other differences, 
in the sequence of these concatenation operations. So, according to 
Bierwisch, (3) implies a pass from 0 to the value L(b), then a pass of 
length £ in the same direction, by which L(a) is reached. In contrast, 
(4) implies a pass from 0 to L(a), then a pass in opposite direction 
('towards' 0) of length £, by which L(b) is reached. It is immediately 
obvious that -pole, or marked, adjectives always demand a reversal in 
the concatenation operations, whereas with +pole adjectives all passes 
proceed in the same positive direction (i.e. 'away from' 0). It is of 
course tempting to regard this reversal in the sequence of 
concatenation operations with marked adjectives as the basis for the 
greater difficulty of dealing with them (cf. Bierwisch, 19Θ4 p. 27). In 
particular, this explanation keeps track of the fact that the 
unmarked-marked difference holds independent of the normrelatedness of 
the expression in which the adjective occurs (at first glance 
Bierwisch's terminology of "passes", "concatenations" etc might appear 
rather metaphorical, but these concepts could be thought of, for 
example, as "test procedures" in the framework of procedural 
semantics). 
If one also takes into account that the underlying dimension is 
conceived of as extending outwards from zero in positive direction, and 
that measure phrases like (5) and (6) fixate ν at 0, it becomes clear 
that (6) has to be unacceptable (or at least less acceptable than (5)) 
since (6) would demand a pass from zero downwards (i.e. to a 
nonexisting part of the dimension). Only if (6) is interpreted from the 
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point of view of a norm N can such a pass below zero be avoided. And, 
as can be seen from the paraphrase of (6) given above ('..., and that 
is short*), the object mentioned in the measure phrase must be below 
this norm. Or, as Teller (1969) argues, one can use -pole adjectives 
with measure phrases if one is talking about an object which possesses 
the relevant attribute only to a small degree, as compared to the 
average degree of this attribute with objects of the relevant 
comparison class. Note, however, that by this one is talking about two 
types of standards of comparison: On the one hand, in measure phrases y 
has to be 0 since otherwise с could not specify absolute size. On the 
other hand, the relevant class of objects talked about seems to 
introduce a second standard of comparison. Its value is determined by 
the average degree of the relevant attribute for this relevant class of 
objects. So, capturing normrelatedness exclusively in terms of the 
values j£ takes, without taking into account the influence of the 
relevant comparison class, does not seem sufficient (see also the 
similar argument made above on normrelatedness of comparative 
sentences). 
Despite these problems, the construction of relative adjectives as 
three place predicates in Bierwisch's theory gives the possibility of 
capturing markedness asymmetries independent of the issue of 
normrelatedness, thereby avoiding the above mentioned problems with the 
interpretation of acquisition and comprehension studies. 
Normrelatedness is a question of the value the variable у takes whereas 
the polarity of concatenation of у and s. (+ vs -) is an inherent 
property of the adjective type (cf., Bierwisch et al. (1984) for the 
corresponding semantic representations of D-adjectives). 
In the following, we will primarily refer to the framework 
developed by Clark (with only scattered remarks referring to 
Bierwisch's theory of gradation), because of the more elaborated 
assumptions on the link between language and perception in Clark's 
theory. The issues raised by Bierwisch's theory of gradation, however, 
will be taken up again in the general discussion. 
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2. Verifying sentences aoainst pictures 
Let us now turn to the sentence-picture verification paradigm. For the 
experiments to be reported in Chapters 4 and 6 the typical verification 
task was changed into a production task. Therefore the available 
evidence and models of verification tasks will be discussed in some 
more detail. 
In the typical sentence-picture verification experiments the 
subject is presented with a picture and a sentence (either the picture 
first or the sentence first or both simultaneously). The subject's task 
is to decide whether the sentence gives a correct description of the 
picture or not. Usually the time needed for this decision is the 
dependent variable. 
Early experiments of this kind attempted to demonstrate that 
sentences of the same semantic content but different syntactic surface 
structure are transformed to one and the same semantic or conceptual 
representation by the comprehension process (e.g. Cough, 1965; Seymour, 
1969). 
However, in following experiments (Cough, 1966; Seymour, 1973, 
1974a,b; Slobin, 1966; Trabasso, Rollins & Shaughnessy, 1971) effects 
showed up that could not be explained by this assumption. Apparently 
the semantic representations built up by the comprehension process are 
not independent of the surface structure of the sentence. 
This became the starting point for substantial experimental and 
theoretical efforts in this field. Typically the sentences used 
describe the relative locations of two objects in space (e.g. 'A is 
above B") or the relative values of two objects in a certain 
(perceptual) attribute (e.g. 'A is bigger than B"). This allows the 
possibility of describing the same picture by the unmarked and the 
marked term of a pair of antonymous locatives or comparatives. The 
second linguistic variable manipulated in these experiments is 
negation: the description can be given in an affirmative (e.g. 'A is 
above B") or a negative form (e.g. 'A is not below B*). With respect to 
the latter of these two linguistic variables it should be mentioned 
that corresponding affirmative and negative descriptions can only be 
regarded as having the same semantic or conceptual content under the 
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restrictive conditions of a laboratory experiment: "В is not above A" 
denotes the same perceptual event as "A above B" only if the possible 
spatial arrangements of A and В are restricted to two possibilities, 
either A being above B, or A being below В (see Kroll & Corrigan, 1981, 
for an experimental test of this issue). 
Besides these two linguistic variables there are two further 
variables which are usually manipulated: the truth-value of the 
sentence with respect to the picture, and the order in which the 
subjects receive the picture and the sentence. The second variable can 
be realized either by an instruction to attend first to the picture or 
to the sentence, or by successively presenting the picture and the 
sentence (it will be shown below that these two realizations are not 
equivalent). 
On the basis of the verification latencies obtained in experiments 
of this type, researchers tried to infer the mental representations of 
the sentence and the picture, as well as the comparison processes which 
act upon these representations (see Levelt, 1978, for a survey on these 
experiments). 
We will first focus on studies concerning locatives in view of the 
more extensive empirical evidence and the more elaborate theoretical 
models available for this type of linguistic construction. 
Clark & Chase (1972, 1974) developed two models for picture 
sentence verification tasks: Model A is responsible for the 
sentence-first case, Model В for the picture-first case. These models 
were in first instance developed for verification studies which use the 
locatives above vs below and corresponding visual arrangements of two 
objects. But the authors indicate that these models should in principle 
also hold for verification situations using other pairs of loctives and 
comparatives showing an unmarked-marked asymmetry. 
The basic premise of these models posits that subjects must encode 
the picture and the sentence into the same mental format in order to be 
able to decide whether a sentence is a correct description of the 
picture (this is called the 'principle of congruence" in Clark (1973b); 
for a general formulation of this principle see Jackendoff's (1983) 
"conceptual structure hypothesis"; in connection with this hypothesis 
Jackendoff explicitly refers to the work of Clark & Chase). Clark & 
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Chase assume that the format of this representation is some combination 
of embedding and embedded elementary propositions. After encoding 
picture and sentence into such a propositional representation, a 
comparison process checks in which respects picture and sentence 
representations match. As an outcome of these match-procedures the 
subject gives his true- or false-judgement. So, the whole model has 
four stages: a picture encoding stage, a sentence encoding stage, a 
comparison stage and a response execution stage. 
In the sentence encoding stage the sentence is encoded into an 
abstract propositional format. An important assumption of the model is 
that this representation of the sentence maintains some of the surface 
structural features of the sentence: the kind of relation in the 
propositional representation is the same as in the presented sentence. 
Furthermore, when the sentence is negative the proposition expressing 
the locative is embedded into a "negation proposition". Taken together, 
these assumptions yield the following propositional representations for 
the four possible sentences which result from the full combination of 
the two linguistic variables mentioned above: 
Sentence Sentence Representation 
A is above В [A above B] 
В is below A [B below A] 
В isn't above A [not [B above A]] 
A isn't below В [not [A below B]] 
Besides these representational assumptions some assumptions 
concerning processing difficulty in the sentence encoding stage are 
made. First, it is assumed that below (and other marked locatives and 
comparatives) are linguistically more complex than their unmarked 
antonyms and thus are more difficult to encode (Though Clark & Chase do 
not spell out precisely what is meant by "encoding" it seems that they 
refer to the derivation of a propositional representation of a given 
sentence). This is a more concrete formulation of Clark's (1973a) 
"comprehension hypothesis" and can be regarded as a direct consequence 
of the asymmetries of L-space (which in turn are assumed to be 
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paralleled by corresponding asymmetries in P-space). But the 
application of the concept of markedness to locative pairs as above. 
below is questionable since none of the criteria distinguishing 
unmarked from marked members of a pair of antonyms are applicable to 
such locatives (cf., Clark & Clark, 1978, p. 243, where it is 
explicitly pointed out that such locative pairs cannot be regarded as 
linguistically unmarked vs marked). Despite this problem, the term 
markedness will be used in the following for characterizing the members 
of a pair of locatives, just as in most publications of Clark and his 
colleagues, λ common basis for asymmetries in pairs of locatives like 
above• below and pairs of D-adjectives like big, small can be seen in 
the similar organization of the underlying dimensions; in both cases 
the underlying dimensions extend from a natural zero point outwards 
(compare the discussion of the correlation hypothesis). This suggests 
that the concept of polarity of concatenation of the standard of 
comparison γ and the difference с as proposed for D-adjectives in 
Bierwisch's theory of gradation, might also be applicable to locatives 
like above• below. 
Clark & Chase further assume that encoding a negative sentence 
takes more time than encoding an affirmative sentence. 
With this conception of the sentence encoding stage and the 
principle of congruence mentioned above it is clear that the picture 
encoding stage must also deliver a comparable kind of propositional 
representation of the picture. The construction of a propositional 
representation of the picture is guided by three principles. 
The basic or default principle claims that a picture of an object 
A above an object В is -in the absence of other influences- coded with 
the unmarked relation as [A above B]. That is, this default principle 
states a preference for a mental representation of perceptual events 
which reflects the asymmetry of the up-down direction in P-space. As we 
have seen above this principle is paralleled on the linguistic level by 
the assumption that unmarked locatives take less encoding time than 
their marked counterparts. This default principle can be overruled 
under certain circumstances by two additional principles. The first of 
these principles says that whenever an observer consciously decides to 
code the location of an object A with respect to an object В as 
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reference point, he will code the picture as [A above B] or [A below 
B], but not as [B below A] or [B above A]. 
The second principle says that whenever the observer perceives an 
object В as a stable and prominent reference point he will code the 
position of A relative to the position of object B. 
These two principles are always tested first, and in the order 
given above. If neither of the principles applies, the observer will 
code the picture according to the default principle. 
It should be noted that the second principle and the default 
principle reflect influences of preferences for certain mental 
representations of pictures whereas principle 1 seems to be more a 
reflection of conscious attention. Principle 1 especially comes into 
play when the sentence precedes the picture: Depending on the 
preposition of the sentence, the picture will be coded from the top to 
the bottom figure (if the preposition of the sentence is above) or from 
the bottom figure to the top figure (if the preposition of the sentence 
is below). This will result in a picture code which makes use of the 
same preposition as the sentence. That is, under the influence of a 
preceding sentence, sentence and picture will be coded with the same 
prepositions. This interpretation of principle 1 for the case of a 
preceding sentence assumes that a perceiver will code the picture 
contingent on the sentence with respect to the locative of the 
sentence. In contrast, the general formulation given above assumes 
coding of the picture contingent on a preceding sentence with respect 
to the topic or subject term of the sentence. This inconsistency stems 
from different formulations of the principle given in different 
publications of Clark and colleagues. Later on, this inconsistency 
between the different formulations of principle 1 will be discussed in 
more detail. But in what follows coding of the picture contingent on 
the locative of a preceding sentence will be assumed (as proposed in 
Clark & Chase, 1972). 
Although the coding of the picture in unmarked terms is regarded 
as the default, Clark & Chase assume that coding a picture in unmarked 
or marked terms takes an equal amount of time (cf. Clark & Chase, 1972, 
where empirical evidence in support of this assumption is given). 
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Because of principle 1, a sentence-first and a picture-first model 
have to be distinguished (model λ and model В in Clark & Chase, 1972, 
1974). In the sentence-first case the coding of the sentence is 
contingent on the surface structure of the sentence and the coding of 
the picture is in turn contingent on the coding of the sentence, 
whereas in the picture-first case the picture is always coded according 
to the default principle, i.e. in unmarked terms. The comparison 
process that follows is conceptualized as a sequence of 
match-procedures which compare the propositions of the two 
representations from inside to outside. Whenever a mismatch is 
encountered a truth-index which is initially set to "true" is changed. 
Each change of the truth index is assumed to take an additional amount 
of time. The final value of the truth-index determines the answer to be 
given. Figures 1 and 2 show the codings which result for picture and 
sentence for the picture-first and the sentence-first case and the 
necessary operations in the comparison stage. 
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(1) Ρ, N = oositive (affireative), negative sentence 
T, F = true, false description of the picture 
А, В = sentence with the preposition above, below 
Fig. 1: Sentence-first model for a picture of an object A 
above an object В (see Clark & Chase, 1972, p.480) 
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Fig. 2: Picture-first model for a picture of an object A 
above an object В (see Clark Ь Chase, 1972, p.488) 
In the sentence-first case the comparison stage first tests on a match 
of the logical subject of the sentence and picture propositions. 
Because picture and sentence are coded with the same preposition, a 
mismatch of the subjects of picture and sentence representation leads 
to a change of the truth index from true to false. Otherwise the truth 
index remains on the value 'true". The second step checks whether the 
sentence representation contains a negation. Because the model claims 
that pictures are exclusively coded in affirmative form (i.e. the 
picture code can never be embedded in a negation proposition), the 
detection of a negation in the sentence implies a mismatch of picture 
and sentence code in this aspect (but see for example Clark et al. 
1973, for a discussion of the circumstances under which a negative 
coding of a picture can be experimentally induced). Otherwise -
negation in sentence code absent - a match occurs. 
In the picture-first case a check on subject identity alone in the 
comparison process is not sufficient to determine whether the truth 
index has to be changed. Clark & Chase propose that in this case the 
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comparison process consists of a three-step match procedure. In the 
first step the logical subjects of the two representations are checked. 
If a mismatch is encountered, then - contrary to the sentence first 
model - there will be no change of the truth-index. Instead one of the 
propositional representations (according to Clark & Chase (1972) the 
sentence) has to be recoded to its converse (e.g. [B above A] — > [A 
below B]) which is assumed to be a time consuming operation. Now the 
logical subjects match. In the next step the identity of the 
prepositions is checked. In the third stage, just as in the 
sentence-first case, it is checked whether the sentence representation 
contains a negation. 
These models predict that for the sentence-first case main effects 
of the markedness of prepositions, of the negation of the sentence, and 
of the truth value should show up. The first two effects are 
attributable to the sentence encoding stage, the third effect is 
attributable to the comparison stage. In contrast, the picture-first 
condition will show an interaction between markedness of the 
prepositions and truth value, due to the comparison process. This 
expectation is a direct consequence of the noncontingent coding schemes 
claimed for the picture-first case. 
These predictions are nicely borne out in different experiments. 
As an example, Figure 3 shows the latencies for picture-first and 
sentence-first verifications (for affirmative sentences only) of Clark 
& Chase (1972, Exp. II) as reported in Clark et al. (1973). 
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Fig. 3: Latencies to verify "A is above B" and 
"B is below A" as true or false when the 
subject attended to the picture first 
(left panel), or to the sentence first 
(right panel), (see Clark et al. 1973, 
p.331) 
Until now we have primarily been concerned with the verification of 
locative sentences against pictures. This was because more empirical 
evidence and better elaborated models are available for the case of 
locatives than for the case of comparatives. At this point, we will 
take a closer look at comparatives here because the linguistic variable 
of primary interest in the experiments reported in Chapters 4 and б 
will be semantic markedness of comparatives. 
In general, for comparatives the same should hold as for 
locatives, in particular for comparatives expressing relative spatial 
extent. This should be the case since locatives and comparatives share 
essential features. First, comparatives just like locatives usually 
occur as pairs of antonyms, one of which is unmarked and one which is 
marked (e.g. bigger, smaller; longer, shorter). Second, just like 
locatives locate one object - the subject of the sentence - with 
respect to another object which establishes a reference point, 
comparative sentences locate the subject of the sentence (i.e. the 
topic of comparison) with respect to a reference point denoted by the 
object of the sentence on an underlying dimension of comparison. Third, 
as already shown above, the same type of asymmetries in P-space should 
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hold for locatives as well as for dimensional comparatives (although 
the application of the concept of markedness to locatives seems 
questionable; see above). 
From Clark et al. (1973) it becomes clear that in fact the sane 
4-stage model as described above should hold for verification tasks 
with sentences containing unmarked vs marked comparatives. As with 
locatives, a propositional representation of the sentence is built up 
in the sentence encoding stage maintaining the comparative of the 
surface sentence. Encoding a sentence with an unmarked comparative 
should take less time than encoding one with a marked comparative. 
The picture encoding stage also works in principle the same way as 
with locatives. But in contrast to the three picture-coding principles 
mentioned above, here a fourth principle is proposed by Clark et al. 
(1973). This fourth principle states that whenever the picture contains 
a dimension of comparison with a well-defined secondary reference point 
(or standard) on it, this secondary reference point will divide the 
dimension into two subdimensions on which perceptual comparisons are 
coded. 
The idea of coding comparisons on corresponding subdimensions is 
based on assumptions about the cognitive structure of comparisons. As 
Clark (1971) points out in connection with a discussion with 
Huttenlocher & Higgins (for the whole discussion see Huttenlocher & 
Higgins, 1971, 1972; Clark, 1971, 1972), there are three points of 
reference in comparative sentences. For a sentence like "A is taller 
than B' there is a primary reference point (PRP) which is the zero 
point for the whole dimension of height. The secondary reference point 
(SRP) is an implicit standard to which objects are compared. This 
secondary reference point is the origin for both the subdimension of 
"tallness" (that is from the SRP upwards) and "shortness" (that is from 
SRP downwards). These two subdimensions underly the contrastive meaning 
of tall and short. The position of the SRP on a dimension can for 
example be determined by the domain of objects talked about. For 
example, a statement such as "This boy is tall" contains an implicit 
comparison which can be paraphrased as 'This boy is taller than the 
average boy of the corresponding age group'. In this case the average 
tallness of boys of the corresponding age group establishes the SRP. 
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The tertiary reference point (TRP) is always explicitly given in 
comparative constructions by the object term of the sentence. So, for 
example, in "A is taller than В", В would establish the TRP. 
Now Clark (1971) claims that the use of taller for comparing A and 
В implies that both A and В are above the SRP on the dimension of 
height and that the use of shorter presupposes that both A and В are 
below SRP. That is, the position of SRP is determined by the 
comparative and not by the comparison class which is induced by the 
objects mentioned in the comparative sentence. The reference points for 
two comparative sentences as "A is taller/shorter than B" can then be 
displayed as in Figure 4. 
(1) (2) 
-a SRP -
TRP - -b "tallness" TRP -
SRP 
"shortness" 
PRP PRP _ 
Fig. 4: Reference points on the dimension "height" for 
the comparative sentences (1) "a is taller than b", 
and (2) "b is shorter than a . PRP = primary 
reference point; SRP = secondary reference point; 
TRP = tertiary reference point (cf. Clark, 1971; 
also Fuchs, 1983). 
But "B is shorter than A", for example, presupposes the shortness of A 
and В only relative to an SRP whose position is perhaps very high in 
absolute terms (by this, Clark (1971) claims that "Jets are slower than 
rockets" does not presuppose that jets and rockets are slow. "This 
sentence simply presupposes that jets and rockets are slow relative to 
some very high standard of speed, the secondary reference point", 
P.511). 
Three points should be made with respect to this analysis: First, 
unmarked as well as marked comparatives are analyzed as normrelated. 
This is exactly opposed to Bierwisch (1984; Bierwisch et al., 1984) who 
assumes that comparative expressions are never normrelated. According 
to Bierwisch's theory of gradation the standard of comparison у takes 
either the value of the complement of the comparative construction 
(which coincides with Clark's TRP) or, if such a complement is not 
explicitly given (e.g. "A is big"), the value of a contextually defined 
"tallness" 
-a "shortness" 
-b 
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norm N. In Clark's conception, in contrast, these two standards of 
comparison are not mutually exclusive. Rather, even if a value of ^  is 
explicitly defined - as in a full comparative construction - the 
construction can still be normrelated with respect to a secondary 
reference point. 
Second, since unmarked as well as marked comparatives are viewed 
as normrelated, normrelatedness cannot be responsible for the typical 
markedness effects (cf. Fuchs, 1983). However, according to Clark's 
analysis unmarked comparatives denote distance in positive direction 
from the primary as well as the secondary reference point whereas 
marked comparatives denote distance in positive direction from the 
primary reference point, but in negative direction from the secondary 
reference point (cf. Clark et al., 1973, p.336f). This closely 
resembles Bierwisch's analysis, with extents of objects always 
referring to positive direction from the zero point upwards, and with 
differences between extents allowing for both directions ('toward' and 
'away from' zero), depending on the polarity of the comparative. But 
instead of differing directionality of differences, Clark's analysis 
assumes the possibility of splitting a dimension into subdimensions. 
Differences between unmarked and marked adjectives are then captured by 
the relation between the directionality of the overall dimension and 
the directionality of the corresponding subdimension. 
Finally, it is important to note that, at least according to 
Clark's analysis, the cognitive structure underlying locatives as above 
and below differs from comparatives in that locatives have no such 
implicit standard. That is, above and below locate two objects only 
with respect to one another, but not with respect to some implicit 
secondary reference point in space. Secondary reference points seem 
only to play a role with attributes which are inherent to objects. This 
is further reflected by the fact that for locatives there are no 
linguistic criteria like neutralizing contexts for distinguishing the 
unmarked and the marked member. 
The comparison and response stages for comparatives are assumed to 
work in the same way as in verification tasks with locatives, except 
for a slight change in the comparison stage which stems from a 
different conception of the contingent coding scheme in the 
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sentence-first case. Whereas for locatives it is assumed that a picture 
is coded contingent on a preceding sentence with respect to the 
preposition of the sentence (Clark et al. 1973, p.332f; Clark & Chase, 
1972, p.478ff), the same authors assume that for comparatives the 
picture is coded contingent on a preceding sentence with respect to the 
topic of the comparative sentence (usually the subject term of the 
sentence). For the comparison stage in the sentence first case this 
means that with "contingeny of prepositions" there has to be a test on 
subject identity in sentence and picture representation, whereas with 
"contingency with respect to the topic" there has to be a test on 
identity of prepositions in the first step of the comparison process. 
In none of Clark's articles is a reason given for this difference in 
the models (for a related critique see Trabasso, 1973). But in 
principle, these two versions of coding a picture contingent on a 
preceding sentence can be looked upon as notational variants. Both 
versions lead to the same predictions for verification tasks as long as 
it is assumed that finding a mismatch and changing the truth-index is 
the only source for additional time consumption in the comparison 
stage. 
That is, for comparatives as well as locatives there should be 
main effects of markedness, of truth value and of negation for the 
sentence first case. For the picture-first case there should be an 
interaction of markedness and truth-value. However, later it will be 
shown that for the case of relative judgment, the two different 
versions of contingent coding lead to different predictions. 
Clark et al. (1973, p.347) report data for the sentence-first case 
which confirm the corresponding predictions. In this experiment 
subjects had to verify sentences like "blue line is longer than red 
line" against corresponding pictures of two lines differing in length. 
But they do not report data for the picture-first case. 
26 
С/ 
о 
ш 
н 
< 
•J 
true false 
Fig. 5: Latencies to verify 'A is longer/çhorter 
than B" as true or false when subjects attend 
to the sentence first, (see Clark et al., 1973, 
p.347) 
Fortunately Flores d'Arcáis (1974, Exp. 2 and 3) compared the 
sentence-first and the picture-first situation for comparative 
sentences. It turned out that in both situations there were main 
effects of the markedness of the comparatives and truth-value (negation 
wasn't realized in these experiments), but in neither condition a 
truth-value by markedness interaction appeared. This means that order 
of presentation of picture and sentence had no influence on the latency 
patterns. This result stands in clear contradiction to the Clark & 
Chase model. 
Flores d'Arcáis tried to explain this result by suggesting that, 
in the case of comparatives, pictures are always coded according to the 
default principle, i.e. in unmarked terms. But with this explanation 
one would expect an interaction of truth-value and markedness for both 
orders of presentation. The Clarkian coding principles, in contrast, 
would suggest that in both presentation conditions the picture is coded 
contingent on the sentence. For the picture-first condition that can 
only be the case if the subject does not begin processing the picture 
until he has heard the sentence. But that would be a very uneconomical 
and implausible strategy, especially because the results for locative 
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sentences never show such a strategy. So, is there a more plausible 
interpretation of the results obtained by Flores d'Arcáis? 
It is clear that in the picture-first experiment of Flores 
d'Arcais (1974) subjects did not code the picture in unmarked terms, 
i.e. they did not use the default coding principle proposed for 
locatives. However, by assuming a "topic neutral coding" for the 
picture-first case one can account for the data. For a picture of a 
left triangle being bigger than a right triangle, for example, such a 
coding could take a form like "the left is the bigger one", "the right 
is the smaller one". The comparison procedure then encompasses only two 
steps. First, find the subproposition of the picture code which 
comprises the subject term of the sentence. Second, test whether the 
comparatives in the sentence and the subproposition of the picture code 
match. If they do, give response "true"; if they do not, give response 
"false". This holds irrespective of whether the sentence contains an 
unmarked or a marked comparative. 
Under the additional assumption that changing the truth index in 
step 2 of the comparison process is time consuming, there should be a 
main effect of truth value (attributable to the comparison process) and 
a main effect of markedness (attributable to the sentence encoding 
stage) for the picture-first case. This contradicts the predictions 
generated by the "locative" model for the picture-first case, but fits 
well with the results of Flores d'Arcais (1974). 
By means of such a coding, subjects would keep track of the fact 
that it is not yet known which figure is going to be the topic of 
comparison at the moment that picture encoding starts. 
Of course, this assumption raises the question why such a topic 
neutral coding strategy was used in the experiment of Flores d'Arcais, 
whereas in the experiments of Clark & Chase with locatives a coding of 
the relative location in unmarked terms was the preferred coding. There 
are two plausible answers to this question, the first one referring to 
a difference in the experimental situations, the second one referring 
to a difference in the cognitive structure of comparative and locative 
dimensions. 
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With respect to the experimental situations it is important to 
note that in the Clark & Chase experiments picture and sentence were 
presented simultaneously, the subjects being instructed to 'attend to 
the picture before reading the sentence". In contrast, in the Flores 
d'Arcáis experiment subjects were first presented with the picture for 
two seconds, and then heard the comparative sentence. That is, in the 
first case subjects had to encode the picture under time pressure, 
perhaps then adopting the default coding in unmarked terms, whereas in 
the latter case subjects were given two seconds to encode the picture. 
The "topic neutral coding", then, could just be the result of an 
optimal preparation strategy which is enabled by the way of stimulus 
presentation. 
The difference between the results of Flores d'Arcáis and Clark & 
Chase could, furthermore, be due to different default coding strategies 
for locatives and comparatives. It has been pointed out above that, 
according to Clark's analysis, the dimensions underlying comparisons 
can be split up into subdimensions according to some implicit standard 
or secondary reference point, whereas this should not hold for 
locatives. The possibility of splitting up comparative dimensions into 
subdimensions could induce the topic neutral coding described above. 
For locatives such an organization of the underlying dimension is 
not assumed to hold. However, in the case of locatives like above and 
below the spatial arrangement of the objects always coincides with the 
judgmental dimension. This may induce a perceptual strategy by which 
the picture is scanned from top to bottom, thus yielding a coding of 
the relative location of the two objects in unmarked terms. In fact, 
Clark & Chase (1972, Experiment 3) report an experiment which is 
consistent with this point of view. In this experiment subjects 
verified sentences like 'star is above plus" against corresponding 
pictures under three different instructions, namely (1) 'to attend to 
the picture as a whole before reading the sentence", (2) "to attend to 
the top figure of the picture before reading the sentence", and (3) "to 
attend to the bottom figure of the picture before reading the 
sentence". Under the first two instructions the typical truth value by 
markedness interaction as predicted under the assumptions of default 
coding in unmarked terms showed up, whereas the pattern of results 
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under the third instruction showed a truth value by markedness 
interaction which was compatible with the assumption of coding the 
relative locations in marked terms. 
On the basis of the results of the experiments of Flores d'Arcáis 
and Clark & Chase it is impossible, however, to decide whether the 
topic neutral coding of comparisons has the status of a default coding 
strategy which only holds for comparatives - irrespective of the 
experimental situation - or whether it has the status of an additional 
coding strategy which can overrule the default coding strategy if the 
experimental situation allows for an optimal preparation strategy. 
In order to test the theoretical status of these strategies for 
the picture-first case, an experiment was conducted in which subjects 
had to verify comparative sentences like "triangle is bigger than 
circle" against corresponding pictures. The experiment paralleled as 
closely as possible the corresponding picture-first verification 
experiments with locative sentences as reported in Clark & Chase (1972, 
1974). If the default coding principle of a preferred picture coding in 
unmarked terms holds for comparatives just as well as for locatives, as 
suggested by Clark, the same truth value by markedness interaction as 
in the locative experiments should show up. If, however, this 
interaction does not show up for the case of comparatives, the 
assumption of different default coding strategies for comparatives and 
locatives gains substantial support. 
Before proceeding to this experiment let us have a short look at 
the sentence-first case. It will be assumed that if a preceding 
linguistic input defines the topic, the subject will make use of this 
information by coding the relation in the picture from the point of 
view of the topic. So, in the case of a comparative sentence preceding 
the picture the subject will code the picture in a manner parallel to 
encoding principle (1) proposed by Clark for the case of a preceding 
locative sentence, i.e. contingent on a preceding sentence. 
Just as with the locative model, then, picture and sentence code 
contain the same topic (and TRP). A simple test on match/mismatch of 
comparatives in the two codes gives the correct true- or 
false-response. 
30 
Apart from the model of Clark & Chase, an alternative model has 
been developed by Carpenter & Just (1975). Just like Clark's model, it 
makes the assumption that picture and sentence are to be coded into a 
propositional format and that then these codes are matched against each 
other. Although this model has only been tested experimentally for the 
sentence-first case, Singer (1979) showed that this model can be 
expanded in such a way that it also accounts for the picture-first 
case, and that it leads to the same predictions as the Clark & Chase 
models. 
For a further discussion and comparison of these models see 
Carpenter & Just (1976), Catlin (, Jones (1976), Tannenhaus, Carroll & 
Bever (1978), and Shoben (1978). 
Finally, three publications should be mentioned which examine the 
possibility of the development of different strategies for verification 
tasks. For the sentence-first case MacLeod, Hunt & Mathews (1978) and 
Mathews, Hunt & MacLeod (1980) showed by means of a double reaction 
task (sentence encoding time and verification time measured separately) 
that there are two general strategies. With short sentence reading 
times, subjects adopt a "linguistic" strategy which leads to effects of 
markedness, truth value, and negation in the verification times. With 
long reading times, subjects tend to use a "pictorial" strategy, which 
leads only to an effect of truth value in the verification times. 
Finally, Kroll & Corrigan (1981) showed that with a larger set of 
possible pictures the tendency to act in accordance with the linguistic 
strategy is strengthened. 
2.1 Experiment 1: Verification of comparative sentences against 
pictures 
In this experiment subjects had to judge whether sentences like "circle 
is bigger than triangle' are true or false descriptions of 
simultaneously displayed pictures. As in the corresponding experiments 
of Clark & Chase (1972, 1974) subjects were instructed to attend to the 
picture first and then to read the sentence. 
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If the perceptual comparisons are coded in unmarked terms, as 
assumed by Clark's default principle, the typical truth value by 
markedness interaction as found with picture first-verifications with 
the locatives above• below should show up. In contrast, if subjects use 
a topic neutral coding strategy there should be no such interaction. 
2.1.1 Materials 
Each picture consisted of an equilateral triangle and a circle with 
either the triangle standing above the circle or the circle standing 
above the triangle. Furthermore, the figure in upper position could be 
bigger or smaller than the figure in lower position (triangles having a 
side length and circles a diameter of either 3 cm or 1.5cm). The full 
combination of these two binary factors yields four picture types. 
There were also four sentence types. The sentence gave either a correct 
or an incorrect description of the picture, making use of either the 
unmarked or the marked comparative. The sentences were in Dutch, using 
the Dutch words "driehoek" (triangle), "cirkel" (circle), "groter dan" 
(bigger than) and 'kleiner dan" (smaller than). 
The combination of these four sentence types with the four picture 
types yields 16 trial types. Each of these 16 trial types was realized 
5 times in the experiment. So each subject received a total of 80 
trials (plus a block of 16 practice trials at the beginning of the 
experimental session). 
2.1.2 Procedure 
The experiment was run under control of a PDP 11/23 computer. The 
pictures and sentences were presented on an electronic display. 
Pictures and corresponding sentences were displayed simultaneously, 
with the pictures positioned on the left half of the display and the 
sentences on the right half. As in the corresponding experiments of 
Clark & Chase (1972) the visual angle between the center of the picture 
and the beginning of the sentence was about 10 degrees. Furthermore, as 
in the corresponding experiments of Clark & Chase subjects were 
instructed to attend to the picture first, then to read the sentence 
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and then to indicate whether the sentence gave a true or false 
description of the picture by pressing corresponding pushbuttons. They 
were instructed to perform this sequence as fast as possible, while at 
the same time avoiding errors. 
The time course of a single trial was as follows. First, a picture 
with a corresponding sentence appeared on the screen. At the same time 
a computer internal millisecond clock was started. The subject had to 
look at the picture, to read the sentence and to indicate whether the 
sentence gave a true or false description of the picture by pressing a 
corresponding pushbutton. The clock was stopped by the button press. 
160 msec after pressing a button picture and sentence disappeared. 
Another 2 sec later the next picture with a corresponding sentence was 
presented. If the subject did not react within 6 sec after onset of the 
display, the display was blanked and the trial was counted as an 
incorrect response. 
The subjects were seated in a dimly lit sound-proof room about .70 
m from the display on which the pictures and the sentences were 
presented. Two pushbuttons for giving the response were installed in 
front of the subject. Half of the subjects had to give a 
"true"-response by pressing the left pushbutton and a "false'-response 
by pressing the right pushbutton. For the other half of the subjects 
the assignment of pushbuttons to responses was reversed. 
For each subject a new random order of the 80 trials was 
constructed. To prevent occurrence of the same trial type in direct 
succession the 80 trials were devided into five lists of 16 trials such 
that in each list each trial type occurred only once. Then, for each 
subject a random order of the 16 trials in each list was determined. 
Subsequently, random orders of the five randomized lists of each 
subject were determined under the restriction that at the transition 
between two lists no replication of the same trial type occurred. 
22 subjects participated in the experiment. All subjects were 
students at the University of Nijmegen and all of them were native 
speakers of Dutch. They were paid Dfl 8.50 for participation in the 
experiment. 
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2.1.3 Results 
First, the means of the reaction times (RTs) for correct responses over 
replications of the same trial type were calculated for each subject. 
These mean RTs were analyzed using an analysis of variance with the 
factors subjects, position of figures in the picture (triangle above 
circle vs circle above triangle), position of the bigger figure in the 
picture (bigger figure being in upper position vs in lower position), 
comparative in the sentence (unmarked, i.e. "groter" vs marked, i.e. 
"kleiner"), and truth value of the sentence with respect to the picture 
(true vs false). 
In this analysis there was neither a main effect of the factor 
"figure position" (triangle above circle vs circle above triangle) nor 
a significant interaction of this factor with any of the other factors. 
So in reporting the results this factor will not be considered. 
Figure 6a gives the mean RTs with respect to the factors "position 
of the bigger figure", "comparative type" and "truth value". 
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Fig. 6a: Latencies to verify "A is bigger than B" (solid lines). 
and "B is smaller than A" (broken lines) as true or false 
for pictures with the bigger figure in upper position 
(left panel), and for pictures with the bigger figure in 
lower position (right panel). 
The analysis of variance gives significant main effects for 
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•comparative type" (RT(groter) = 2171 msec, RT(kleiner) = 2303 msec, 
РП.гі) = 11.9, MSe = 128533, ρ = .0024) and for "truth value" 
(RT(true) = 2165 msec, RT(false) = 2309 msec, F(1,21) = 28.1, MSe = 
65233, ρ < .0005; here and subsequently MSe represents the mean sqare 
error of the corresponding F-ratios). In addition, there is a 
significant interaction of comparative type and truth value (F(1,21) = 
26.3, ρ < .0005). These results are consistent with the predictions of 
the Clarkian picture-first model. 
However, inspection of Figure 6a reveals that this pattern only 
holds for the case where the bigger figure stands in upper position 
(left panel of Figure 6a), whereas the pattern for the case of the 
smaller figure standing in upper position (right panel of Figure 6a) is 
more consistent with the predictions of the Clarkian sentence-first 
model (see Figure 3 above). This is reflected in a significant three 
way interaction of "position of the bigger figure" by "comparative 
type" by "truth value" ( F(1(21) = 13.8, MSe = 111809, ρ = .0013). 
2.1.4. Discussion 
The results of the present experiment are not consistent with the 
assumption of a default coding of the perceptual comparison in unmarked 
terms (i.e. in terms of the relation "bigger"). Otherwise the truth 
value by markedness interaction should have shown up independent of the 
position of the bigger figure. However, the results are also not 
consistent with the assumption of a topic neutral coding of the 
perceptual comparison; otherwise there should have been no markedness 
by truth value interaction at all. Finally the results cannot be 
explained by assuming that the subjects always code the picture from 
top to bottom, irrespective of the position of the bigger figure. In 
this case, the markedness by truth value interaction found for the case 
of the bigger figure being in upper position, should have been 
precisely reversed for the smaller figure being in upper position. 
However, there is a simple and plausible explanation for the 
observed pattern of results. Let us assume that there are two 
preferences influencing the perceptual coding simultaneously. Namely a 
preference to code the perceptual comparison from the top figure 
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downwards, and a preference to code it from the point of view of the 
bigger figure. If the bigger figure is in upper position both 
preferences will coincide, yielding exclusively perceptual codings in 
unmarked terms. If the bigger figure is in lower position, however, the 
two preferences are in conflict. The subjects might then code the 
picture according to a top-down strategy in about 50*4 of the cases and 
from the point of view of the bigger figure in the other 50*4 of the 
cases. The latter strategy would yield the truth value by markedness 
interaction as predicted by the Clarkian default coding principle 
whereas the first strategy should yield precisely the reversal of this 
interaction. Taken together, then, the interactions should cancel out. 
For the case of the picture-first verification experiments with 
the locatives above vs below, however, only the top-down strategy 
should play a role since the figures used (star, plus) were about equal 
in size. 
However, within the above argumentation it is not yet clear 
whether the coding strategies vary within subjects or between subjects. 
Dividing the subjects into groups according to their individual pattern 
of RTs can give an answer to this question. Such a grouping gives the 
following picture. Eight of the 22 subjects show the truth value by 
markedness interaction to be expected under the assumptions of the 
Clarkian picture-first model, irrespective of the position of the 
bigger figure. The mean RTs over these subjects are given in Figure 6b. 
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Fig. 6b: Latencies to verify "A is bigger th^n B' (solid lines), 
and 'B is smaller than A" (broken lines) as true or 
false for pictures with the bigger figure in upper position 
(left panel), and with the bigger figure in lower position 
(right panel). Means over 8 subjects who exclusively coded 
the picture from the point of view of the bigger figure. 
For ten subjects this truth value by markedness interaction only shows 
up if the bigger figure is in upper position. If the bigger figure is 
in lower position this interaction vanishes as can be seen in Figure 
6c. 
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Fig. 6c: Latencies to verify "A is bigger than B" (solid lines). 
and "B is smaller than A' (broken lines) as true or false 
for pictures with the bigger figure in upper position 
(left panel), or in lower position (right panel). Means 
over 10 subjects who used two different coding preferences. 
The remaining four subjects are not classifiable into one of these 
subgroups. So there seems to be one group of subjects who exclusively 
prefer perceptual coding in unmarked terms on the relevant dimension of 
size, and one group of subjects who use the top-down coding strategy in 
about 50% of the cases and the big-to-small coding strategy in the 
other 50\ of the trials. There are no subjects who exclusively rely on 
a top-down coding strategy. 
By this, nothing is said about the origin of these perceptual 
coding preferences. They can be regarded as induced by the structure of 
P-space, as suggested by Clark (1972, 1973a, see also Clark et al. 
1973), or they could just be a reflection of socio-cultural habits 
(e.g., reading habits etc). Finally, the clear markedness effect 
supports the comprehension hypothesis. 
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2.2 General discussion of the verification model 
Clark's (1973a) correlation hypothesis assumes a parallelism between 
the structure of P-space and L-space. In particular, it is assumed that 
the asymmetries of the front-back and up-down directions in P-space are 
reflected by corresponding unmarked-marked asymmetries in pairs of 
antonymous adjectives and locatives directly (or indirectly) referring 
to these directions. 
Furthermore, the asymmetry of these directions in P-space should 
be reflected in preferences for coding perceptual comparison and 
relative location in unmarked terms over coding them in marked terms. 
The typical experimental test of this assumption is the picture-first 
verification task. The verification latencies obtained by Clark and 
others in such experiments support the notion of unmarked 
representations of corresponding pictures. 
It is important to stress that Clark's argumentation assumes that 
asymmetries of P-space influence perceptual encoding only within the 
relevant judgmental dimension; that is, if other influences are absent, 
perceptual comparisons etc. are always coded in unmarked terms of the 
relevant dimension. If, for example, above/below is the relevant 
dimension, a picture will be preferably coded in terms of above : if 
size is the relevant dimension, a picture will be preferably coded in 
terms of bigger, etc. 
But the experiment reported above showed that it is not only the 
asymmetry of the relevant judgmental dimension which influences coding. 
Asymmetries in other dimensions can also influence the coding, such as 
the physical arrangement of objects along the top-down dimension, 
though this dimension might be irrelevant to the judgment to be given. 
A picture can then be coded in the "unpreferred" marked form. As shown 
above in the discussion of Experiment 1, such effects could not show up 
in the typical verification experiments with locative sentences. 
So, the Clarkian model seems to be too restrictive in its 
assumption of preferred coding in unmarked terms on the relevant 
judgmental dimension. Coding of a picture can be influenced by a number 
of coding preferences on different dimensions, and it is not 
necessarily the coding preference holding for the task-relevant 
dimension which finally determines the type of code generated. 
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Two such possible preferences have been mentioned here, though 
there might be a number of other preferences interacting with each 
other as well, thus forming some kind of "coding preference network". 
The results of Experiment 1 further show that coding preferences on the 
relevant judgmental dimension have a stronger influence on perceptual 
coding than preferences on an irrelevant dimension. In particular, none 
of the subjects showed a pattern which is congruent with the notion of 
exclusively coding the pictures according to preferences on the 
irrelevant dimension. 
Furthermore, it is plausible that the effects of such a coding 
preference network are only present if the picture has to be encoded 
under time pressure. If the subject is given the opportunity to apply 
an optimal preparation strategy, as in the experiments of Flores 
d'Arcais (1974), they might use a topic neutral strategy. It remains an 
open question, however, whether such a strategy is primarily enabled by 
dimensions having some kind of SRP, i.e. some kind of organization into 
subdimensions, or whether this also holds for dimensions not showing 
such an organization, like the dimensions underlying locatives. 
Finally, the above experiment only presents results on the interplay of 
different coding preferences for the case that other influences, like a 
preceding linguistic input which defines the topic, are absent. It is 
unclear in how far these influences can also interact with 
simultaneously existing coding preferences, or whether these influences 
just overrule coding preferences. 
Under the latter assumption the situation for the coding 
preferences on the top/down and the big/small dimension can be sketched 
as follows: if the topic is already known or if there is a permanent 
and stable reference point, the picture will be coded according to 
Clark's principles (1) or (2) respectively. If neither of the two 
principles is applied, however, the above mentioned coding preferences 
come into play. But these preferences are not preferences for a certain 
type of resulting mental representation (in particular a preference for 
a representation in unmarked terms) as assumed by Clark. Rather, they 
lead to the selection of one of the two presented objects as "starting 
point" for the perceptual coding, i.e. they induce a perceptual coding 
of the picture from the point of view of one of the objects. This can, 
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but need not, result in a representation in unmarked terms. There are 
two basic possibilities given the two coding preferences mentioned in 
the discussion of Experiment 1. First, the picture can be structured 
such that only one of the coding preferences plays a role (e.g. the 
Clarkian verification tasks with the locatives above. below). Second, 
if both coding preferences play a role two subcases have to be 
distinguished. Both coding preferences can favour coding of the picture 
from the same point of view, as it was the case in Experiment 1 for 
pictures with the bigger figure being in upper position. Or the two 
coding preferences can be conflicting, i.e. favoring coding of the 
picture from two different points of view. Depending on the weight or 
importance of each of these coding preferences, the influence of the 
resulting codes on verification latency will partly or completely 
cancel out. 
The data of Experiment 1 suggest that the weight of the coding 
preference on the relevant judgmental dimension is higher than the 
weight of the coding preferences on irrelevant dimensions. But this 
finding is not at all surprising since subjects were aware of the fact 
that the sentences to be verified dealt with size relations between the 
two figures. Rather, it is surprising that even in this situation 
preferences other than on the relevant judgmental dimension clearly 
play a role. The role of different competing preferences will be even 
stronger if different perceptual attributes are simultaneously possible 
relevant topics, so that the listener cannot determine in advance which 
aspects of a perceptual event to examine (cf. Anderson, 1976; Miller & 
Johnson-Laird, 1976, for a discussion of this aspect of verification 
tasks). 
The most important points with respect to the coding preferences 
can be summarized as follows. It is not a certain kind of mental 
representation that is preferred, but a building up of a mental 
representation from the point of view of one of the presented objects. 
That is, it is not that 'people prefer certain codings or 
interpretations of pictures to others" (Clark et al. 1973, p. 315), but 
rather that people prefer to interpret pictures from a certain point of 
view. Second, the preference for such a point of view need not be a 
preference on the same dimension on which the picture is coded. 
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It still remains an open question whether these preferences for 
interpreting and coding pictures from a certain point of view really 
reflect asymmetries of corresponding dimensions in F-space. Let us just 
make a few remarks with respect to two sets of data. 
In Clark & Chase (1972, Exp. 3) clear evidence is presented in 
favour of the assumption that people code pictures of, for example, a 
star above a plus, from top to bottom. It is important to note that 
this assumed direction of coding is not the positive direction of the 
vertical dimension (which extends from zero upwards in positive 
direction according to Clark's (1973a) analysis of P-space). 
In Clark et al. (1973) an experiment is reported in which subjects 
had to judge which of two simultaneously displayed lines was the longer 
or the shorter one. Reaction time systematically covaried with the 
length of the shorter line, but not with the length of the longer line. 
Clark et al. (1973, p. 341) interpret this result as evidence "that 
people scan a dimension outwards from the primary reference point of 
that dimension to locate the proximal object. The proximal object (say, 
B) then becomes a secondary reference point, and the position of the 
other object (say, A) is established with respect to this secondary 
reference point." The important point is that in this case it is 
assumed that perceptual coding processes in fact proceed in the 
preferred positive direction of the underlying dimension (i.e. from 
zero length outwards), whereas for locatives the coding processes are 
assumed to proceed in negative direction. 
This shows that it is not just asymmetries of P-space which 
determine the direction of picture encoding, but that the conditions 
determining picture encoding are organized in more complex ways. So, 
one and the same perceptual attribute might influence perceptual coding 
in different ways. For example, in coding two figures with respect to 
their relative size, the relation between the two figures was 
preferably interpreted from the point of view of the bigger figure. 
However, for coding the same picture as to the relative spatial 
locations of the two figures, there is most probably a tendency to 
interpret the picture from the point of view of the smaller figure; the 
smaller figure will be regarded as the object to be located relative to 
the bigger, i.e. immobile and stable object (see Clark & Chase (1974) 
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for results pointing in this direction). 
Finally, all the influences on perceptual coding discussed thus 
far, can be overruled in the case that the subject does not yet know 
which object is going to be the topic, and if he is not under time 
pressure during the encoding of the picture. In this case the subject 
will use the optimal preparation strategy described above. That is, he 
makes constructive use of the fact that the topic is not yet known at 
the moment that picture encoding starts. 
The fourth picture encoding principle proposed by Clark et al. 
(1973) is not considered in the present reformulation of the encoding 
principles. With respect to this principle, the reader is referred to 
the discussion of congruity effects in the production of simple 
descriptions (Chapter 5) and to the corresponding experiments reported 
in Chapter 6. 
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3. On naming comparative relations 
This chapter gives an outline of a model for the production of 
descriptions of the kinds of pictures usually used in picture-sentence 
verification tasks. There are three sources available in the literature 
for the construction of such a model. First, there are the verification 
models and their modifications proposed above which one can try to 
extrapolate to a production model. Second, Clark & Chase (1974) give an 
informal proposal as to what such an extrapolated model might look 
like. Third, reference will be made to general models of sentence 
production, in particular to the framework proposed in Levelt (1983a,b) 
and Bock (1962). 
Clark & Chase (1974) propose a two-stage model. In stage 1 a 
perceptual code is constructed from the sensory information given in 
the picture. The construction of this perceptual code is guided by the 
same principles as in the construction of perceptual codes in 
verification tasks. In stage 2 a description is constructed on the 
basis of the output of stage 1. 
This very general model can be integrated with the models of 
sentence production mentioned above. By incorporating the Clark & Chase 
model into the framework of a general sentence production model, the 
internal structure of the two stages proposed by Clark & Chase becomes 
evident. 
According to Levelt (1983a,b) the starting point for sentence 
production is message construction, that is the generation, ordering, 
retrieving and delivering of information and intentions for expression. 
For the case of simple descriptions of pictures the input for the 
message construction comes from the perception of the picture. This 
input is processed by what Bock (1982) calls 'activities in the 
referential arena". By means of these processes a relational structure 
is built up that can be described as a proposition or a set of 
propositions that structure and segment nonlinguistic visual patterns 
(cf. Bock 1982, p. 4). Bock calls this representation an 'interfacing 
representation" to stress its "cognitive-to-linguistic translation 
function' (op cit., p.4).It will be assumed that the format of 
representation is prepositional, in order to keep the model compatible 
with the verification models. 
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On the basis of the internal abstract representation of the 
picture built up in the referential arena, the lexical items required 
to convey the intended meaning have to be accesssed. According to 
recent theories (Kempen & Huijbers, 1983; Levelt, 1983a; Levelt & 
Haassen, 1981) this lexicalization stage is regarded as consisting of 
two separate processes. First, a so-called lemma has to be retrieved. A 
lemma is conceived of as a phonologically unspecified lexical item 
which is specified with respect to syntactic category, semantic 
features and syntactic functional properties. Second, the phonological 
shape of the lemma has to be retrieved. The retrieval of the 
phonological shape of the lemma is not an all-or-none phenomenon, as is 
shown by tip-of-the-tongue failures (e.g. Brown & McNeill, 1966). 
In connection with models of sentence production it is important 
to stress that only the phonological shape of the first word of an 
utterance has to be retrieved before starting the utterance. So, for 
example, Lindsley (1975, 1976) showed that in describing simple 
actor-action pictures by an S-V-phrase, enlarging the set of possible 
actors increases speech-onset latency, whereas enlarging the set of 
possible actions (which occur in second position in the utterance) does 
not change speech-onset latency; i.e., retrieving the articulatory form 
of the first word of an utterance is a main determinant for 
speech-onset latency (for a similar argument see Levelt & Maassen, 
1981, Exp. 3). This finding had considerable influence on the 
construction of the experimental task used in Chapters 4 and 6 as will 
be discussed later on. 
The output of the retrieval of the phonological shape consists of 
a relatively abstract phonological code. This code is translated in the 
next step into an articulatory motor program which in turn guides 
articulation. 
In summary then, we have a 6-step model for the generation of 
simple descriptions: (1) perception of the picture, (2) building up a 
conceptual representation of the picture, (3) retrieval of the 
corresponding lemmas, (4) retrieval of the corresponding phonological 
shapes, (5) translation of the phonological shape into an articulatory 
motor program, and (6) articulation of the description. In this 
formulation the steps which are responsible for the generation of a 
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syntactic frame etc. are left out. As will become clear later on, this 
is the case because the task for the subjects in the experiments to be 
reported was to name the relation between two stimuli; that is, they 
did not give sentential descriptions. 
So far, then, a framework of a model for the naming of the 
relation between two perceptually presented objects has been developed. 
Now the next phase is to set up an experimental task that gives the 
possibility to test the role of semantic markedness in language 
production. This can be achieved by changing the typical verification 
task into a production task. 
It was decided to use speech onset latency measured from the onset 
of the picture to be described to the onset of the description as the 
dependent variable, just like verification times are used as a 
dependent variable in the verification paradigm. 
Initially one could think of the following experimental procedure: 
the subject is presented a picture of two figures differing in size, 
and is asked to give a description of this picture by means of a 
comparative sentence. As dependent variable the time from onset of the 
picture to the onset of the description is measured. 
But this situation does not really seem appropriate for our 
purpose, that is for the comparison of onset latencies for descriptions 
with an unmarked vs a marked comparative. Results of Flores d'Arcáis 
(1974, Exp.5) and Clark & Chase (1974, Exp. 1) show that in the vast 
majority of instances speakers have a strong tendency to give free 
descriptions of pictures in unmarked terms. So with the task proposed 
above one would most propably lose the possibility to compare the onset 
latencies for unmarked and marked descriptions. 
By consequence, unmarked and marked descriptions must be induced 
by an experimental manipulation. In our experimental procedure this is 
accomplished by always having one of the two figures of a picture 
marked by a cross. Subjects are instructed to give descriptions using 
comparative sentences which start with the figure marked by the cross. 
Nevertheless there still remains a problem with the use of onset 
latency as the dependent variable. The subject can start the 
description by naming the figure marked by the cross before making a 
decision in speech planning on the comparative to be used (cf. Levelt & 
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Maassen, 1981; Lindsley, 1975, 1976; and above). Measuring onset 
latencies in the paradigm proposed above would then only reflect 
lexicalization difficulty for the first word of the description; 
potential markedness effects will not show up in the onset latencies. 
Therefore, the required descriptions were reduced to naming the 
relation between the figure marked by the cross and the other figure of 
the picture by mentioning the corresponding comparatives. That is, 
subjects were instructed to indicate as fast as possible by the vocal 
responses 'bigger* and 'smaller' the relation between the figures of 
the display from the point of view of the figure marked by the cross. 
So, schematically we obtain the following task: 
Δ Δ 
RT 
'bigger' 
'smaller' 
Nevertheless with this task one still misses an important feature of 
the verification studies. There is no control on whether the pictures 
are coded by the default picture coding principle or according to some 
other principle. In verification tasks picture encoding was manipulated 
by the order of presentation of picture and sentence. For the relation 
naming task a similar manipulation can be introduced by two different 
modes of picture presentation. 
Let us assume that the subject is presented with a picture first, 
and only after a certain amount of time the cross indicating the topic 
of comparison appears. In this case the subject will code the picture 
according to the topic neutral coding principle. Only after the cross 
has appeared can the subject identify the topic of comparison. This 
should parallel the situation in picture-first verification studies 
which first present the subject with the picture for some time and then 
with the corresponding sentence (e.g. Flores d'Arcáis, 1974). 
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However, if at first only the cross is presented to indicate the 
position where the topic figure of the comparison is going to appear, 
and some time later the two figures are added to the display, the 
subject will make use of his knowledge about which figure is going to 
become the topic by coding the picture from the point of view of the 
topic. This should parallel the situation of the sentence-first 
verification studies. 
These conditions of presentation will from now on be referred to 
as the POST- (marking cross appears after the figures) and PRE-
(marking cross appears before the figures) conditions, respectively. 
In Chapter 2 the picture coding principles as proposed in the 
Clark & Chase models were discussed. In particular, the general notion 
of default coding in unmarked terms was split up into a set of possible 
coding strategies. First, it was shown that it is not preferences for 
certain mental representations but rather preferences for coding the 
picture from the point of view of one of the objects. The preferences 
for determining this point of view need not necessarily be preferences 
on the dimension on which the picture is encoded. Second it was argued 
that an optimal preparation strategy delivering a topic neutral coding 
of the picture will be applied if perceptual coding is not performed 
under time pressure. The crucial evidence for deciding which of these 
different coding strategies had been applied was the occurrence of an 
interaction of markedness with truth value in the picture first case. 
Now, in the relation naming task truth value cannot be realized as an 
independent experimental variable. Nevertheless the assumption of 
default coding in unmarked terms on the relevant dimension and the 
assumption of a topic neutral coding also lead to different predictions 
for the naming task, as will be discussed now. 
As a basic premise it will be assumed that the prepositional 
picture code has to be brought into such a form that the relation 
expressed in the code can be directly mapped onto the lemma necessary 
for description, i.e. the relation between the two figures from the 
point of view of the topic figure must be captured in the 
representation. This assumption parallels the principle of congruence 
assumed by Clark (1973b) for verification tasks (and the so-called 
message-level activity of ordering information for expression, cf. 
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Levelt 19B3b). 
With the Clarkian picture coding principles, i.e. the default 
unnarked coding strategy, the subjects should go through the following 
processing steps in the POST-condition. First the two figures presented 
have to be perceived. Then they are coded into a prepositional format 
according to the Clarkian default principle, because there are no other 
influences present (stable reference point, preceding linguistic input 
defining the topic of comparison). Now the cross marking one of the two 
figures appears and the subject has to test whether the figure marked 
by the cross is identical to the topic of the representation of the 
pictorial comparison. This is only the case if the cross marks the 
bigger one of the two figures, so that the corresponding lemma and 
phonological shape for the correct answer bigger can be immediately 
retrieved on the basis of the picture code. If the cross marks the 
smaller of the two figures, the topic of the picture representation and 
the figure marked as topic will mismatch, and the picture code has to 
be receded to its converse (i.e. [A bigger B] — > [B smaller A]). On 
the basis of this picture code the correct lemma and phonological shape 
for the answer to be given ('smaller') can be retrieved. So it is to be 
expected that naming latencies with bigger will be faster than naming 
latencies with smaller because of the receding step necessary in the 
latter case. 
However, such a difference could also be due to a more time 
consuming lexicalization process for marked than for unmarked 
comparatives. But if the differences between unmarked and marked 
responses are only due to receding processes they should vanish in the 
PRE-condition. In the PRE-condition the subject first identifies the 
position where the topic of comparison will appear. When the figures 
are added to the display the subject will code the picture from the 
viewpoint of the topic of comparison (just as with a preceding sentence 
in verification tasks). So the picture of an object A being bigger than 
an object В will be coded as [A bigger B] or [B smaller A] 
respectively, depending on whether the cross marked the position of A 
or B. In agreement with Clark's verification models it is assumed here 
that coding the picture in unmarked or marked terms will take an equal 
amount of time (this issue will be discussed shortly in more detail and 
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data will be presented which support this assumption). With these 
picture codes it is possible to start the retrieval of the lexical item 
without any receding operation. 
If differences between unmarked and marked naming reactions in the 
POST-condition are exclusively due to receding operations in the case 
of marked responses, then this difference should vanish in the 
PRE-condition. On the other hand, if a combination of receding and 
differences in lexicalization difficulty accounts for the effects in 
the POST-condition then there should also be an effect of markedness in 
the PRE-condition. But this effect should be smaller in size than the 
corresponding effect in the POST-condition, because in the 
PRE-condition only lexicalization difficulty contributes to the 
difference between unmarked and marked responses. 
What are the predictions under the assumption that a topic neutral 
codino is operative in the POST-condition? 
In the POST-condition the subject first has to perceive and code 
the picture. The picture is encoded as a conjunction of two 
propositions each of which codes one of the two objects with its 
relation to the other object. So the picture of an object A bigger than 
an object В will be coded as [A > & В <]. When the cross indicating the 
topic of comparison appears, the proposition containing the topic has 
to be identified. Following this, the lemma and the phonological shape 
of the word corresponding to the relation in the identified proposition 
have to be activated and the response can be executed. So contrary to 
the Clarkian model no receding is necessary in the POST-condition under 
the assumptions of the revised model. This means that markedness 
effects can be due only to lexicalization. 
In general, in the PRE-condition the same processing steps have to 
be taken as with the Clarkian model: the picture will be coded from the 
point of view of the topic, which is known before the picture itself is 
displayed. The important point is that also with this coding scheme, 
just as in the POST-condition, the relation in the conceptual structure 
can immediately be used -without any receding operations- to retrieve 
the lemma and the phonological shape of the correct verbal réponse. 
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In summary, differences between unmarked and marked responses 
should not be greater for the POST-condition than for the 
PRE-condition. This stands in clear contradiction to the expectations 
derived on grounds of an extrapolation of the Clarkian verification 
model. 
The Clarkian model would predict a small or even no markedness 
effect in the PRE-condition and a substantial markedness effect in the 
POST-condition. The revised model would predict the same kind of 
markedness effects in both presentation conditions (or even a bigger 
markedness effect in PRE than in POST because subjects are given time 
to code the picture before lexicalization, and can thus optimally 
prepare for the lexicalization stage to come). 
It must be stressed that in deriving these hypotheses a 
parallelism between comprehension and production processes has been 
implicitly assumed: Just as comprehension of an unmarked comparative is 
assumed to take less time than comprehension of a marked one, here it 
is assumed that lexicalization is faster for unmarked comparatives than 
for marked ones. Or to put it differently, it is assumed that the 
"comprehension hypothesis" (Clark 1973a) is paralleled by a 
corresponding "production hypothesis". 
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4. Markedness effects in naming comparative relations 
4.1 Experiment 2: Naming relations on the dimension of size: bigger vs 
smaller 
Experiment 2 addressed the question whether -just as in verification 
tasks- an advantage for unmarked over marked descriptions on the 
underlying dimension of size can be demonstrated. At the same time it 
addressed the question whether such an advantage is explainable in 
terms of a recoding operation for the picture code (as is necessary 
under the assumptions of the Clarkian model), or if this advantage is 
to be located in the lexicalization stage. Given these questions, a 
PRE- and a POST-condition were realized. There were only two levels of 
size, just as in the verification experiment of Clark et al. (1973). A 
problem with using only two figure sizes is that the subjects, having 
realized the fact that there are only two figure sizes, could of course 
give a judgement of the absolute size of the figure marked by the cross 
instead of naming the relation between the figures. This strategy will 
also lead to a correct response. To prevent subjects from adopting this 
stategy there were also trials in which the two figures were of equal 
size. Subjects were instructed to give the vocal response same in these 
cases. So subjects were forced to really attend to the relation between 
the two figures presented and not just to their absolute size within 
the set of figures used in the experiment. 
4.1.1 Hatmalg 
The pictures displayed consisted of two geometric figures positioned to 
the left and right of the middle of the screen. The two figures of a 
picture were either two (equilateral) triangles or two circles. The two 
figures were either equal or different in size. The figure to be marked 
by the cross could be the left or the right figure of the picture, and 
it could be either a small or a big figure (triangles with a side 
length and circles with a diameter of either 4 cm or 2.5 cm). The full 
combination of these 4 binary factors of stimulus construction thus 
yields 16 picture types. Each of these 16 picture types was realized 
five times in each of the two presentation conditions (PRE vs POST). 
Figure 7 gives the resulting 8 picture types for the figure type 
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"triangle' with the correct responses. 
^Δ 
+ 
Δ Τ 
ΔΔ 
+ 
Δ Δ 
i in Experiment 2 
So each subject received a total of 160 trials (plus 8 practice trials 
at the beginning of each presentation condition). 
4.1.2 Procedure 
The experiment was run under control of a POP 11/23 computer. The 
pictures were displayed on an electronic display interfaced with the 
computer. The time-course of a trial in the PRE-condition was as 
follows. First the marking cross appeared to the left or the right side 
of the middle of the display. 1.5 seconds later two figures were added 
to the display such that the marking cross was placed in the middle of 
one of the figures. At the same time a computer internal millisecond 
clock was started. The subject then named -as fast as possible- the 
relation between the figure marked by the cross and the other figure of 
the display. The clock was stopped by this naming response via a 
voice-operated relay interfaced with the computer. 
Besides the speech onset latencies the vocal responses produced 
were registered on audio tape. On the other track of the tape a puis of 
1000 hz was placed at the moment the voice operated relay was 
triggered. After the subject gave the answer the picture disappeared. 
By pressing a pushbutton the subject could then initiate the following 
•groter" 
(bigger) 
"kleiner" 
(smaller) 
"gelijk" 
(same: big) 
"gelijk" 
(same: small) 
Λ 
+ 
Δ 
Δ 
+ 
Λ 
лл 
+ 
Δ 
+ 
Δ 
Fig. 7: Examples of the stimul 
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trial. 
The time-course of a trial in the POST-condition was in principle 
the same, with the order of appearance of marking cross and figures 
being reversed. Time was measured from appearance of the cross to the 
onset of the vocal response. 
The subjects were seated in a dimly lit sound proof room about .70 
m from the screen. A pushbutton for initiating the trials as well аз a 
microphone for operating the voice key and tape recording the answers 
were installed in front of the subjects. 
Half of the subjects started with the trials in the PRE-condition 
and then moved on to the POST-condition trials. For the other half of 
the subjects the order of the presentation conditions was reversed. 
For each subject and each presentation condition a new random 
order of the trials was constructed. To prevent occurrence of 
replications of the same picture type in direct succession the 80 
trials in a given presentation condition were divided into 5 lists of 
16 trials each, such that in each list each picture type occurred only 
once. From each list, for each subject and presentation condition, a 
different random order was determined. Then, random orders of these 5 
randomized lists were determined for each subject and presentation 
condition, under the restriction that at the transition between two 
lists no replication of the same picture type could occur. 
36 subjects participated in the experiment. All subjects were 
students at the University of Nijmegen and all of them were native 
speakers of Dutch. They were paid Dfl 8.50 for participation in the 
experiment. 
4.1.3 Results 
The latencies obtained in the experiment were first checked with 
respect to correct operation of the voice key. A comparison of the 
onset of the speech signal of the answer with the triggering of the 
voice key (marked by the 1000 hz puis on the second track of the tape) 
showed that the voice key did not really react to the speech onset 
itself but somewhat later in the given vocal response. This deviation 
was measured for every response for each subject by comparing the 
position of the 1000 hz puis with the position of speech onset on an 
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oscilloscope. 
The means of the corrected latencies for correct responses over 
replications of the same trial type were calculated for each subject 
(for an analysis of the erroneous responses see below). Then these mean 
RTs were analyzed separately for PRE- and POST-condition via an 
analysis of variance with the factors subjects, figure type (triangle 
vs circle), size difference (two figures of equal or different size), 
position of the figure marked by the cross (left vs right), and size of 
the figure marked by the cross (big vs small). For figures differing in 
size this last factor is identical to the response to be given 
('bigger" vs 'smaller"). In these analyses there was neither a 
significant main effect of the factor "figure type" nor a significant 
interaction of this factor with any of the other factors. So in 
reporting the results, this factor will not be considered. 
Figure 8 shows the latencies for the PRE- and POST-condition with 
respect to the factors size difference, position and size of the figure 
marked by the cross. 
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"kleiner" 
(smaller) 
"groter" "gelijk" "gelijk" 
(bigger) (same: small) (same: big) 
Fig. β: Naming latencies for comparisons on the dimension 
"size for pictures of figures of different size (left 
panel), and of equal size (right panel). Solid lines for 
topic figure in left position, broken lines for topic 
figure in right position; triangles = PRE; circles = POST. 
The major finding is that in both presentation conditions unmarked 
responses are given significantly faster than marked ones (for POST: 
Fd.SS) = 27.35, MSe = 1527, p=.0001; for PRE: F(1,35) = 22.16, MSe = 
1661, p=.0O01 in analyses of the latencies for trials with different 
figure sizes only). This markedness effect is of the same size in POST 
(34 msec) and PRE (32.5 msec) conditions. A corresponding analysis of 
variance of the RTs of the "different"-trials in the PRE-condition vs 
the POST-condition in fact yields F(1,35) < 1 for the interaction 
between presentation condition (PRE vs POST) and response type 
("bigger" vs "smaller"). 
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Nevertheless there is a difference in the results of POST- and 
PRE- condition. In the PRE-condition there is an interaction between 
markedness of the response and the position (left vs right) of the 
figure marked by the cross (F(1,35) = 4.12, NSe = 1343, p=.05) The same 
pattern holds descriptively for the POST-condition, but the 
corresponding interaction does not reach significance (F(1,35) < 1). 
Besides the major finding of markedness effects there are two 
additional important results. First, in the PRE-condition 'same' 
responses are given faster for pictures with two big figures than with 
two small figures of equal size (F(1,35) = 6.2, NSe = 2063, p=.018), 
whereas this does not hold for the POST-condition. Second, the overall 
latency in the PRE-condition is clearly higher than in the 
POST-condition. This difference is more pronounced when the two figures 
are of same size (200 msec) than when the two figures are of different 
size (120 msec). 
4.1.4 Discussion 
The major finding of a markedness effect of about the same size in 
POST- and PRE-condition fits well with the notion of a topic neutral 
coding in the POST-condition. Such a coding principle does not only 
explain the difference in the pattern of results between picture-first 
verification studies with simultaneous presentation of picture and 
sentence (e.g. Clark & Chase, 1972, 1974) as opposed to delayed 
sentence presentation (e.g. Flores d'Arcáis, 1974). It also accounts 
for the findings in the relation naming task of the present experiment. 
Furthermore, the results suggest that the markedness effect should be 
attributed to the lexicalization process. So, Clark's 'comprehension 
hypothesis' is paralleled by a corresponding "production hypothesis". 
The interpretation given up till now assumes that in the 
PRE-condition, coding the picture in marked terms (i.e. from the point 
of view of the smaller figure) and in unmarked terms (i.e. from the 
point of view of the larger figure) should take an equal amount of 
time. Markedness effects under the PRE-condition should then in fact be 
due to differences in lexicalization difficulty. 
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However, the markedness effects could also be located in the 
process of perceptual coding. For the PRE-condition, it could be the 
case that perceptual coding in unmarked terms is faster than perceptual 
coding in marked terms. Also, if in the POST-condition subjects do code 
the picture by default in unmarked terms, and not according to a topic 
neutral coding strategy, markedness effects might be due to recoding 
operations which become necessary if the smaller of the figures is the 
topic of comparison. 
In order to test this alternative interpretation of the results, 
an experiment was run which excluded lexicalization of the necessary 
lexical items, but which still included the perceptual coding (and 
potential recodings). If the markedness effects are located at the 
level of perceptual coding, this experiment should yield the same 
markedness effects as Experiment 2. If markedness effects are due to 
the lexicalization stage, however, (i.e. if they are located on the 
linguistic level), they should be eliminated in this experiment. 
Before proceeding to this experiment, the other two results of the 
present experiment will be briefly discussed. The latency difference 
between POST- and PRE-condition can be explained by the fact that, in 
the POST-condition, coding the picture does not fall into the RT 
measured whereas in the PRE-condition the whole picture coding process 
is reflected in the RTs. But it was also found that this advantage is 
more pronounced when the two figures are of equal size. This is 
plausible because in the POST-condition, but not in the PRE-condition, 
a correct same-response could already have been given before the cross 
appeared. Subjects were, however, explicitly instructed to give their 
answer only after appearance of the cross, so that the corresponding 
RTs reflect only the time required to pronounce a possibly already 
computed response in reaction to a signal (i.e the cross). 
Finally, it was found that in the PRE-condition but not in the 
POST-condition, the absolute size of the figures played a role in 
"same"-responses; these responses were faster for pictures of two big 
figures than for pictures of two small figures. This effect is 
explainable from the construction of the pictures. The spatial distance 
between two big figures is smaller than the distance between two small 
figures (see Fig. 7). If the cross is presented first, the subjects 
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will be faster in identifying two big figures as being equal in size 
than in identifying two small figures as being equal in size. In 
accordance with the latencies obtained this only plays a role in the 
PRE-condition where the whole process of picture perception is 
reflected in RT. 
However, one cannot explain by the same argument the differences 
between biaoer- and smaller- responses in the PRE-condition with 
pictures of two figures of different size. In these cases the spatial 
distance between the bigger and the smaller figure of the display is 
independent of the position of the figure marked by the cross (left vs 
right) and of the size of the figure marked by the cross (see Fig 7). 
Furthermore, this difference between bigger- and smaller- responses is 
also found in the POST-condition, so that this effect cannot be 
explained as a perceptual effect. 
4.1.5 Error analysis 
In addition to the latencies, the erroneous responses were analyzed. In 
this error analysis all responses were included which 
(i) clearly were wrong answers 
(ii) clearly began with one type of response, but were 
corrected by the subject whilst giving the answer. 
An attempt was made to categorize these errors as completely as 
possible. So, for example, all responses to a picture of two small 
figures of equal size which clearly began with the subject answering 
kleiner (smaller) although geliik (same) was the correct naming 
reaction, were scored as one category. That is, all answers of the 
following kind were categorized together: 
kleiner 
kleiner (eh) gelijk 
klei (eh) gelijk 
kl (eh) gelijk 
к (eh) gelijk 
According to Levelt (1983a,b) this type of repairs is due to monitoring 
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for correctness (as opposed to monitoring for appropriateness). As in 
Levelt's (1983a) repair corpus, the vast majority of these correctness 
repairs shows repairing within the incorrect word. 
Out of the total of 97 selfcorrected (or incorrect) responses 68 
were responses to pictures of two figures of equal size. Out of these 
68 errors, 60 can be unambiguously classified as errors where the 
subjects in first instance tend to name the absolute size of the 
figures. 36 of these 60 errors occur in the PRE-condition and 24 in the 
POST-condition. The remaining 29 responses with pictures of two figures 
of different size do not show any clear systematic pattern. Table 1 
gives the distribution of the errors by presentation condition and 
trial type ("same'- vs 'different'-trials) 
I two figures of two figures of | 
1 eaual size 1 different size 1 
PRE | 40 | 15 | 
1 (36) | | 
POST | 2Θ | 14 | 
I (24) | | 
Table 1: Distribution of errors in Experiment 2. 
(numbers between brackets represent errors 
which can be categorized as being in corres­
pondence with judgments of absolute size) 
This distribution of errors suggests that although the experimental 
design forces the subjects to focus on the relation between the two 
figures and not on their absolute size, there seems to be some kind of 
interference between naming of the relation on the one hand, and naming 
the absolute size of the figures on the other hand. Because only two 
figure sizes were realized in the experiment, this interference can 
only show up with pictures of two figures of equal size (with figures 
of different size, absolute size and relation always agree). 
In terms of the framework developed above, this means that in the 
conceptual representation forming the basis for the lexicalization and 
naming processes, there must be some kind of information on absolute 
size besides the information about the relation between the two 
figures. The interference should occur if the subject is not completely 
sure on which part of the conceptual representation (absolute or 
relative information) the naming response should be based. 
These considerations are compatible with the notion that there are 
two stages which affect lexicalization difficulty. First, the 
information to be mapped onto a lexical item (in the present case the 
relative information) has to be extracted from the conceptual 
structure. Second, the relevant information has to be mapped onto the 
corresponding lexical item. 
An alternative explanation of the pattern of errors could be that 
subjects first just focus on the figure marked by the cross, and begin 
by naming the absolute size of the figure. Whilst doing so they might 
detect that the relation between the two figures has to be named 
"gelijk* (same). But with this explanation one would not expect 
interference in the POST-condition, where the subjects are given time 
to scan the whole picture (that is both figures and the relation 
between them) before giving the answer. 
4.2 Experiment 3: Are markedness effects due to the picture encoding 
SiàSSl 
Experiment 3 addressed the question whether the markedness effects 
found in Experiment 2 are to be attributed to perceptual encoding 
processes or to the lexicalization stage. This point had to be tested 
experimentally because the assumption of equal difficulty of building 
up the corresponding representations is a crucial point in the above 
argumentation. 
Because there is no way of directly accessing the speed in which 
such representations are built up, one needs an external response. This 
response should show whether a correct representation has been built 
up, but at the same time should require as little additional processing 
based on this representation as possible (in particular, there should 
be no activation of the corresponding lexical items). 
To meet these requirements the vocal responses of Experiment 2 
were replaced by pushbutton responses in the present experiment. The 
assumption here is that there is no internal lexicalization process 
which mediates between the building up of the conceptual representation 
of the picture, and the mapping of the relation in this representation 
onto the corresponding pushbuttons. 
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This is of course a rather strong assumption and cannot be 
accepted right away without any empirical evidence. However, the 
necessary evidence suggests itself from the data obtained in the 
experiment. If an internal lexicalization does not intervene between 
the building up of the conceptual representation and the motoric 
response, and furthermore, if the building up of unmarked and marked 
representations has no differential effect, then the RTs for both kinds 
of relations (bigger, smaller) should not be significantly different in 
the PRE-condition. Equality of RTs in the POST-condition would be 
consistent with the notion of a topic neutral coding and of markedness 
effects being due to lexicalization difficulty. 
On the other hand, if there is a difference between unmarked and 
marked responses in the motoric response mode, one cannot be sure which 
process accounts for this difference. The effect can be due to a 
difference in picture encoding, to differences in internal mediating 
lexicalization processes, or to some combination of the two. 
A last point to be mentioned is the difficulty which arises when 
asking subjects to give three kinds of motoric responses using 
pushbuttons. To circumvent this problem, subjects were instructed to 
react to the relations biooer and smaller with one of two corresponding 
pushbuttons and to give no reaction with the relation same. 
4.2.1 Materials 
The materials were identical to those used in Experiment 2. 
4.2.2 Procedure 
The procedure was the same as in Experiment 2 with only the response 
mode changed and a slight change in the time course of trials. With 
trials in the PRE-condition, the marking cross first appeared to the 
left or the right side of the middle of the display. 1.5 sec later two 
figures were added to the display such that the marking cross was 
placed in the middle of one of the figures. At the same time a computer 
internal millisecond clock was started. If the two figures were 
different in size the subjects had to indicate the relation between the 
two figures by pressing the corresponding pushbutton. At 160 msec. 
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after this response the screen was blanked and 2 seconds later the next 
trial started with the presentation of the marking cross. If the two 
figures were of equal size the subjects were instructed just to wait 
for the next trial. Two seconds after the presentation of the two 
figures the screen was blanked and the marking cross for the next trial 
appeared. 
The time course of a trial in the POST-condition was in principle 
the same, with the order of appearance of marking cross and figures 
being reversed. Time was measured from appearance of the cross to the 
pushbutton reaction. 
Half of the subjects started with the PRE-condition trials and 
then moved on to the POST-condition trials. For the other half of the 
subjects the order of presentation of the conditions was reversed. One 
half of each of these groups of subjects were instructed to press the 
left pushbutton if the relation bigger held and the right pushbutton if 
the relation smaller held. For the other half in each of the two groups 
of subjects the assignment of pushbuttons to relations was reversed. 
For each subject a new random order of the trials was constructed in 
the same way as described with Experiment 2. 
24 subjects participated in the experiment. All subjects were 
students at the University of Nijmegen and were paid Dfl Θ.50 for 
participation in the experiment. All subjects were native speakers of 
Dutch. 
4.2.3 Results 
Figure 9 gives the latencies for the PRE- and POST-condition with 
respect to the factors position and size of the figure marked by the 
cross. 
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Fig. 9: Latencies for judging relations on the dimension 
'size' by means of pushbutton responses. Solid lines 
for topic figure in left position, broken lines for 
topic figure in right position; triangles = PRE, 
circles = POST. 
The results were analyzed separately for PRE- and POST-condition via an 
analysis of variance with the factors subjects, figure type (triangle 
vs circle), position of the figure marked by the cross (left vs right), 
and size of the figure marked by the cross (and thereby response type: 
"bigger"-button vs "smaller'-button). 
In the PRE-condition none of these factors and no interaction 
reached significance. In particular, there was no main effect of 
response-type (RT("bigger"-button) = 632 msec, RT("smaller"-button) = 
623 msec; F(1,23) < 1, MSe = 3720). There is even a very small trend in 
the opposite direction as compared to Experiment 2. 
The same pattern holds for the POST-condition. Once again, 
reactions with the 'smaller'-button are given a little faster than 
reactions with the "bigger'-button (RT("bigger"-button) = 490 msec, 
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RTCsmaller'-button = 483 msec; FM,23) < 1, MSe = 4010). 
ks in Experiment 2, subjects clearly profit from the possibility 
to process the figures before presentation of the cross in the 
POST-condition (RT(PRE) = 628 msec, RT(POST) = 487 msec). 
4.2.4. Replication of Experiment 3 with simultaneous presentation of 
figures and marking cross 
In order to get an idea of the time needed for the whole process of 
perceptual encoding (identifying the topic of comparison in the display 
and building up of the representation), Experiment 3 was replicated 
with another pool of 20 subjects, the only difference being that the 
marking cross and the figures were presented simultaneously. In all 
other aspects the experiment was identical to Experiment 3. 
Figure 10 gives the latencies of this replication with respect to 
the factors position and size of the figure marked by the cross. 
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Fig. 10: Latencies for judging relations on the dimension 
•?ize" by means of pushbutton respçnses. Solid 
lines for topic figure in left position, broken 
lines for topic figure in right position. 
The results were analyzed via an analysis of variance with the factors 
subjects, figure type (triangle vs circle), position of the figure 
marked by the cross (left vs right), and size of the figure marked by 
the cross (and thereby response-type: "bigger'-button vs 
"smaller*-button). 
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Of all main effects and interactions only the position of the 
figure marked by the cross was significant (F(1,19) = 6.5, MSe = 2353, 
p=.02, RT(left) = 610 msec, RT(right) = 630 msec) reflecting faster 
reaction when the cross was in left position than when it was in right 
position. This might be a reflection of a preference for scanning such 
pictures from left to right, so that the subjects detect the marking 
cross somewhat later in right position than in left position. There are 
two points with respect to this finding: First, this preference in 
picture scanning is not paralleled by a corresponding asymmetry in 
P-space. It might be a reflection of socio-cultural habits, in 
particular a reading habit (cf. Levelt & Maassen, 1981, Exp. 3, who 
found similar preferences in the order of mentioning objects in 
descriptions, i.e. a weak preference to describe from left to right, 
and a stronger preference to describe from top to bottom, as in 
Experiment 1 of the present study). Second, this effect did not show up 
with the PRE-condition of the preceding experiment. This supports the 
notion that perceptual preferences are eliminated if the topic is known 
before perceptual coding starts. This fits the formulation of 
influences on perceptual coding processes given above, in particular 
the notion of the influence of a known topic overruling the influence 
of perceptual coding preferences. 
Most important, response type ("groter" vs "kleiner") once again 
did not have any influence on the RTs (RT("groter"-button) = 619 msec, 
RT("kleiner"-button) = 621 msec, F(1,19) < 1, MSe = 2286). 
Taken together, the results of these two experiments suggest that 
subjects are able to build up a conceptual representation of the 
picture and to "read out" directly the relation contained in the 
representation, without a mediating lexicalization step. There was 
neither an effect of building up a representation of the picture in 
unmarked or marked terms, nor of response type. 
4.3 Discussion of Experiments 2 and 3 
The results of Experiments 2 and 3 give substantial support to the 
interpretation of markedness effects being due to differences in 
lexicalization difficulty. Given Experiment 3 one can no longer 
maintain that the markedness effect in the PRE-condition of Experiment 
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2 is due to a difference in the speed of coding a picture from the 
point of view of the bigger or the smaller figure. This effect should 
then also have emerged in the PRE-condition of Experiment 3, but it 
didn't. Over and above this finding, the results of the POST-condition 
of Experiment 3 show that subjects do not rely on a default coding of 
the picture in unmarked terms if there is no previously defined topic. 
Otherwise one should have found an effect of response type in the 
POST-condition of Experiment 3 due to the necessary picture recoding in 
the case of smaller-responses. Rather, the results for the 
POST-condition give further support to the notion of a picture coding 
which is neutral with respect to a topic of comparison in the absense 
of a previously defined topic. This is also consistent with the 
interpretation given above for the picture-first verification 
experiments of Flores d'Arcáis (1974). 
What has been discussed thus far can be summarized in the 
following assumed sequence of processing steps in relation naming: 
First, the picture has to be perceived and to be coded into a 
propositional format. On the basis of the results of the error analysis 
of Experiment 2 it was informally suggested that there are two types of 
information in the resulting conceptual structure. Namely, information 
on the relation between the two objects and information on the absolute 
size (within the relevant domain of referents) of each of the two 
objects. The coding of the relation seemed to be determined by a kind 
of hierarchy of coding strategies with the "highest" applicable 
strategy determining the coding. This hierarchy can be roughly 
summarized as follows: 
(1) Whenever the subject already knows what the topic of 
comparison is going to be at the moment picture encoding starts, 
he will code the relation between the two figures of the picture 
from the point of view of the topic stimulus (cf. Clark's coding 
principle 1). 
(2) Whenever the subject perceives an object В as a stable and 
prominent reference point he will use this object В as the 
tertiary reference point of the comparison and code object λ as 
the topic relative to object В (cf. Clark's coding principle 2). 
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If neither (1) nor (2) can be applied, the perceptual event will 
be coded according to "natural coding preferences". However, such a 
coding preference is not to be conceived of as a preference for mental 
representations in unmarked terms on the relevant underlying dimension, 
as has been assumed by Clark (1972, 1974). This has been demonstrated 
in Experiment 1. Rather, a coding preference determines one of the 
objects as 'starting point" from which the perceptual event will be 
interpreted and coded on the relevant underlying dimension. This 
preference need not be from the dimension on which the perceptual event 
has to be coded. Finally, these preferences need not have a parallel in 
corresponding asymmetries of perceptual dimensions in P-space (see 
above). 
All these influences on perceptual coding (with the exception of 
the influence of a_ known topic) can be overruled by a topic neutral 
coding strategy in the case that the subject does not encode the 
picture under time pressure. 
The possible influences of absolute size information will be 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 5, and empirical evidence with 
respect to potential conflicts between absolute and relative 
information will be given in Chapter 6. Here, it will suffice to state 
that in the next step the task relevant information has to be extracted 
from the conceptual structure. For the case of relation naming tasks 
this will be the information on the relation between the two objects. 
It seems to be this selection stage which gives rise to the kind of 
erroneous responses that occurred in Experiment 2. 
In the next step, the selected conceptual information has to be 
mapped onto the corresponding lexical items (this step can be further 
regarded as being composed of two substages, namely retrieval of the 
corresponding lemma followed by the retrieval of the corresponding 
phonological form). Finally, articulatory motor programming and 
articulatory response execution follow. 
With this general outline of a model it becomes clear that a 
further control experiment is necessary. It must be shown that the 
markedness effect obtained cannot be explained in terms of response 
execution. To eliminate this possibility, Experiment 4 was run. 
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4.4. Experiment 4: Controlling for differences in articulatorv 
Experiment 4 addressed the question whether the differences between 
unmarked and marked vocal responses found in Experiment 2 can be 
explained in terms of articulatory difficulty. Is the reported 
markedness effect perhaps just a reflection of differences in the 
difficulty to "translate" the accessed lexical items into concrete 
articulation? If this is the case one would be dealing with a pure 
response execution effect. 
To test for this possibility subjects were asked to pronounce a 
word in response to a signal. At the moment the signal occurred the 
subjects were already completely informed on the word to be pronounced. 
So differences in lexicalization difficulty should not be reflected in 
pronounciation RTs obtained with this procedure. If the effects 
obtained in Experiment 2 are exclusively due to the response execution 
stage, then one should find differences in pronounciation time between 
the unmarked and the marked member of a pair of antonymous comparatives 
of about equal size as in the relation naming experiment. If, on the 
other hand, no differences in pronounciation times are found, then this 
further strengthens the claim that the markedness effects found in 
Experiment 2 are due to differences in lexicalization difficulty. 
4.4.1 Materials 
As words to be pronounced the three vocal responses of Experiment 2 
("groter", "kleiner", "gelijk") were used. In addition three further 
pairs of antonymous comparatives were included danger, korter; breder, 
smaller; helderder, donkerder, their English equivalents being longer, 
shorter; wider, narrower; brighter, darker) in order to select a 
further pair of antonymous comparatives for which pronounciation 
latencies do not differ. This would give the possibility to replicate 
Experiment 2 for another pair of antonymous comparatives. 
Taken together, the experimental materials consisted of 9 words (4 
pairs of comparatives and "gelijk"). In order to get a stable 
estimation of the pronounciation latency, each of the words had to be 
pronounced 5 times in the experiment. This gave 45 pronounciation 
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latencies for each subject. In addition to these 45 test trials a set 
of 45 catch trials was constructed. These catch trials were identical 
to the test trials, but in these trials no signal occurred. So in the 
case of the catch trials the word was not pronounced by the subject. 
This was a preventive measure against articulatory false starts. 
4.4.2 Procedure 
The experiment was run under control of a PDP 11/23 computer. The words 
(and in test trials also the start signal) were presented on an 
electronic display interfaced with the computer. The time course of a 
test trial was as follows. First one of the nine words was presented. 
One second later a cross appeared underneath the middle of the word 
presented. At the same time a computer internal millisecond clock was 
started. The subject had to pronounce the word presented as fast as 
possible in response to the signal. The clock was stopped by this 
pronounciation reaction via a voice operated relay interfaced with the 
computer. 2.5 seconds after onset of the word the screen was blanked 
and another second later the next word was presented. 
The time course of a catch trial was in principle the same, the 
only difference being that no signal cross appeared underneath the 
word. In this case the subject just had to wait for the presentation of 
the next word. 
The vocal responses were registered on audiotape. Just as in 
Experiment 2 a puis of 1000 hz was placed on the other track of the 
tape at the moment the voice operated relay triggered. 
The subjects were seated in a dimly lit sound proof room about .70 
m from the stimulus display. In front of the subject a microphone was 
installed for operating the voice key and the tape recording. 
For each subject a new random order of the 90 trials was 
constructed. To prevent occurrence of replications of the same stimulus 
in direct succession, the same procedure was used as in the 
construction of randomizations in Experiments 1 through 3. 
27 subjects participated in the experiment. All subjects were 
students at the University of Nijmegen and all of them were native 
speakers of Dutch. They were paid Dfl 8.50 for participation in the 
experiment. 
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4.4.3 Results 
Three of the 27 subjects had to be excluded from further analysis 
because of high rate of articulatory false starts. For the remaining 24 
subjects the pronounciation latencies were first corrected for 
deviations between operation of the voice key and speech onset in the 
same way as in Experiment 2. 
The corrected pronounciation latencies were analyzed via an 
analysis of variance with the factors subjects and words to be 
pronounced (with 9 levels). This analysis yields a significant overall 
effect of words on pronounciation latencies (F(8,184) = 3.89, p=.0003). 
Table 2 gives the pronounciation latencies for the nine words. 
|groter 
I 427 
I 23 
kleiner|langer 
433 | 446 
19 | 23 
|korter 
I 450 
1 20 
breder 
457 
22 
smaller 1helder-
1 der 
403 | 448 
24 | 17 
donker-
der 
443 
23 
gelijk | 
423 I 
21 | 
Table 2: Pronounciation latencies (in msec), Experiment 4 
(the lower row gives the standard error of the mean) 
On the basis of the overall test the assumption of no differences in 
pronounciation latencies cannot be maintained. Nevertheless the 
question of interest does not primarily concern an overall effect, but 
instead potential differences in pronounciation latency between the 
unmarked and the marked member of each pair of comparatives. 
Therefore the relevant differences for the four pairs of 
comparatives were tested separately via t-tests. Because the t-test is 
applied repeatedly to data from one sample of subjects, the alpha had 
to be adjusted for the statistical test. Otherwise one would 
overestimate alpha in each of the four comparisons. To maintain an 
alpha of .05 for each of the four tests separately, alpha was fixated 
at .0125 for the four tests to be performed (for a careful discussion 
of procedures for alpha adjustment see Stelzl 1983). 
The correlations between the pronounciation times for unmarked and 
marked comparatives are quite high for each of the four comparative 
pairs tested (r ranging from .80 to .96). So the power of the t-test is 
quite high in these comparisons and the sample (n=24) should be large 
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enough for a t-test of correlated samples. 
Three of the four comparisons show no significant differences in 
pronounciation latencies (groter, kleiner t(23)=-.81, p=.43; langer, 
korter: t(23)=-.38, p=.71; helderder, donkerder t(23)=.37l p=.72). Only 
the difference in pronounciation times between breder and smaller turns 
out to be significant (t(23)=5.25, p<.0005). This difference is also 
descriptively the largest difference between any two of the nine words. 
So it is probably this difference which primarily contributes to the 
significant overall effect. 
4.4.4 Discussion 
The results clearly show that the markedness effects of Experiment 2 
cannot be explained in terms of response execution. Taken together then 
the results of Experiments 2, 3 and 4 suggest a localization of the 
markedness effect in the lexicalization stage. 
Furthermore, the results show that in the POST-condition of 
Experiment 2 the subjects do not activate both possible responses 
("bigger"; "smaller") before appearance of the marking cross and then 
just articulate the appropriate answer at the moment the marking cross 
appears. If such a preparation strategy had been operative, there 
should have been no differences between unmarked and marked responses 
in the POST-condition. 
Ά secondary goal of the present experiment was to select a further 
pair of comparatives for which pronounciation latencies do not differ. 
Such a pair of comparatives would give the opportunity to test whether 
the results of Experiment 2 can be generalized to other dimensions of 
comparison. On the basis of the present results there are two 
candidates for such an experiment: langer, korter and helderder. 
donkerder, it was decided to use the pair langer, korter because the 
experimental realization of stimuli for a relation naming task on the 
dimension of brightness leads to additional complications. Audley & 
Wallis (1964) have shown in a series of experiments, that judgments on 
the relative brightness of, for example, two lights crucially depend on 
the brightness of the background against which the lights are 
presented. In terms of the present framework this effect of the 
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brightness of the background can be conceived of as the background 
fixating a certain SRP. On the other hand it seems very difficult (or 
even impossible) to realize a visual background for the stimuli which 
is neutral with respect to brightness (these considerations came to 
mind after having run Experiment 4, so that in fact it contained a 
"superfluous' condition). 
4.5 Experiment 5: Warning relations on the dimension of length; longer 
vs shorter 
Experiment 5 was designed to study whether the pattern of results 
obtained in Experiment 2 generalizes to other dimensions of 
description, i.e. to other pairs of unmarked and marked comparatives. 
For the reasons discussed above, the comparatives langer vs korter 
were used in the present experiment. The experiment is identical to 
Experiment 2 with only a change in the figures presented and responses 
to be given. 
In Experiment 2 subjects were presented with two circles or two 
triangles of equal or different size. The subjects had to name the 
relation between the two figures via the vocal responses groter. 
kleiner. or geliik. The figures in Experiment 2 satisfied the 
conditions of application for groot and klein as proposed by Clark et 
al. (1973, p. 366) for the corresponding English adjectives big and 
small. 
(1) The object measured must have at least two dimensions 
(2) The extent measured is two- or three-dimensional 
As Bierwisch (1967) shows for German, adjectives like lang and hoch (in 
contrast to gross, klein) always exclusively refer to one dimension. 
The dimension modified by lang or hoch must be the 'maximal dimension" 
of an object, or to put it in more psychological terms, the value of 
the object on this dimension of physical extent must clearly exceed the 
values on its other dimensions of physical extent. Finally, lana says 
nothing about the orientation of the dimension labeled by lana with 
respect to the observer or to the environment; in particular it is not 
assumed that the orientation of this dimension is vertical. This 
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distinguishes lana from hoch where it is assumed that the dimension 
modified by hoch be vertical. 
According to this analysis the conditions of application for lang. 
kort can be roughly summarized as follows-. 
(1) The object measured may have only one dimension (e.g. lines of 
different length) since the extent measured by lang, kort is 
one-dimensional. 
(2) If the object modified by lang, kort has more than one dimension 
the dimension labeled by lang, kort must clearly exceed the other 
dimension in extent. 
(3) A description of an object by lana, kort makes no assumptions about 
the spatial orientation of the relevant dimension. 
It should be stressed that the above analysis only applies to the 
modification of physical objects by dimensional adjectives (but see 
Bierwisch 1967 for some thoughts on possible extrapolations of such an 
analysis to domains like time). 
The pictures used in the present experiment consisted of two bars. 
Both bars were standing upright beside each other on one common 
imaginary reference line or plane. This arrangement of the bars was 
chosen for two reasons. First, it parallels the arrangement of the 
figures in Experiments 2 and 3 so that comparability with the present 
experiment is ensured. Second, it minimizes the difficulty of 
performing the perceptual comparisons of the length of the bars. 
These pictures clearly fulfill the conditions of application given 
above. 
An informal pilot study with pictures of two bars as used in the 
experiment showed that speakers spontaneously describe these pictures 
exclusively in terms of differences in length. 
4.5.1 Materials 
The two bars of a picture were positioned at equal distances (3 cm) to 
the left and the right of the middle of the screen. The bars were 
either equal or different in length. The bar marked by the cross could 
be the left or the right figure of the picture. And the bar so marked 
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could be a long or a short bar (6.5 cm vs 4.5 cm in length, 0.5 cm 
wide). The full combination of these 3 binary factors yields 8 picture 
types. Each of these 8 picture types was realized 8 times in each of 
the two presentation conditions (PRE vs POST). 
So each subject received a total of 128 trials (plus 8 practice 
trials at the beginning of each presentation condition). 
4.5.2 Procedure 
The procedure was identical to the procedure in Experiment 2. The 
randomizations were constructed in a way parallel to Experiment 2. 
34 subjects -all of them students at the University of Nijmegen-
participated in the experiment. All subjects were native speakers of 
Dutch. They were paid Dfl 8.50 for participation in the experiment. 
4.5.3 Results 
Four subjects were excluded from further analysis because they produced 
too many other sounds besides the vocal responses, thereby frequently 
triggering the voice key independent of the vocal responses. 
For the remaining 30 subjects the naming latencies were first 
corrected for deviations between operation of the voice key and real 
speech onset just in the same way as in Experiments 2 and 4. The means 
of the corrected latencies for correct responses over replications of 
the same trial type were calculated for each subject (for an analysis 
of the erroneous responses see below). Then these mean latencies were 
analyzed separately for PRE- and POST-condition via an analysis of 
variance with the factors subjects, length difference (two bars of a 
picture of equal or different length), position of the bar marked by 
the cross (left vs right), and length of the bar marked by the cross 
(long vs short). 
Figure 11 shows the latencies for the PRE- and POST-conditions 
with respect to the factors length difference, position of the bar 
marked by the cross, and length of the bar marked by the cross. 
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"korter" "langer" "gelijk" "gelijk" 
(shorter) (longer) (Same: short) (same: long) 
Fig. 11: Naming latencies for comparisons on the dimension 
"length' for pictures of two figures of different 
length (left panel), and of equal length (right 
Eanel). Solid lines for topic figure in left position, roken lines for topic figure in right position; 
triangles = PRE, circles = POST. 
In general the results replicate the results of Experiment 2. The main 
finding is that in both presentation conditions unmarked naming 
responses are given significantly faster than marked ones (for POST: 
F(1,29) = 4.67, MSe = 2015, p=.039; for PRE: F(1,29) = 11.11, MSe = 
5542, p=.0024 in analyses of the latencies of different-trials only). 
But in contrast to Experiment 2, this difference is more pronounced in 
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the PRE-condition (45 msec) than in the POST-condition (18 msec). A 
corresponding analysis of variance of the RTs of the different-trials 
in the PRE- versus the POST-condition shows, however, that this 
reduction of the markedness effect is not statistically reliable: there 
is still a significant main effect of markedness over presentation 
conditions (F(1,29) = 16.26, NSe = 3663, ρ » .0004, RT(langer) = 556 
msec, RT(korter) = 588 msec), but no interaction between presentation 
condition (PRE vs POST) and markedness ( F(1,29) =2.93, HSe = 3893, ρ = 
.098). 
Besides this main finding there are two additional results. First, 
in the PRE-condition 'same'-responses are given faster with two short 
bars of equal length than with two long ones (F(1,29) = 7.59, MSe = 
2101, p=.01). This does not hold for the POST-condition. 
Second, the overall latencies in the PRE-condition are clearly 
higher than in the POST-condition. Just as in Experiment 2, this 
difference is more pronounced with pictures of two bars of the same 
length (219 msec) than with pictures of two bars of different length 
(131 msec). 
4.5.4 Discussion 
A markedness effect shows up in the PRE- as well as in the 
POST-condition. This replicates the results of Experiment 2. But, in 
contrast to Experiment 2, the markedness effect is smaller for the 
POST-condition than for the PRE-conditions. This difference in size of 
effects is not in the direction that is predicted if pictures are just 
coded in unmarked terms instead of a topic neutral coding in the 
POST-condition. Rather, it seems that subjects make use of a topic 
neutral coding, but in contrast to Experiment 2 they sometimes succeed 
in activating both possible vocal responses before appearance of the 
marking cross. 
The latency difference between PRE- and POST-condition nicely 
parallels the corresponding difference of Experiment 2. So the 
interpretation of this difference given in the discussion of Experiment 
2 also applies to the present results. 
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The finding that, in the PRE-condition, £âme-responses in the case 
of two short bars are given faster than in the case of two long bars, 
seems to be a reflection of a perceptual phenomenon. If the perception 
of the picture is completed before RT-measurement starts, as in the 
POST-condition, these effects vanish (just as in Experiment 2 where 
only in the PRE-condition same-responses for two large figures were 
given faster than for two small figures). 
Finally, as in Experiment 2, there is a slight tendency in the 
direction of an interaction between the position of the marked figure 
and the size of the marked figure (and thereby response to be given) 
with 'different"-trials. This interaction reached significance only for 
the PRE-condition of Experiment 2, but a comparison of the left panel 
of Figure θ with the left panel of Figure 11 reveals that the general 
pattern of this interaction, though small, is very similar among the 
two presentation conditions and the Experiments 2 and 5. In each of 
these cases, the same verbal response is given a little faster if the 
figure with the smaller value on the relevant dimension is in left 
position. This might be a reflection of conceiving of dimensions of 
physical extent as extending from a zero point at the left to positive 
extents to the right (notice that this can be seen as a further example 
of the rather complicated interactions between the mental organization 
of dimensions of extent and the spatial arrangement of the objects, as 
demonstrated in Experiment 1). 
4.5.5 Error analysis 
In addition to the latencies the erroneous responses were analyzed. 
This error analysis was carried out in the same way as in Experiment 2. 
Out of the total of 60 incorrect (or selfcorrected) responses, 35 
were responses to pictures of two bars of equal length. 26 of these 
errors can be classified as errors where the subjects in first instance 
tended to name the absolute length of the bars. These 26 errors are 
equally distributed among the two presentation conditions. 
The remaining 25 errors with pictures of two bars of different 
length do not show any clear systematicity, with the exception that 
most of these errors (18 out of 25) occur in the PRE-condition. Table 3 
gives the distribution of errors by presentation condition and trial 
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type. 
1 two figures of two figures of | 
1 equal lenath 1 different lenathl 
PRE | 19 | 18 | 
1 (13) | I 
POST | 16 | 7 | 
1 (13) I I 
Table 3: Distribution of errors in Experiment 5. 
(numbers between brackets represent errors 
which can be categorized as being in corres-
pondence with judgments of absolute size). 
Although the pattern is less clear than in Experiment 2, it again 
provides evidence that the conceptual representations underlying the 
naming responses contain information on the relation as well as on the 
absolute size. Otherwise incorrect langer- and korter- responses should 
be randomly distributed between pictures of two long bars of equal 
length and two short ones. But in fact more than two thirds of the 
errors with 'same'-trials again fit the notion of confusing information 
on absolute and relative size. So, on the basis of the argumentation 
developed in the discussion of Experiment 2, it can be claimed that 
these errors occur by addressing the "wrong", i.e. task irrelevant, 
part of the conceptual representation. 
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5. Semantic markedness and congruitv: introductory remarks 
So far it has been demonstrated that accessing an unmarked lexical item 
on the basis of a given conceptual representation takes less time than 
accessing the corresponding marked lexical item. Or to put it 
differently markedness effects in speech production are due to 
differences in lexicalization difficulty. So, a "production hypothesis" 
paralleling Clark's "comprehension hypothesis" can be posited. Both 
hypotheses locate markedness effects on a linguistic level rather than 
on a perceptual or conceptual level. 
Further, the influences of asymmetries in P-space on perceptual 
coding are organized in a more complex way than assumed in the 
verification models of Clark. In particular, it was shown that the 
assumption of default coding in unmarked terms on the relevant 
underlying dimension is not the main principle guiding perceptual 
coding. Rather, it is a number of perceptual preferences that can 
determine the point of view from which a perceptual event is coded. 
This can, but need not necessarily, lead to a coding in unmarked terms 
on the relevant underlying dimension. Furthermore, such coding 
preferences need not be paralleled by asymmetries of corresponding 
dimensions in P-space. 
However, it turned out that encoding of the relation between two 
objects is not the only type of information playing a role in relation 
naming tasks. The error patterns in Experiments 2 and 5 suggested that 
the conceptual representation of the picture does not only contain 
information on the sizes of the two figures relative to one another, 
but also some information on the absolute size of each of the figures 
independently. Most of the errors and selfcorrections in these 
experiments were explainable in terms of confusing the information on 
the absolute size (or length) of the figures with the information on 
their relative size (or length). With this interpretation it is 
implicitly assumed that both types of information (absolute and 
relative) are available in the conceptual representation of the 
picture. Before the lexicalization process starts there must be a 
choice process which determines which information contained in the 
conceptual representation has to guide lexical choice. Errors are then 
due to choosing the wrong part of the conceptual information as input 
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for lexicalization. In Experiments 2 and 5 such errors could only show 
up in 'same"-trials because only in these cases do absolute and 
relative information lead to different responses. 
In order to determine whether conflicts between absolute and 
relative information really do play a role, it was important to get 
more direct evidence on this issue. In order to achieve this a series 
of experiments was conducted in which absolute and relative information 
were systematically brought into conflict with each other (see Chapter 
6 below). Two pairs of figures were used, one with two quite small 
figures of different size, and one with two quite big figures of 
different size. With two small figures, a smaller-response should given 
faster than a bigger-response because in the latter case absolute and 
relative information ought to be in conflict with each other. With two 
big figures, the reverse should hold by the same argument. That is, a 
congruity effect should emerge in the form of an interaction between 
the absolute size of the figures of a picture and the relation between 
these two figures from the point of view of the topic (for the precise 
derivation of expectations concerning such congruity effects under 
different models and the different presentation conditions (PRE vs 
POST) see below). These experiments then aim at providing a more direct 
test of the assumption of potential conflicts between relative and 
absolute information. 
Such congruity effects will closely resemble the congruity effects 
usually found in relative judgment tasks. In the standard relative 
judgment task the subject is asked to judge which of two stimuli has 
the larger or smaller value on a given dimension. In a typical 
experiment the subject is usually first presented with an instruction 
to choose the larger (or smaller) of two stimuli (or with a 
corresponding instruction for other dimensions of comparison). Then the 
subject is presented with the two stimuli and has to give his response 
according to the instruction, by means of pushbuttons. The dependent 
variable is the time needed for this judgment. There are two further 
experimental variants of this procedure that have been used to decide 
between the different models which have been developed to account for 
the data found in the standard situation described above. First, the 
instruction can be presented after the stimuli. Second, the two stimuli 
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can be presented successively instead of simultaneously (these variants 
will be considered below in discussing the corresponding models). For 
an overview of the research on relative judgment the reader is refered 
to Banks (1977) and Seymour (1979). 
The congruity effect usually found in such tasks is the effect of 
main interest for the present study. This effect reflects a tendency 
for large values of an attribute to be discriminated faster under a 
"choose larger'-instruction than under a "choose smaller"-instruction, 
and for small values to be discriminated faster under a "choose 
smaller"-instruction than under a 'choose larger'-instruction. 
Statistically this effect shows up as an interaction of instruction and 
position of the stimulus pair on the dimension of judgment (high vs 
low). 
These congruity effects have been found in a wide range of 
relative judgment tasks (e.g., Banks, Clark & Lucy, 1975; Banks & 
Flora, 1977; Banks, Fujii & Kayra-Stuart, 1976; Paivio, 1975; Trabasso 
& Riley, 1975; Riley 1976). 
However, the models developed to account for congruity effects in 
relative judgment tasks usually do not explain congruity effects on the 
basis of potential conflicts between absolute and relative information. 
The explanation given in these models is based on the idea of potential 
recodings of one type of information; i.e. it is assumed that the 
coding of the stimuli contains only one type of information. Two of the 
relative judgment models are of special interest in the present 
context. These are the model of Clark et al. (1973) (which is in fact 
an elaboration of the Clark δ·. Chase (1972) model for verification 
tasks) and the model of Banks and colleagues (e.g. Banks, 1977; Banks & 
Flora, 1977; Banks et al., 1976). 
The model of Clark et al. (1973) assumes coding of a perceptual or 
symbolic comparison with direct reference between the objects to be 
compared (i.e. exclusive coding of relative information), and the model 
of Banks and colleagues assumes coding of each of the objects 
separately with respect to some criterion value on the underlying 
dimension of comparison (i.e. exclusive coding of absolute 
information). 
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So it is possible to contrast the predictions of these two models 
for a relation naming task in which absolute and relative information 
are in conflict with each other on half of the trials and not in 
conflict with each other on the other half of the trials with the 
corresponding results of the experiments to be reported in Chapter 6. 
This should give the necessary evidence to decide whether the above 
mentioned congruity effects are due to receding of one type of 
information (only absolute or only relative information), or whether 
they are due to interferences between both types of information, as 
proposed above. 
In the following, each of these two models will be briefly 
described. In addition, each model will be discussed with respect to 
the following points. What are the predictions the models would make 
for the relation naming task with a congruity manipulation (as used in 
the experiments of Chapter 6)? Can the models explain the results of 
the experiments of Chapter 4? In how far are the models consistent with 
the empirical findings in the field of relative judgment? 
In addition to these two models the expectancy hypothesis model of 
Narschark & Paivio (1979) will be discussed. This model is of special 
interest to the present study because it makes explicit assumptions 
about the relationship between markedness effects and congruity effects 
(are these two effects independent from each other, mutually exclusive, 
or reducible to each other in the sense that markedness effects are 
just a special (default) subcase of congruity effects?). 
The discussion of these three models together with the error 
patterns of the experiments of Chapter 4 suggest that in fact 
information on the absolute size of each object (coded separately for 
each object), as well as information on the relation between the two 
objects (coded with direct reference to each other) does play a role. A 
model which integrates this notion will be developed and the 
corresponding predictions will be derived. 
Following this discussion, three experiments will be reported 
which test for the predictions of these four models. It will become 
apparent that both theoretical considerations and the data clearly 
favour the model which assumes absolute and relative coding. 
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5.1 The discrete codina model of Banks: Coding each object of a 
comparison separately relative to a criterion 
5.1.1 Description of the model 
The first model to be discussed in more detail is the one developed by 
Banks, Fujii & Kayra-Stuart (1976) for digit inequality judgments. The 
model has been expanded to other stimulus domains in Banks (1977), 
Banks & Flora (1977) and a number of other publications of Banks and 
colleagues. The model will be described here only for the standard 
relative judgment task in which the instruction precedes the two 
simultaneously displayed stimuli. 
The model distinguishes three main processing stages: encoding, 
choice, and response execution, with the choice stage containing two 
substages. In the encoding stage, the instruction first has to be 
encoded and the result of this encoding has to be stored in memory. The 
instruction "choose larger", for example, will be coded as [pick (large 
+)]. If then the two stimuli are presented, the codes of these two 
stimuli are generated by a "criterial process". If the value of a 
stimulus on the judgmental dimension is smaller than some fixed 
criterion value, then the stimulus will be coded as [small]. If it 
falls above the criterion value it will be coded as [large]. This 
criterion value (or cut-off point) usually is the middle of the 
judgmental dimension used in the experiment. This criterion value is 
not regarded as being absolutely fixed, but as varying stochastically 
around some mean value. 
The next processing stage is a choice stage which consists of two 
substages : discrimination and matching. The discrimination substage 
tests whether the two stimuli have different codings. If the two 
stimuli of a pair lie on opposite sides of the criterion the codings 
are different (e.g. SI[large], S2[small]). But if both stimuli lie on 
the same side of the criterion they will have the same discrete codes 
so that further information has to be added to the codes. The model 
implicitly assumes that this discrimination is guided by the coding the 
stimuli have before the discrimination stage. That is, if both stimuli 
are coded as [large], it is assumed that the larger one will be receded 
to [large +], holding the coding for the smaller one constant as 
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[large]. Correspondingly, two small stimuli will be receded to S1[small 
+], S2[small]. 
In principle, this stage adds discriminating information to the 
stimuli which before the discrimination stage had identical size codes. 
Discrimination is viewed as a time-consuming operation. 
The discrimination substage is followed by a matching substage 
which compares the codings of the instruction with the coding of the 
stimuli. If the stimuli lie on different sides of the criterion (e.g. 
S1[small] S2[large]) choosing the stimulus which matches the 
instruction ( [pick (large +)] or [pick (small +)] ) immediately leads 
to a correct response. In contrast, if the stimuli lie on the same side 
of the criterion a recoding of the stimuli will become necessary in 
some cases, in order to achieve a match of the instruction code with 
one of the stimulus codes. So, for example, if the stimuli are coded as 
S1[large +] S2[large] and the instruction code is [pick (small+J], the 
stimuli have to be receded to SI[small] S2[small+]. These recoding 
operations lead to a congruity effect. 
So, the discrete coding model for the standard relative judgment 
situation can be summarized by the following flowchart: 
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Fig. 12: FlowcharF of the discrete coding model for the case of 
relative judgment with instruction preceding the stimulus pair 
Two points should be stressed with respect to this model. First, 
it relies completely on discrete coding of the two stimuli, i.e. it is 
assumed that the relation between the two presented stimuli is not 
directly coded. Instead, the stimuli are coded separately with respect 
to a criterion value on the dimension of interest, i.e. without direct 
reference to each other. This coding is in fact nothing else than a 
coding of the absolute size of the objects with respect to the relevant 
domains of referents. The second point is that the concept of a 
criterion value dividing the relevant judgmental dimension into two 
subdimensions closely resembles the proposal by Clark et al. (1973) of 
a secondary reference point. However, whereas Clark et al. assume that 
the two objects are coded with direct reference to each other on such a 
subdimension (see below), the discrete coding model assumes that each 
of the stimuli is coded separately with respect to the criterion 
dividing the subdimensions. Congruity effects are due to potential 
recodings of this type of conceptual information. 
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5.1.2 Predictions of the discrete codina model for the experiments in 
Chapter 6 
If the discrete coding model were able to account for the results of 
the experiments in Chapters 4 and 6, the notion of potential conflicts 
between absolute and relative information should be abandoned. Absolute 
information alone, as coded according to the discrete coding model, 
would then be sufficient to explain the data. 
Therefore, in the following the predictions of the discrete coding 
model for the experiments of Chapter 6 will be derived. In the next 
section it will be checked whether the discrete coding model is 
consistent with the data of the experiments in Chapter 4. 
In the experiments to be reported in Chapter 6, conflicts between 
absolute and relative information were induced by presenting the 
subjects on half of the trials with two quite small figures of 
different size and on the other half of the trials with two quite big 
figures of different size. On each trial the smaller or the bigger 
figure could be marked by a cross as the topic of comparison. As in the 
experiments of Chapter 4, a PRE- and a POST- condition were realized. 
RT was always measured from the moment that the whole picture was 
available (figures and cross) to the moment subjects started naming the 
relation from the point of view of the topic figure (for details of 
these experiments see below, Chapter 6). 
In order to derive the predictions of the discrete coding model 
for this relation naming task we will refer to the flowchart of the 
model given above (Figure 12). 
In the POST-condition the first processing step will be the 
encoding of the two figures with respect to the criterion value. Two 
large figures should be both coded as [large], two quite small figures 
both as [small]. So the discrimination stage becomes operative; it 
recodes the larger of two large figures to [large +] or the smaller of 
two small figures to [small +]. Now the cross marking one of the 
figures as the topic appears and RT measurement starts. If the cross 
marks a figure coded as [large +] or [small-*-] this coding can guide the 
lexicalization process. In contrast, if the cross marks a figure coded 
as [large] or [small], just like in the matching substage of the 
relative judgment model, a receding becomes necessary which transforms 
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the actual codings of the two stimuli to the converse (e.g. Sltsmall], 
S2 [small +] — > S1[large +], S2[large] ). Only then can the coding be 
used to guide the lexicalization process. This leads to the prediction 
of a congruity effect in the POST-condition. 
Since the discrete coding model assumes separate coding of the two 
stimuli the subject cannot profit from knowing the position of the 
topic of comparison before picture presentation. So in the 
PRE-condition the subjects will go through the same processing steps as 
in the POST-condition. So again a congruity effect is to be expected. 
At the same time the overall level of RT should be higher in the PRE-
than in the POST-condition since in the PRE-condition encoding stage, 
discrimination stage, and a potential receding stage are included in RT 
whereas under the POST-condition only the potential recoding stages 
should be included in RT. 
So, in summary, the discrete coding model predicts a congruity 
effect for both presentation conditions, and at the same time a higher 
overall level of RT in the PRE- than in the POST-condition. The 
prediction of congruity effects for both presentation conditions is a 
consequence of the automaticity of the processes forming the stimulus 
codes and of their independence from information other than the one 
contained in the stimuli (cf. Marschark & Paivio,1979, p.176), in 
particular the independence of stimulus coding from knowledge about the 
topic. For the same reasons the discrete coding model also predicts a 
congruity effect for relative judgment tasks independently of the fact 
whether the instruction precedes or follows the stimulus pair (this 
point will be discussed below in more detail). 
5.1.3 Can the discrete coding model account for the results in 
Chapter 4? 
It is easy to verify that the discrete coding model can explain the 
results for 'different" trials in Experiments 2 and 5. Because only two 
figure sizes are realized, the stimuli should fall on different sides 
of the criterion. No discrimination process or recoding process is 
necessary. It is sufficient to identify the code that belongs to the 
figure which is marked as the topic. So the pattern of results for PRE-
and POST-conditions should be identical, with only a higher overall 
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level of RTs in the PRE-condition than in the POST-condition. This is 
in fact what was found. 
It should be stressed, however, that the discrete coding model has 
no mechanism to account for the markedness effects of Experiments 2 and 
5. Banks et al. (1975) indicate that their model could account for the 
markedness effects by assuming faster coding for stimuli as [large] 
than as [small]. But this interpretation locates the markedness effect 
in the stimulus encoding stage, so that such effects should emerge 
independent of the response mode (motoric vs vocal). This 
interpretation is clearly contradicted by the results of Experiment 3. 
What about the "same'-trials? In the POST-condition the correct 
answer 'same* can be computed before RT measurement starts; POST-trials 
should yield shorter RTs than PRE-trials (compare the above discussion 
of Experiments 2 and 5). 
But on PRE-trials the encoding and choice stage fall within the 
measured RT. On "different"-trials the information contained in the 
discrete coding is sufficient to guide response execution. But on 
"same'-trials the codes of the two stimuli should be identical so that 
a discrimination stage becomes necessary (see the flowchart of the 
discrete coding model above). The outcome of this discrimination stage 
should provide the necessary information for a "same"-response. 
•Same'-trials require one more processing step than different-trials; 
as a consequence the overall RT for "same'-trials should be longer than 
for 'different'-trials in Experiments 2 and 5. But this is not what was 
found (PRE-condition of Experiment 2: RT(same) = 625 msec, 
RT(different) = 622 msec, F(1,35) < 1; PRE-condition of Experiment 5: 
RT(same) = 617 msec, RT(different) = 637 msec, F(1,29) = 1.9; ρ = .18). 
5.1.4 The discrete coding model and results of relative judgment 
experiments 
Above, in 5.1.1., it was already pointed out that the discrete coding 
model has no difficulties in accounting for the relative judgment data 
usually found in the standard experimental procedure (i.e. instruction 
preceding the two simultaneously displayed stimuli). 
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But there are two further variants of relative judgment tasks 
which are of interest for the present discussion. 
The first of these variants concerns the situation in which the 
instruction is given after the presentation of the stimuli. The 
discrete coding model predicts a congruity effect independent of 
whether the instruction precedes or follows the stimulus pair. 
Banks & Flora (1977) explicitly tested whether this assumption of 
the discrete coding model really holds by comparing the RTs of relative 
judgments with the instruction preceding the stimuli against the RTs of 
relative judgments with the instruction following the stimuli. In the 
first condition RT was measured from the onset of the stimulus pair to 
the response, in the second condition RT was measured from the onset of 
the instruction to the response (with the stimulus pair presented 2 
seconds before presentation of the instruction; cf. Banks & Flora 1977, 
Expts. 3 and 4). They indeed found a congruity effect under both 
conditions, but the congruity effect was reduced when the instruction 
followed the stimuli. They take this as evidence for the discrete 
coding model, at the same time explaining the reduction of the 
congruity effect for the instruction following the stimulus pair by 
means of a preparation strategy, which the subjects use when inspecting 
the stimuli before the instruction. Such a strategy might work much the 
same way as the topic neutral coding strategy described above. 
The situation where the instruction follows the stimulus pair has 
of course much in common with the POST-condition of the relation naming 
experiments; subjects are given time to inspect and encode the stimuli 
before really knowing the precise task. And just as it was shown above 
that the discrete coding model predicts a congruity effect for the 
POST-condition of the relation naming task, Banks & Flora (1977) 
explicitly do so for the corresponding relative judgment situation with 
the instruction following the stimulus pair. It should be stressed, 
however, that the corresponding empirical evidence lacks consistency 
(e.g. Moyer & Landauer, 1967; Marschark & Paivio, 1979). This point 
will be taken up again when discussing the expectancy hypothesis model. 
In the second variant of relative judgment tasks the two stimuli 
are presented successively. Banks (1977) reports such an experiment in 
which the subjects were first presented with an instruction ("choose 
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larger/smaller"), then auditorily with the name of a large or small 
object, and 1 second later visually with the name of another large or 
small object. If the first stimulus was the correct choice subjects had 
to press a left button, if the second stimulus was the correct choice 
they had to press a right button. In a similar experiment, Wallis & 
Audley (1964) presented subjects with the instruction to choose the 
higher or lower of two tones which were presented successively after 
the instruction. For this situation the discrete coding model predicts 
a congruity effect independent of whether the first or the second 
stimulus is the correct choice. This should be the case because each 
stimulus is coded separately relative to the criterion and because the 
potential recoding operations which are responsible for congruity 
effects cannot start before both stimuli are encoded. But contrary to 
these predictions both experiments show a congruity effect only for the 
second stimulus being the correct choice, and not for the first 
stimulus being the correct choice. 
Banks (1977, p.143f) interprets this finding as evidence that some 
sort of relative coding takes place (i.e. coding of the stimuli with 
direct reference to each other) besides the coding of the absolute size 
of each of the stimuli separately. These findings, together with the 
interpretation by Banks, give further support (in addition to the error 
patterns of Experiments 2 and 5) for the idea of simultaneous coding of 
absolute and relative information. 
5.2 The model of Clark. Carpenter and Just: Coding comparisons with 
direct reference between the objects to be compared 
5.2.1 Description of the model 
The model of Clark et al. (1973) will be refered to in the following as 
"relative coding model", in order to stress its basic assumption that 
comparisons are coded with direct reference between the objects to be 
compared. Originally the model was developed for picture-sentence and 
sentence-picture verification tasks (see Chapter 2 above for a 
discussion of this application of the model). Clark et al. (1973) 
expanded the range of this model to include relative judgment tasks. 
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For the standard relative judgment task (instruction preceding the 
stimulus pair) the model assumes four basic stages-, encoding of the 
instruction, encoding of the stimulus pair, comparison of instruction 
and stimulus codes (with potential recoding operations) and response 
execution. The core of the model are the four principles guiding the 
coding of perceptual or symbolic comparisons. For ease of reference 
these principles will be repeated here: 
(1) If a previous context (e.g. a sentence) gives an explicit topic, 
then the subject will code the comparison from the point of view of 
this topic. 
(2) If one of the two stimuli is (perceptually) prominent or salient, 
then this stimulus will function as a tertiary reference point (TRP) 
and the other stimulus will be coded with respect to this reference 
point. 
(3) If the underlying dimension of comparison has a well defined 
secondary reference point (SRP), then the subject will use the SRP to 
specify two subdimensions and code the stimuli relative to each other 
on these subdimensions. 
(4) If principles (1) through (3), do not apply the subject will code 
the comparison in unmarked terms. 
In the standard relative judgment task first the instruction will 
be coded in a propositional format (e.g. "choose larger" as [? 
larger]). In the next step the stimuli are coded. If the subject has 
some idea of the relevant domain of referents (i.e., the subject knows 
or has induced that the stimuli are , for example, names of animals) he 
will establish an SRP for this domain of referents and apply principle 
(3); two small stimuli will be coded relative to each other in terms of 
their smallness (i.e., by means of the relation "smaller') and two 
large stimuli in terms of their largeness (i.e., by means of the 
relation "larger"). 
In the next stage the subject will try to match the instruction 
code and the stimulus code in order to determine the correct response. 
If instruction and stimuli are both coded with the same relation he 
will immediately succeed. Otherwise the stimuli have to be receded to 
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the converse relation (e.g. [A larger B] — > [B smaller A]). Only 
after this recoding can the correct answer be determined. This recoding 
operation is responsible for the typical congruity effect. 
This explanation of the congruity effect implies that principles 
(1) and (2) are not applicable, since the relative coding model assumes 
that the four principles are tested in the order (1) to (4) for 
applicability, with the highest applicable principle governing the 
encoding. 
With the formulation of principle (1) given above it is clear that 
a preceding instruction (like 'choose larger") or a preceding 
wh-question (like "which is larger?") should not influence stimulus 
coding since this kind of instruction or question does not explicitly 
name a topic of comparison. However, Clark has also given an 
alternative formulation of principle (1). According to this formulation 
subjects tend to code the relation between two stimuli in terms of the 
relation used in the preceding expression (for this analysis see also 
Trabasso, 1973). As long as one is dealing with sentence-picture 
verification this difference is marginal because both versions of 
principle (1) lead to the same predictions (see the discussion above in 
Chapter 2). 
However, for relative judgment tasks the two formulations lead to 
different predictions. If stimulus coding is influenced by an 
explicitly named topic, a preceding instruction or wh-question should 
not determine the stimulus coding. In this case, principle (3) should 
come into play (at least if principle (2) is not applied), with as 
result a congruity effect. In contrast, if stimulus coding is 
influenced by the relation contained in an utterance preceding the 
stimuli, principle (1) should be applied instead of principle (3), 
resulting in the absence of a congruity effect. 
The available data show that congruity effects are quite 
consistently found with questions preceding the stimuli (e.g. Audley & 
Wallis (1964): 'Which (of two lights) is darker/brighter?'; Ellis 
(1972): "Which (of two pictorially given persons) is older/younger?") 
and with instructions preceding the stimuli (e.g. Narks (1972) with the 
instruction to choose the more/less likely of two events). 
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That is, a previously defined relation does not influence the 
coding of the two stimuli, whereas a previously defined topic does (as 
the results of sentence-picture verification experiments show). This 
view has further support from an unpublished experiment by Maassen & 
Levelt (1981). In this experiment subjects were either first presented 
with a syntactic frame like "... above ..." and then with a 
corresponding picture of two figures which had to be described by means 
of the syntactic frame or first with the picture and then with the 
syntactic frame. The experiment addressed the question whether 
presenting a syntactic frame before the picture would enable the 
subjects to immediately code the figures in the right order. The 
pattern of description onset latencies showed that this was not the 
case. Note that the syntactic frames presented before the picture 
define a relation between objects, but not a topic. The results of this 
experiment, then, again show that a previously defined relation does 
not influence perceptual coding. That is, there are no natural 
preferences for coding perceptual events in terms of certain relations 
(see Experiment 1), nor can such a preference be induced by presenting 
subjects verbally with a certain relation before the stimulus 
presentation. 
Finally, it should be noted that the Clarkian model is not a pure 
relative coding model. Certainly the application of principle (3) 
requires some kind of absolute coding (in the sense of a "first 
impression" on the absolute size), in order to determine the 
subdimension on which the stimuli are to be coded. This gives further 
support to the notion that both kinds of information play a role in 
relative judgment, though the Clarkian model is not really explicit 
about this. 
5.2.2 Predictions of the relative coding model for the experiments in 
Chapter 6 
In the relation naming task the perceptual comparison has to be encoded 
first. In the POST-condition the subjects should apply principle (3) 
since the experimental procedure stresses establishing an SRP, with the 
two quite small figures falling below SRP, and the two quite big 
figures falling above SRP. Receding to the converse has to take place 
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if the cross marks the smaller of two quite big figures or the larger 
of two quite small figures. By consequence, congruity effects should 
show up in the POST-condition. If the subjects apply an optimal 
preparation strategy, however, a topic neutral coding should be built 
up and, therefore, no congruity effects should show up. 
In the PRE-condition subjects will apply principle (1) because 
they know which figure is going to be the topic of comparison before 
the encoding of the picture is started. Therefore, the subjects will 
always code the picture in a manner which is congruent with the answer 
to be given, so that there should be no congruity effect under the 
PRE-condition. 
5.2.3 Can the relative coding model account for the results in 
Chapter 4? 
This point has already been discussed in Chapters 3 and 4 where it was 
shown that the relative coding model can account for the data only if 
an additional topic neutral coding strategy in the POST-condition is 
assumed. 
5.2.4 The relative coding model and results of relative judgment 
experiments 
As with the discrete coding model, the results of the two mentioned 
variants of relative judgment tasks (instruction following the stimulus 
pair, and successive presentation of the two stimuli) will be discussed 
with respect to the relative coding model. 
Like the discrete coding model, the relative coding model predicts 
a congruity effect for both presentation situations, i.e. the 
instruction following or preceding the stimuli; in both situations 
principle (3) should be operative. It has already been pointed out 
above that the evidence concerning this point lacks consistency, some 
experiments showing congruity effects with the instruction following 
the stimuli and some not. This difference in the pattern of results is 
probably due to whether the experimental situation allows for an 
optimal preparation strategy or not. 
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For successive presentation of the stimuli the predictions of the 
relative coding model are quite unclear. One could assume that the 
first stimulus will be regarded as the topic of the comparison and that 
the comparison will always be coded from the point of view of this 
first stimulus. But then principle (3) should not come into play so 
that no congruity effect should show up, neither for the first stimulus 
being the correct choice nor for the second stimulus being the correct 
choice. The same predictions hold if the first stimulus is regarded as 
the reference point of the comparison. On the other hand, if the 
subjects do apply principle (3) independent of the fact which stimulus 
comes first, one should expect a congruity effect for the first as well 
as for the second stimulus being the correct choice. None of these 
predictions is consistent with the data of Banks (1977) and Wallis & 
Audley (1964) . 
5.3 The expectancy hypothesis model of Marschark and Paivio (1979) 
5.3.1 Description of the model 
According to this model an instruction preceding the stimulus pair in a 
relative judgment task will influence the processing of the stimuli by 
preparing the subject for a certain range of stimuli. So, for example, 
a "choose larger" instruction will set the subject to expect two quite 
large stimuli. If this expectation turns out to be correct RT will be 
reduced, if it turns out to be incorrect RT will be increased, thus 
yielding the typical congruity effect. 
The crucial evidence with respect to this model is to demonstrate 
a congruity effect with the instruction preceding the stimulus pair, 
and no congruity effect with the instruction following the stimulus 
pair. For the latter condition, this prediction is exactly opposed to 
the discrete and the relative coding model which, in their pure 
versions, predict congruity effects for both presentation conditions 
(see above). Under the assumption of an optimal preparation strategy, 
however, the models make the same predictions. 
More importantly, the expectancy hypothesis model makes explicit 
assumptions about the relationship between congruity effects and 
markedness effects, an issue which has been neglected until now in the 
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present discussion. The expectancy hypothesis predicts that markedness 
effects and congruity effects should be mutually exclusive. That is, if 
the instruction precedes the stimuli the subjects will be predisposed 
to expect stimuli from the range indicated by the instruction thereby 
producing a congruity effect. But since the subjects are given time to 
process the comparative before the stimulus pair is presented this. 
should eliminate a markedness effect. In contrast, if the stimulus pair 
precedes the instruction the subjects have no expectation with respect 
to the range of the stimuli. This should eliminate a congruity effect. 
However, the response immediately follows the processing of the 
instruction so that this processing should be reflected in a markedness 
effect. 
Marschark & Paivio (1979) tested for this prediction. In their 
Experiment 1 subjects were first presented with the instruction for 1 
second and then with the stimulus pair. RT was measured from the onset 
of the stimulus pair to the response. In their Experiment 2 subjects 
were first presented with the stimulus pair for 3 seconds and then with 
the instruction. RT was measured from the onset of the instruction to 
the response. 
In accordance with the assumption of markedness effects and 
congruity effects being mutually exclusive, they found a congruity 
effect but no markedness effect in Experiment 1, and a markedness 
effect but no congruity effect in Experiment 2. 
But it has already been pointed out above that the evidence 
concerning the emergence of a congruity effect with the instruction 
following the stimuli lacks consistency (cf. the results of Banks & 
Flora, 1977). It might be that the time subjects are given to 
preprocess the stimuli before the instruction is presented (2 sec in 
Banks & Flora, 1977, Exp. 4; 3 sec in Marschark & Paivio, 1979, Exp. 2) 
is determining the differences in the pattern of results. Longer time 
intervals between presentation of the stimuli and presentation of the 
instruction will probably favour an optimal preparation strategy. 
The critical statistical evidence in this line of argument 
concerns the emergence of only a congruity effect, only a markedness 
effect, or both effects. According to the generally used argumentation, 
a pure congruity effect should show up as an interaction between 
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absolute size level of the stimuli and the instruction. The advantage 
of "choose larger" over "choose smaller" for two quite large stimuli 
should be of the same size as the advantage of "choose smaller" over 
"choose larger" for two quite small figures. In contrast, a pure 
narkedness effect should show up as an advantage of "choose larger' 
over "choose smaller" instructions of the same size for two quite large 
and two quite small figures. Finally, simultaneous effects of congruity 
and markedness should show up as a so called "funnel effect". That is, 
the advantage of "choose smaller" instructions over "choose larger" 
instructions for two quite small figures should be smaller in size than 
the advantage of "choose larger" instructions over "choose smaller" 
instructions for two quite big figures. Statistically this should show 
up as a congruity interaction and a main effect of markedness. 
But this argumentation which has been used by Marschark & Paivio 
(1979) and a number of other authors relies on a set of untested 
implicit assumptions concerning the subjective organization of 
congruity which need not necessarily be true. It conceives of congruity 
as a trichotomy: either congruity with a "smaller'-instruction, or 
congruity with a "larger'-instruction, or a neutral congruity value. 
Under the additional assumption that the facilitating or inhibiting 
effects of congruity and incongruity on RT are of the same size for 
both types of instructions, one should in fact expect an absolute 
symmetrical cross-over interaction if only congruity plays a role. An 
additional independent markedness effect should then yield the funnel 
effect described above. Statistically this should show up as a 
significant congruity interaction and a main effect of markedness. 
However, congruity could just as well be some kind of continuous 
dimension yielding different degrees of congruity with the responses. 
If one then realizes stimuli where the two big figures are "more 
congruent" with a "bigger'-response than the two small figures with a 
"smaller'-response, the pattern of a funnel effect (i.e., of a 
significant congruity effect together with a significant markedness 
effect) cannot be decisive evidence for simultaneous effects of 
congruity and markedness. 
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5.3.2 Predictions of the expectancy hypothesis model for the 
experiments in Chapter 6 
The predictions of the expectancy hypothesis model for the relation 
naming experiments to be reported in Chapter 6 are straightforward. 
Because in neither presentation condition (PRE vs POST) an instruction 
or question precedes the stimuli, the subjects should never be 
predisposed to expect stimuli from a certain range on the underlying 
dimension. So in neither presentation condition should a congruity 
effect show up. On the other hand, in both cases processing of the 
comparative, i.e. lexicalization, should be reflected in the RTs. So 
for both conditions a markedness effect due to lexicalization 
difficulty should show up, just as for the experiments in Chapter 4. 
5.3.3 Can the expectancy hypothesis model account for the results in 
Chapter 4? 
As in the experiments to be reported in Chapter 6, in the Experiments 2 
and 5 the stimuli were not preceded by a comparative, so that the 
subjects were not predisposed to expect stimuli from a certain range on 
the underlying dimension. So only markedness effects should be found 
for both presentation conditions. This is in fact what was found. 
5.4 'Double coding' as an alternative model: Coding absolute and 
relative size 
So far, theoretical and empirical evidence has been gathered in support 
of the notion that both absolute and relative information play a role 
in relation naming tasks. First, the error patterns of Experiments 2 
and 5 showed that in relation naming tasks subjects tend to err in the 
direction of naming the absolute size of the figure marked by the 
cross. 
Second, a careful theoretical analysis of the Clarkian model also 
points towards this direction. We discussed that to code the relation 
between two stimuli on subdimensions (Clark's principle (3)) the 
perceiver must first have an impression of the absolute sizes of the 
two objects (relative to SRP) in order to determine the relevant 
subdimension. That is, the relative coding has to be preceded at least 
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by an impression of the absolute size of the two objects. 
Finally, the results of relative judgment experiments with 
successive presentation of the stimuli (Banks, 1977; Wallis & Audley, 
1964) cannot be explained by the assumption of absolute coding alone, 
nor by the assumption of relative coding alone. 
Taken together, one should seriously consider the possibility that 
absolute and relative size information simultaneously affect the 
performance in such tasks. 
In the following, therefore, a model will be presented which 
incorporates this assumption. 
5.4.1 General outline of the model 
Let us begin with an informal consideration of what might happen in a 
relation naming task.— From the picture presented the subject gets an 
impression of the absolute size of each of the two presented figures 
independently (but relative to the relevant domain of figures). Next 
the subject derives the relation between the two figures. From the 
resulting conceptual representation the information relevant for the 
task is extracted. In the case of the relation naming task this is the 
relative information. If absolute and relative information on the topic 
of the comparison are in conflict with each other, this extraction (or 
choice) process can be hindered by an interference of the absolute 
information with the relevant relative information. Finally, after 
choosing the correct conceptual information the lexicalization process 
is initialized, i.e. the task-relevant information will be used to 
access the corresponding lexical item. 
Hence, there are three major steps: (i) the building up of a 
conceptual representation of the picture, (ii) the extraction of those 
parts of the conceptual representation which are relevant with respect 
to the experimental task, the communicative goal etc., and finally, 
(iii) the mapping of this extracted information onto lexical items 
(i.e. the lexicalization process in a narrow sense). 
The first processing step -the building up of a conceptual 
representation of the picture- is guided by two principles. 
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(1) The absolute size of each of the figures is coded independent 
of whether the topic of the perceptual comparison is already given. A 
figure's size is coded as its position on the underlying dimension of 
comparison with respect to some standard (or SRP) on this dimension. Or 
to put it differently, the absolute size is only "absolute" given the 
domain of referents talked about. 
(2) The coding of the relation between the two figures depends on 
whether or not the topic of comparison is already given at the moment 
that the figures are displayed. Whenever the topic of the comparison is 
previously given (from a preceding utterance or by a cross marking the 
position where the figure representing the topic will appear) the 
subjects will make use of this information by coding the relation 
between the figures from the topic to the other figure (i.e. the 
reference object). When there is no previously given topic, as in the 
POST-conditions, the subject will code the comparison in a way which 
gives an optimal preparation for the response, independent of which of 
the two figures will later turn out to be the topic. This will be in a 
form which can be circumscribed as 'a is the bigger one, b is the 
smaller one". 
The second processing step consists of extracting the 
task-relevant relative information. This stage could be responsible for 
potential congruity effects. 
The third processing step encompasses the lexicalization process 
in a narrow sense; the conceptual information extracted has to be 
mapped onto the corresponding lexical item. It is in this stage that 
markedness effects should show up. 
In summary, the present model diverges from other models of 
picture-sentence verification and relative judgment in two respects. 
First, it is based on two intuitively quite plausible assumptions, 
namely the assumption of a 'first impression of absolute size" and the 
assumption of an "optimal preparation strategy" for cases where the 
topic of comparison is not known in advance and stimulus processing is 
not under time pressure. Chapter 4 already presented evidence in favour 
of both assumptions. Second, it gives a different account of congruity 
effects: congruity effects are not explained any more by receding 
operations, but rather by interference between simultaneously existing 
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but conflicting types of conceptual information which set up divergent 
tendencies for the lexicalization process. 
In the next sections it will be discussed whether this model can 
account for the data of the experiments of Chapter 4, and what 
predictions this model makes for the experiments to be reported in 
Chapter 6. The evaluation of the correspondence between the model and 
the data will crucially depend on the interpretation of the "anchor 
points' of the reaction times measured, i.e., on which processes are 
included in RT. Ideally the three processing steps should be strictly 
serial. In the PRE-condition, then, all three steps should be included 
in the measured RT, whereas in the POST-condition the perceptual 
encoding and the extraction of the task relevant information should 
already be completed before RT-measurement starts. 
Graphically the situation can be displayed in the following way: 
1 J 1 ! χ >
 ti m e 
I I I I I I I I 
I absolute relative information I lexicali- I articulatory 
I encoding extraction I zation I response 
I I I execution 
I I I 
begin RT begin RT begin RT 
PRE POST articulation 
(see Exp. 4) 
Figure 13: Processing steps and assumed measurment points for relation 
naming tasks 
In addition to the three processing steps described above, the 
figure also includes the articulatory response execution stage which 
has to follow the lexicalization process. The results of Experiment 4 
show that the differences in the RTs of the Experiments 2 and 5 cannot 
be attributed to this stage. 
5.4.2 How does the model account for the results of the experiments 
in Chapter 4? 
In the PRE-conditions of Experiments 2 and 5 the subjects are first 
presented with a cross indicating where the topic figure is going to 
appear. When 1.5 sec later the figures appear the .subject will first 
code their absolute size relative to SRP. Because there were only two 
figure sizes realized in these experiments, this will result in 
propositions of the type [A < SRP] [B > SRP] for 'differenf-trials of 
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a figure A being smaller than a figure B. In the next step the direct 
relation between the figures will be coded as [A < B] or [B > A] for A 
or В being marked as the topic. For two small figures of equal size the 
absolute coding will be [A < SRP], [B < SRP], and for two big figures 
of equal size [A > SRP], [B > SRP]. The relation between the two 
figures will be coded as [A = B]. 
In the next step the task relevant relative information has to be 
extracted which in turn guides the lexicalization process. The 
necessary processing steps and the resulting codes can be taken from 
Figure 14. 
presentation of 
the picture 
code absolute 
s ize 
yes (=PRE) topic no (=POST) 
already 
Í known I 
ion from code re la t ion neutral ly 
viewpoint of topic with respect to topic 
stimulus 
p icture(1 ) 
absolute 
code (2) 
r e l a t i v e 
code (2,3) 
А Л 
+ 
a<SRP 
b>SRP 
a < b 
+ 
a<SRP 
& 
b>SRP 
b > a 
ΔΔ 
+ 
a<SRP 
& 
b<SRP 
a = b 
ΔΔ 
+ 
a>SRP 
& 
b>SRP 
a = b 
Δ Λ 
+ 
a<SRP 
S. 
b>SRP 
a < 
b > 
ΔΛ 
+ 
a<SRP 
& 
b>SRP 
a < 
b > 
Δ Δ 
+ 
a<SRP 
& 
b<SRP 
a = b 
ΛΛ 
+ 
a>SRP 
S< 
b>SRP 
a = b 
(1) The stimuli are given without taking into account that each stiimilus can 
also occur with the left and right figure interchanged. Interchanqinq 
the left and right figure should yield the saiee codes. 
(2) "a" always refers to the left figure, "b" always to the right figure. 
(3) "a<"l "a>" etc. express a topic neutral coding which can be 
described as "a is the bigger/saaller one". 
Fig. 14: Processes in encoding a perceptual comparison, and the 
resul t ing codes. 
I t i s easy to verify from Figure 14 t h a t in none of the cases absolute 
and re la t ive information are real ly conf l ict ing. Furthermore no 
recoding processes are necessary so t h a t only markedness effects due to 
lexical izat ion d i f f icu l ty should show up. This i s in fact what was 
found in Experiments 2 through 5. 
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Furthermore, from inspection of Figure 14 it is easy to verify 
that the pattern of errors which showed up with "same"-trials are in 
fact explainable by the assumption that in these cases the absolute 
instead of the relative information guides lexicalization. 
For the POST-condition the same absolute codings as for the 
PRE-condition will be built up. Furthermore, the subjects will, 
according to principle (2) given above, build up a coding of the 
relation between the two figures which is neutral with respect to the 
two still possible topics. This is expressed in Figure 14 by the 
notation [A <], [B >]. This notation is meant to express something like 
"A is the smaller one", "B is the bigger one". With "same'-trials, in 
contrast, identifying that the relation "same" holds between the two 
figures is sufficient, and the marking of one of the two figures as the 
topic can just be taken as a signal in response to which the answer 
same has to be pronounced. This assumption is clearly confirmed by the 
finding of faster "same"-RTs than "differenf-RTs in the POST-condition 
(and by the finding that the RTs for articulating gelijk ("same") in 
response to a signal in Experiment 4 are of about the same size as the 
corresponding relation naming latencies in the POST-conditions of 
Experiments 2 and 5). 
However, as the pattern of errors shows, even in the 
POST-condition sometimes the absolute information is erroneously chosen 
to guide the lexicalization process. 
So, in summary, the double coding model predicts that markedness 
effects are due to the lexicalization process and not to perceptual 
coding processes or properties of the resulting mental representation. 
This is clearly confirmed by the results of Experiment 3 which shows 
that the markedness effect vanishes with a motoric response mode. 
Finally, the results of Experiment 4 confirm the assumption that the 
measured RT in the POST-condition does not contain only the 
articulatory response execution stage. This is in agreement with the 
time course of the processing stages and the anchor points of measured 
RTs for the different presentation conditions as displayed above in 
Figure 13. 
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5.4.3 Predictions of the double codino model for the experiments in 
Chapter 6 
Against the background of the preceding section and by reference to 
Figure 15, it is easy to derive the predictions for the experiments of 
Chapter 6. 
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the picture 
• 
code absolute 
size 
yes (=PRE) topic no (=POST) 
already 
known | 
ion from code relation neutrally 
viewpoint of topic with respect to topic 
stimulus 
picture(l) 
absolute 
code (2) 
relative 
code (2,3) 
Δ Δ 
+ 
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& 
b<SRP 
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ΔΛ 
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a < b 
ΔΛ 
+ 
a>SRP 
s. 
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(1), (2) and (3) a in Figure 14 
Fig. 15: Processes in encoding a perceptual comparison, and the 
resulting codes 
Two quite small figures will be coded as both falling below SRP, two 
quite large figures as both falling above SRP. Furthermore, in the 
PRE-condition, the subjects will make use of the knowledge which figure 
is going to be the topic figure by coding the relation between the 
figures from the point of view of this figure. In contrast, in the 
POST-condition the same topic neutral coding as for the POST-conditions 
of the experiments in Chapter 4 will obtain. 
In the PRE-condition, according to Figure 13, all three processing 
steps should be reflected in RT so that conflicts between absolute and 
relative information should show up as a congruity effect (for a 
similar interpretation of congruity effects as an interference of two 
perceptual informations or codes cf. Clark & Browne11, 1975). 
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In the POST-condition, however, only the selection of the relative 
code of the topic, lexicalization stage, and response execution stages 
should be reflected in RT. So, in the POST-condition there should be a 
markedness effect, but no congruity effect. 
Furthermore, in both presentation conditions errors should show up 
which are explainable by the assumption that the wrong part of the 
conceptual information is chosen as input for the lexicalization 
process. That is, errors should primarily show up in conditions where 
absolute and relative information are in conflict with each other. 
The theoretical conception of congruity effects developed above 
suggests a comparison with STROOP-tasks in so far as one of two 
(potentially conflicting) attributes of a stimulus has to be selected. 
However in most demonstrations of the STROOP-effect either the critical 
or the intrusive attribute is something linguistic in nature, whereas 
in the present study both attributes are perceptual in nature. Most 
theoretical interpretations of the STROOP-phenomenon assume that the 
interference is due to response competition, i.e. due to the 
competition of the responses to the two attributes for a single channel 
output mechanism. In contrast, the present view attributes the 
interference to the selection of one of the attributes as basis of the 
to-be-given response. 
Palef (197Θ) presents evidence that interference of two perceptual 
attributes occurs at an early processing stage whereas interference of 
a perceptual and a linguistic attribute occurs at some later stage. In 
her experiment subjects had to respond to (1) the meaning of a spatial 
word ("above" or "below"), (2) its absolute position on a display (high 
vs low), or (3) its relative position with respect to a simultaneously 
displayed asterisk, while attempting to ignore the two irrelevant 
dimensions of the display. Word meaning and absolute position affected 
the speed of relative position judgments in an additive manner 
suggesting that the interference of these two types of information with 
the critical relative position information takes place at different 
stages. No STROOP-like effects were found with the other two types of 
judgment. 
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The additional finding that judgments of absolute position are 
given faster than judgments of word meaning (and judgments of word 
meaning faster than judgments of relative position) suggests 
furthermore that interference of two perceptual informations is to be 
located at an earlier processing stage than interference of a 
perceptual and a linguistic information (see also Clark & Brownell 
(1975) for results suggesting a localization of the interference of two 
perceptual informations at an early stage, namely the stimulus encoding 
stage). 
In general, it appears that theories of relative judgment locate 
the congruity effect either in the encoding stage (e.g., the expectancy 
hypothesis model) or in some recoding operation during the comparison 
stage (e.g., the discrete coding model) whereas the similar effect in 
STROOP-tasks is usually located in the response stage. Interestingly 
enough there are almost no attempts to establish one theoretical 
interpretation for the similar kinds of effects in these two paradigms 
(but see Banks & Root (1979) for a discussion of this aspect). The 
conception of congruity effects presented above takes, in some sense, 
an intermediate position between these two conceptions. On the one 
hand, as with theories of the STROOP-effect, it is assumed that the two 
(potentially conflicting) perceptual informations are coded separately, 
on the other hand it is assumed that interference does occur at a stage 
prior to response generation. 
5.5 On possible relations between markedness and conoruitv 
The preceding discussion of the four models was almost exclusively 
restricted to the issue of congruity effects under the two presentation 
conditions. A discussion of the relation between congruity effects and 
markedness effects was left out until now, with the exception of the 
expectancy hypothesis model. 
The expectancy hypothesis model predicts that markedness effects 
and congruity effects are mutually exclusive. Furthermore it was shown 
that the expectancy hypothesis model should predict a markedness effect 
without a congruity effect for both presentation conditions of the 
experiments in Chapter 6. Because the markedness effect is attributed 
to the processing of the lexical item, the markedness effect should be 
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obtained with a vocal response mode, but not with a motoric response 
mode. 
The discrete coding model has no mechanism to account for the 
markedness effect, so that it is difficult to judge what the relation 
between markedness and congruity should be. However, Banks et al. 
(1975) indicate in an informal manner that markedness effects could 
possibly be attributed to faster coding of stimuli as [large] than as 
[small] (see also the above discussion of the model). This explanation 
locates the markedness effect in the stimulus encoding stage; 
markedness effects should be obtained whenever the encoding stage is 
included in the measured RT, independent of the type of response to be 
given (motoric, vocal). 
The relative coding model attributes the congruity effect to 
potential recodings of the stimuli and attributes -as a model of 
verification- the markedness effect to the encoding of the linguistic 
input. Extrapolating this assumption to the relation naming tasks it is 
plausible to ascribe the markedness effect to the lexicalization stage. 
That is, congruity effects should show up with a vocal as well as a 
motoric response mode, whereas markedness effects should only show up 
with a vocal response mode. 
Since the double coding model ascribes congruity effects to 
potential interferences of absolute and relative perceptual codes, and 
markedness effects to the lexicalization stage, these effects should be 
independent of each other. That is, the double coding model predicts 
congruity effects in the PRE- but not in the POST-condition. With a 
vocal response mode this pattern should be accompanied by a markedness 
effect, which should vanish with a motoric response mode. 
It has already been pointed out above, in discussing the 
expectancy hypothesis model, that the interpretation of a funnel effect 
as evidence for the simultaneous effects of markedness and congruity is 
not necessarily correct. This interpretation crucially depends on the 
subjective organization of congruity and the selection of the absolute 
size levels in the experiment. An asymmetrical interaction in the form 
of a funnel effect can always be hypothesized as being a symmetrical 
cross-over interaction by extrapolating beyond the range of stimulus 
sizes used in the actual experiment (for a related argument see 
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Henning, 1977). However, the comparison of the congruity interaction 
with a vocal response mode as opposed to a motoric response mode, can 
give a hint as to whether both effects are at work. For models which 
predict a markedness effect only with a vocal response mode, going from 
the vocal to the motoric response mode should change the congruity 
pattern in a way which is compatible with the idea of eliminating 
markedness effects. 
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6. Experiments on conqruitv and markedness 
In the experiments to be reported in this chapter, absolute and 
relative information were systematically brought into conflict with one 
another. There were four figures of different size (or length). Two of 
them were quite large, two of them quite small. Only the two large 
figures or the two small figures appeared together on the display. 
Thereby a judgmental dimension should be induced with an SRP in the 
middle of the dimension, i.e. with two of the four figures falling 
below SRP and the other two figures falling above it. As in the 
experiments of Chapter 4 a PRE- and a POST-condition were realized. 
In order to test for the predictions of the four different models 
three experiments were conducted. In Experiment 6 subjects had to name 
relations on the dimension of size. In Experiment 7 it was tested 
whether the pattern of results of Experiment 6 also generalizes to 
relation naming on the dimension of length. Finally, Experiment 8 
replicated Experiment 7, with the vocal responses being substituted by 
motoric (pushbutton) responses. 
The predictions of the four models as derived above can be 
summarized as follows: 
For the PRE-condition the relative coding model and the expectancy 
hypothesis model predict the absence of a congruity interaction. In 
contrast, the discrete coding model and the double coding model do 
predict a congruity effect in the PRE-condition. For the discrete 
coding model the pattern of results should be the same for vocal and 
motoric response mode since it ascribes markedness effects to the 
stimulus encoding stage. For the other three models going from vocal to 
motoric response mode should change the pattern of results in a way 
which is compatible with the elimination of markedness effects because 
these models ascribe the markedness effect to processing on the 
linguistic level. 
For the POST-conditions the predictions of the models are not so 
straightforward. This because the "pure* versions of the models could 
be contaminated by application of an optimal preparation strategy. Such 
an optimal preparation strategy would give the prediction of no 
congruity effect in the POST-condition for all four models. The 
discrete coding model additionally predicts no markedness effect with 
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either response mode since it ascribes the markedness effect to the 
stimulus encoding stage. The other three models predict markedness 
effects with a vocal response mode, but not with a motoric response 
mode, since they ascribe this effect to the linguistic level. In their 
"pure" versions only the expectancy hypothesis model and the double 
coding model predict absence of a congruity effect in the 
POST-condition. 
6.1 Experiment 6: Congruity and markedness in naming relations on the 
dimension of size 
Experiment 6 tested the predictions of the four models for naming 
relations on the dimension of size. 
6.1.1 Materials 
The pictures consisted of two geometric figures positioned to the left 
and the right side of the middle of the screen. The two figures of a 
picture were either two (equilateral) triangles or two circles of 
different size. On half of the pictures the figures were both quite 
small (triangles of a side length and circles of a diameter of 3 cm and 
1.5 cm), on the other half of the pictures they were both quite large 
(triangles of a side length and circles of a diameter of 6 cm and 4.5 
cm). Furthermore the figure to be marked by the cross could be in left 
or right position, and the figure so marked could be the smaller or 
larger figure of the picture. So there are 16 picture types: 2 (figure 
types: triangle vs circle) χ 2 (absolute size level: low vs high) χ 2 
(position of the figure marked by the cross: left vs right) χ 2 (size 
relation between the two figures from the figure marked by the cross, 
and thereby response: 'bigger" vs 'smaller'). Just as in Experiment 2 
each of these 16 picture types was realized 5 times in each of the 
presentation conditions (PRE vs POST). So each subject received a total 
of 160 trials (plus 8 practice trials at the beginning of each 
presentation condition). 
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6.1.2 Procedure 
The procedure was identical to the procedure in Experiment 2. Also the 
randomizations were constructed in the same way as in Experiment 2. But 
in contrast to Experiment 2 there were only two kinds of vocal 
responses to be given ("bigger", "smaller"). Furthermore, together with 
the instruction subjects were shown the whole set of figures to be used 
in the experiment. In an upper row the four circles were shown in an 
ascending order from left to right, and in a lower row the 
corresponding triangles. By this fixation of an SRP (or implicit 
standard) in the middle of the whole figure series should be induced. 
34 subjects participated in the experiment. All subjects were 
students at the University of Nijmegen and all of them were native 
speakers of Dutch. They were paid 8.50 hfl for participation in the 
experiment. 
6.1.3 Results 
Two subjects had to be excluded from analysis because of a technical 
error. For the remaining 32 subjects the naming latencies were first 
corrected for correct operation of the voice-key in the same way as in 
Experiments 2, 4 and 5. The means of the corrected latencies for 
correct responses over replications of the same trial type were 
calculated for each subject (for an analysis of the erroneous responses 
see below). Then these mean RTs were analyzed separately for PRE- and 
POST-condition via an analysis of variance with the factors subjects, 
figure type (triangle vs circle), absolute size level (low vs high), 
position of the figure marked by the cross (left vs right) and response 
type (larger vs smaller). 
Figure 16 shows the latencies in the PRE-condition with respect to 
the factors figure type, absolute size level and response type. Figure 
17 shows the corresponding latencies for the POST-condition. 
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The analysis of variance for the PRE-condition shows a highly 
significant interaction between response type ("bigger" vs "smaller") 
and absolute size level (F(1,31) = 45.9, MSe = 3190, p<.0001). This 
interaction is in agreement with a congruity effect. Besides this 
congruity effect there is an additional main effect of the markedness 
of the vocal response (F(1,31) = 13.26, MSe = 5493, ρ = .001, 
RT(groter) =566 msec, RT(kleiner) =589 msec). 
The analysis of variance for the POST-condition also shows a main 
effect of the markedness of the vocal response (FU,31) = 10.63, MSe = 
5658, ρ =.0027, RT(groter) = 515 msec, RT(kleiner) = 538 msec). But the 
interaction of response type and absolute size level clearly does not 
reach significance (F(1,31) < 1, MSe = 7012). A corresponding analysis 
of variance of the RTs in the PRE-condition versus those in the 
POST-condition in fact shows that the congruity effect interacts with 
presentation condition, thereby indicating that the congruity pattern 
significantly differs between the two presentation conditions (F(1,31) 
= 11.84, MSe = 4866, ρ = .0017 for the three-way interaction between 
presentation condition, absolute size level, and response type). 
114 
However, inspection of Figure 17 reveals that the latency pattern 
in the POST-condition is not identical for the two figure types (circle 
vs triangle). This is reflected in a significant two-way interaction of 
figure type and absolute size level (F(1,31) = 8.4, MSe = 2920, ρ = 
.0068), as well as a significant three-way interaction of figure type, 
absolute size level and response (F(1,31) = 5.73, MSe = 5103, ρ = 
.023). The latter interaction is due to a congruity effect for the 
figure type "circle" (F(1(31) = 4.9, MSe = 4665, p=.034 in an analysis 
of variance for the figure type "circle") which does not show up for 
the figure type "triangle" (F(1,31) = 1.1, MSe = 7451, ρ = .30). For 
both types of figures a markedness effect shows up (for "triangles" 
F(1,31) = 4.8, MSe = 7706, ρ = .036; for "circles" F(1,31) = 6.0, MSe = 
4007, ρ = .02). 
Finally, as in the Experiments 2 and 5, the overall latency in the 
POST-condition is smaller than in the PRE-condition (but the difference 
of 52 msec is smaller than the differences found in Experiments 2 and 
5). 
So, in summary, in the PRE-condition there is a congruity 
interaction and a main effect of markedness. The latter effect also 
shows up in the POST-condition. As to the congruity effect, the results 
in the POST-condition are less clear; for "triangles" there is clearly 
no congruity effect, but for "circles" there is still a congruity 
effect, though reduced. 
6.1.4 Discussion 
The finding of a congruity effect in the PRE-condition clearly 
contradicts the predictions of the relative coding model and the 
expectancy hypothesis model. But it is consistent with both the double 
coding model and the discrete coding model. The pure versions of these 
two models (i.e., without the assumption of an optimal preparation 
strategy) differ in their predictions for the POST-condition. The 
discrete coding model predicts a congruity effect and the double coding 
model predicts no congruity effect. The latency pattern of the 
POST-condition, however, does not allow for a decision between these 
two models. 
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Markedness effects show up in both presentation conditions. But as 
shown above, the finding of a congruity interaction together with a 
main effect of markedness in the PRE-condition cannot by itself be 
taken as evidence that markedness and congruity are independent 
effects. More convincing in this respect is the finding that for the 
figure type 'triangle' in the POST-condition the congruity effect is 
eliminated while the main effect of markedness still shows up. 
For the PRE-condition, in contrast, only the comparison of the 
pattern of motoric and vocal response mode gives some evidence on the 
relationship between markedness and congruity effects. 
Further discussion will be postponed until the other experiments 
have been reported. But before proceeding to the next experiment we 
will consider the results of the error analysis of the present 
experiment. 
6.1.5 Error analysis 
In the error analysis all responses were included which 
(i) clearly were wrong answers 
(ii) clearly began with one type of response, but were 
corrected by the subject whilst giving the answer. 
Out of the total of 52 errors of this kind (this is 1.1 % of all 
answers), 36 occurred in conditions of conflict between absolute size 
level and response to be given (i.e. correct response "smaller" with a 
high absolute size level or correct response "bigger' with a low 
absolute size level). All of these 36 errors can unambiguously be 
classified as errors where the subjects in first instance tend to give 
an answer which is congruent with the absolute size level whereas the 
situation demands an answer which is contrastive to the absolute size 
level. That is, more than two thirds of the errors can be classified as 
"contrastive" errors. 
Table 4 gives the distribution of "contrastive* vs 
"noncontrastive" errors by presentation conditions. 
116 
1 contrastive noncontrastive| 
1 errors 1 errors 1 
PRE | 14 | 10 | 
POST | 22 | 6 | 
Table 4: Distribution of contrastive vs noncontrastive 
errors over presentation conditions. 
This pattern once again appears to be a reflection of conflicts between 
absolute and relative information. The majority of errors occurs in 
conditions where absolute and relative information are in conflict with 
each other, and all of these errors can be explained in terms of 
confusing the absolute and the relative information associated with the 
topic figure. It is surprising, however, that this pattern is even more 
pronounced in the POST-condition than in the PRE-condition. 
6.2 Experiment 7: Conaruitv and markedness in naming relations on the 
dimension of length 
The present experiment addressed the question whether the pattern of 
results of Experiment 6 can be replicated for naming relations on the 
dimension of length. 
6.2.1 Materials 
Just as in Experiment 5 the pictures displayed consisted of two upright 
standing bars positioned at equal distances (3 cm) to the left and the 
right of the middle of the screen. But, different from Experiment 5, 
there were two pairs of bars: one pair of quite short bars of different 
length (4.6 cm and 2.9 cm in length, 0.5 cm wide), and one pair of 
quite long bars of different length (8 cm and 6.3 cm in length, 0.5 cm 
wide). Besides this factor of absolute length level, two further binary 
factors were used in the stimulus construction. The bar to be marked by 
the cross was either the left or the right bar of the picture, and the 
bar marked by the cross could be longer or shorter than the other bar 
of the picture. The full combination of these three binary factors 
gives 8 picture types. Each of these 8 picture types was realized 6 
times in each of the presentation conditions. So each subject received 
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48 trials in the PRE-condition and 48 trials in the POST-condition 
(plus 8 practice trials at the beginning of each presentation 
condition). 
6.2.2 Procedure 
The procedure was identical to the procedure in Experiment 6. Also the 
randomizations were constructed in the same way as in Experiment 6. But 
in contrast to Experiment 6 subjects had to give the vocal responses 
langer and korter. As in Experiment 6 together with the instruction 
subjects were shown the whole series of figures to be used in the 
experiment in an ascending order. By this an SRP should be established 
in the middle of the series of the four bars. 37 subjects participated 
in the experiment. All subjects were students at the University of 
Nijmegen and all of them were native speakers of Dutch. They were paid 
Dfl 8.50 for participation in the experiment. 
One subject had to be excluded from the analysis because of a 
technical error during the experiment. Half of the 36 remaining 
subjects started with the trials in the PRE-condition and then moved on 
to the POST-condition trials. For the other half of the subjects the 
order of presentation conditions was reversed. 
6.2.3 Results 
First, the RTs of the 36 subjects were corrected for correct operation 
of the voice key. The means of the corrected RTs for correct responses 
over replications of the same trial type were calculated for each 
subject (for an analysis of erroneous responses see below). Then these 
mean RTs were analyzed separately for PRE- and POST-condition via an 
analysis of variance with the factors absolute length level (low vs 
high), position of the figure marked by the cross (left vs right), and 
response to be given ("langer* vs "korter"). Figure 18 gives the RTs in 
the PRE- and POST-condition with respect to the factors absolute length 
level and response type. 
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The analysis of variance for the PRE-condition shows a highly 
significant congruity interaction between response type and absolute 
length level (F(1,35) = 69.46, MSe = 2378, ρ < .0001). In addition 
there are main effects of the narkedness of the response (F(1,35) = 
15.44, MSe = 4286, ρ = .004, RT(langer) = 598 msec, RT(korter) = 629 
msec) and of absolute length level (F(1,35) = 22.65, MSe = 2025, ρ < 
.0001, RT(low) = 601 msec, RT(high) = 626 msec). 
The analysis of variance for the POST-condition also shows an 
effect of the markedness of the response (F(1,35) = 6.31, MSe = 3130, ρ 
= .017, RT(langer) = 498 msec, RT(korter) = 515 msec) and a congruity 
interaction (F(1,35) = 7.33, MSe = 2221, ρ =.01). But inspection of 
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Figure 18 reveals that the congruity effect in the POST-condition is 
clearly smaller than in the PRE-condition. An analysis of variance of 
the RTs in the PRE-condition versus those in the POST- condition 
reveals that this reduction of the congruity effect in the 
POST-condition is statistically reliable; as in Experiment 6, the 
congruity effect interacts with the presentation conditions (F(1,35) = 
13.94, MSe = 2791, ρ = .0007 for the three-way interaction between 
presentation condition, absolute length level, and response type). 
Finally, as in Experiments 2, 5 and 6, the overall latency in the 
POST-condition is smaller than the overall latency in the PRE-condition 
(with a difference of 107 msec). 
6.2.4 Discussion 
The pattern of results in the PRE-condition is almost identical to the 
pattern of results in the PRE-condition in Experiment 6: a highly 
significant congruity interaction accompanied by a main effect of 
markedness. But again this cannot be interpreted as direct evidence for 
independent effects of markedness and congruity. However, it should be 
stressed that the pattern of a congruity effect plus a markedness 
effect in the PRE-condition has been found in Experiment 6 as well as 
in Experiment 7, that is in two experiments with different comparative 
dimensions. As in Experiment 6 there was a clear reduction of congruity 
effects in the POST-condition. This reduction was not accompanied by an 
elimination of the markedness effect. The congruity effect in the 
POST-condition is almost identical with the one found for the figure 
type "circle" in the POST-condition of Experiment 6. 
As with the preceding experiment, the results clearly rule out the 
relative coding model and the expectancy hypothesis model. But again 
the latency pattern does not allow for a clear decision between the 
discrete coding model and the double coding model; the congruity effect 
is clearly reduced, but not completely eliminated in the 
POST-condition. 
Finally, the effect of absolute length level under the 
PRE-condition, showing faster latencies for a low absolute length level 
than for a high level, parallels the finding for "same"- trials in 
Experiment 5. There, "same"-responses to pictures of two short bars of 
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equal length were given faster than "same'-responses to pictures of two 
long bars of equal length. 
6.2.5 Error analysis 
The erroneous responses were analyzed in the same way as in Experiment 
6. Out of the total of 65 errors (this is 1.9 \ of all responses) 49 
(i.e. 75\ of the errors) can unambiguously be classified as errors 
where the subjects in first instance tend to give an answer which is 
congruent with the absolute length level, whereas the situation demands 
a response which is contrastive to the absolute size level. As in 
Experiment 6, then, the distribution of errors over conditions of 
conflict between absolute and relative information (i.e., contrastive 
errors) and conditions of no conflict (i.e., non-contrastive errors) is 
not at chance level. 
Table 5 gives this distribution of the errors by presentation 
conditions. 
I contrastive noncontrastive| 
1 errors 1 errors 1 
PRE | 30 | 4 | 
POST | 19 | 12 | 
Table 5: Distribution of contrastive vs noncontrastive 
errors over presentation conditions. 
Once again the pattern of errors is compatible with the notion of 
the double coding model that errors are due to confusing absolute and 
relative information. 
6.3 Experiment 8: Conoruitv effects in Judging relations of length 
via a motoric response node 
In Chapter 4 it was shown that markedness effects are only obtained 
with a vocal response mode, and it was concluded that markedness 
effects are due to lexicalization difficulty. The present experiment is 
a replication of Experiment 7 with a motoric response mode. On the 
basis of the findings of Chapter 4 the markedness effects found in 
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Experiment 7 should vanish with a motoric response mode. 
Furthermore, if congruity effects are due to effects operating on 
the conceptual level (i.e. independent of the lexicalization process), 
one would again expect a congruity effect in the PRE-condition. But 
according to the argumentation developed above this congruity 
interaction should approach a more symmetrical cross-over interaction 
because there should be no more additional markedness effects. 
Such findings would be strong additional support for the notion 
that markedness effects and congruity effects are independently caused 
phenomena, and that markedness effects are due to lexicalization 
difficulty. 
But if the congruity effect in the PRE-condition does vanish with 
a motoric response mode, then the assumption that congruity effects are 
due to processes operating on the conceptual level has to be abandoned. 
Congruity effects have then to be explained by different tresholds for 
the activation of lexical items, the tresholds varying dependent on the 
conceptual input. 
6.3.1 Materials and Procedure 
The experimental materials were identical to those used in Experiment 
7. The procedure was identical with Experiment 7, except for the 
response mode being changed to a motoric pushbutton reaction. Half of 
the subjects started with the PRE-condition trials and then moved on to 
the POST-condition trials, the other subjects had the reverse order. 
Each of these groups of subjects were further partitioned such that 
half of them had to react with the left pushbutton if the bar with the 
cross underneath was the longer one and with the right pushbutton if 
the bar with the cross underneath was the shorter one; for the other 
half the assignment of responses to pushbuttons was reversed. 
28 subjects participated in the experiment. All subjects were 
students at the university of Nijmegen and all of them were native 
speakers of Dutch. The subjects were paid Dfl 8.50 for participation in 
the experiment. 
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6.3.2 Results 
The latencies were analyzed separately for PRE- and POST- condition via 
an analysis of variance with the factors absolute length level (low vs 
high), position of the bar marked by the cross (left vs right), and 
response type ("longer"-button vs "shorter'-button). 
Figure 19 shows the results in the PRE- and POST-condition for the 
factors absolute length level and response type. 
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Fig. 19: Latencies for judging relations on the dimension 
'length" by means of pushbuttons in the PRE-condition 
(left panel), and POST-condition (right panel). Solid 
lines tor low absolute length level, broken lines 
for high absolute length level. 
The analysis of variance for the PRE-condition shows a congruity 
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interaction (F(1,27) = 15.5, MSe = 12010, ρ = .0005) and a main effect 
of the absolute length level (F(1,27) = 6.23, MSe = 13026, ρ = .019, 
RT(low)=720 msec, RT(high)=758 msec). Response type ("longer"-button vs 
"shorter"-button) clearly does not reach significance (F(1,27) =1.54, 
MSe = 16717, ρ =.23). 
In the POST-condition there is only a main effect of the absolute 
length level (F(1,27) = 10.94, MSe = 4315, ρ = .0027, RT(low) = 570 
msec, RT(high) = 599 msec). There is neither a main effect of response 
type (RT("longer"-button) = 582 msec, RT("shorter"-button) = 587 msec, 
F(1,27) < 1, MSe = 4529) nor a congruity interaction (F(1,27) < 1, MSe 
= 4163) 
As in the preceding experiments the overall latency in the 
POST-condition is clearly shorter than that in the PRE-condition (with 
a difference of 154 msec). 
6.3.3 Discussion 
The pattern of a congruity effect in the PRE-condition and of no 
congruity effect in the POST-condition agrees with the predictions of 
the double coding model, and contradicts the predictions of the 
relative coding model, the expectancy hypothesis model, and the "pure" 
version of the discrete coding model. Furthermore, the finding that 
markedness effects are not obtained any more in the POST-condition with 
a motoric response mode (as opposed to the vocal response mode in 
Experiment 6) nicely fits the predictions of the double coding model. 
This can be further taken as confirmation of the results of Experiment 
3 for the dimension length. 
Finally, the double coding model predicts that the change from a 
vocal to a motoric response mode should also change the form of the 
congruity interaction in the PRE-condition, because of the elimination 
of markedness effects. Indeed, with a motoric response mode there is no 
significant markedness effect together with the congruity effect, 
whereas this was the case in the PRE-condition with a vocal response 
mode. But more specifically, the double coding model predicts that 
going from a vocal to a motoric response mode in the PRE-condition, 
should enhance the advantage of shorter- over lonaer-responses for 
pictures from low absolute length level and at the same time reduce the 
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advantage of longer- over shorter-responses for pictures from high 
absolute length level. 
This prediction is only partly supported by the corresponding 
descriptive data. As predicted, the advantage of shorter- over longer-
responses for low absolute length level changes from 18 msec for the 
vocal response mode to 36 msec for the motoric response mode. This 
difference is almost identical to the size of the markedness effect in 
the POST-conditions of Experiments 5 and 7. But for high absolute 
length level, the advantage of longer- responses over shorter-responses 
is more or less the same size for both response modes (the difference 
being 81 msec for vocal response mode and 79 msec for motoric response 
mode). 
6.4 Discussion of the congruity experiments 
The results presented so far clearly rule out the relative coding model 
and the expectancy hypothesis model with respect to the relation naming 
task. As shown above both models cannot explain the congruity effect in 
the PRE-conditions of Experiments 6, 7, and 8. 
The two remaining models in their pure versions differ in their 
predictions for the POST-condition. The double coding model predicts 
the complete absence of congruity effects and the discrete coding model 
predicts congruity effects of the same size as in the PRE-condition. 
Unfortunately, the latency patterns in the POST-conditions of 
Experiments 6, 7, and 8 do not allow for a clear decision between the 
models. In Experiment 8 - and for the figure type "triangle" in 
Experiment 6 - there is clearly no congruity effect, whereas in 
Experiment 7 and for the figure type "circles" in Experiment 6 
congruity effects were still found, though clearly reduced as compared 
to the PRE-condition. Both models allow for a simple explanation of che 
fact that in the POST-conditions congruity effects are sometimes 
reduced and sometimes completely eliminated. 
For the discrete coding model, the assumption of an optimal 
preparation strategy predicts the absence of congruity effects. But 
depending on the proportion of trials on which subjects succeed in 
applying this preparation strategy within the 1.5 sec between 
presentation of the picture and presentation of the marking cross, 
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congruity effects will be either reduced or completely eliminated. 
According to the double coding model congruity effects are due to 
potential interferences of the task-relevant relative information and 
the intrusive absolute information. Only if subjects succeed in 
selecting the task relevant information before appearance of the 
marking cross will there be no congruity effects. But if at least on 
some trials the extraction process is still reflected in RT (i.e. if in 
Figure 13 the anchor point of the measured RT is shifted to the left) 
this should result in a small congruity effect. Elaborating this 
argument further, the size of the time interval between onset of the 
picture and the onset of the cross marking the topic of comparison 
should be a main determinant of whether a congruity effect shows up. 
This is also compatible with the finding of erroneous responses due to 
accessing the absolute information under the POST-condition. These 
errors appear to be a reflection of the fact that under the 
POST-condition the extraction process is not always completed before 
appearance of the marking cross. 
Taken together, then, it is not possible to decide between the 
discrete coding model and the double coding model on the basis of the 
congruity patterns alone. But there are nevertheless clear indications 
against the discrete coding model. First, in the PRE-conditions of 
Experiments 2 and 5, the RTs for 'same'-trials are not longer than the 
RTs for "differenf-trials. This finding contradicts the predictions of 
the discrete coding model (see above). Second, the mechanism proposed 
by Banks & Flora (1977) for accounting for markedness effects ascribes 
these effects to the stimulus encoding stage. Markedness effects should 
then only show up if stimulus encoding is included in the RTs, 
irrespective of the type of response mode. This prediction is clearly 
disconfirmed by the results of Experiment 2, 3 and 5. 
Finally, and more important, the double coding model can account 
for the pattern of results found in relative judgment tasks with 
successive presentation of the stimuli. Corresponding experiments 
showed congruity effects only for the second stimulus being the correct 
choice, but not for the first stimulus (Banks, 1977; Wallis & Audley, 
1964). It has been shown above that neither the discrete coding model 
nor the relative coding model can account for these data. These models 
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predict congruity effects for the first as well as the second stimulus, 
or for none of the stimuli. This is a consequence of the fact that 
these models capture absolute and relative information in one code, 
i.e. as one complex piece of information. In the discrete coding model, 
[small +], for example, indicates that the stimulus is small in 
absolute terms and smaller than the other stimulus. In the relative 
coding model, [S1 smaller S2] indicates the relation as well as the" 
absolute "smallness" of both stimuli. 
In contrast, the double coding model assumes that absolute and 
relative information are coded separately; congruity effects are due to 
potential interferences of the task relevant relative information with 
the intrusive absolute information. Congruity effects should vanish, 
however, if the subject is able to eliminate the intrusive absolute 
information before RT measurement starts. Since absolute information 
with respect to the relevant domain of referents is coded separately 
for each of the stimuli and independent of the relative information, 
subjects can eliminate with successive presentation of the stimuli the 
intrusive absolute information on the first stimulus while waiting for 
the presentation of the second stimulus. When the second stimulus is 
presented, its relation to the first stimulus as well as its absolute 
value on the judgmental dimension will be coded. Thus, interference of 
absolute and relative information can only occur for the second 
stimulus. This is in principle the same interpretation of congruity 
effects as for the relation naming tasks. But whereas under the 
POST-condition of the relation naming tasks subjects can disregard the 
intrusive absolute information on both stimuli before RT measurement 
starts, for the relative judgment task with successive presentation of 
the stimuli this can be accomplished only for the first stimulus. 
So the double coding model turns out to be able to explain a whole 
range of phenomena by one mechanism. This mechanism predicts the 
possibility of interferences between different types of information 
which set up divergent tendencies for the response to be given. Whether 
such an interference shows up in the RTs is a question of whether the 
subject has the possibility to distinguish relevant from intrusive 
information before RT-measurement starts. 
127 
Aside from these empirical aspects there are also theoretical 
aspects which favour the idea of a double coding model. In particular, 
a careful analysis of the Clarkian picture coding principle (3) which 
assumes coding of comparisons on relevant subdimensions (e.g. in terms 
of "smaller" for two objects falling below SRP and in terms of "bigger" 
for two objects falling above SRP) revealed that in order to apply this 
principle, the perceiver must have information on the absolute size of 
each of the stimuli separately (but with respect to the relevant domain 
of referents), as well as on the relation between the two stimuli. 
7. Epilogue 
What are the conclusions that can be drawn about the concepts of 
semantic markedness and congruity? 
7.1 Markedness 
The starting point of the present study has been the concept of 
semantic markedness of dimensional adjectives as defined in linguistics 
by means of distributional criteria. Beyond the scope of distributional 
criteria the difference between unmarked and marked dimensional 
adjectives has usually been captured by the opposition "neutral" vs 
"contrastive" meaning; unmarked adjectives can have a neutral meaning 
(as in "How big is X?") or a contrastive meaning (as in "X is big"), 
whereas marked adjectives can only have a contrastive meaning (e.g. 
"How small is X?", "X is small"). This distinction appears to coincide 
with the issue of normrelatedness; an adjective has contrastive meaning 
if it is normrelated, i.e. if it implies a comparison of an object with 
an implicit (contextually defined) standard. An adjective has neutral 
meaning if it does not imply comparison with an implicit standard. 
In semantic feature theories this difference has been captured as 
a difference in featural complexity; contrastive meanings of adjectives 
are characterized by an additional feature specifying deviation from a 
standard in positive (e.g. contrastive "big") or negative (e.g. 
contrastive "small") direction which is absent with the neutral, 
continuum-naming use of adjectives (cf. Carey 1982). 
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This assumed difference in semantic complexity has been used to 
explain findings in research on the acquisition and comprehension of 
such adjectives. 
For the field of acquisition, the so-called "complexity 
hypothesis* (Clark, 1973a) states that unmarked adjectives should be 
acquired before the corresponding marked ones. Despite the substantial 
empirical evidence in support of this hypothesis (e.g. Bartlett, 1976; 
Brewer & Stone, 1975; Donaldson & Wales, 1970; Wales & Campbell, 1970), 
there is a clear problem with the interpretation of these findings as 
being due to differences in semantic complexity. As Carey (1982) has 
pointed out, all of these studies make use of children's performance in 
answering questions of the type "Which one is the tall/short one?". But 
in this case, both unmarked as well as marked adjectives are used in a 
contrastive sense so that they should not differ in semantic complexity 
(cf. Fodor, 1975, for a similar point on the markedness issue). 
For the field of comprehension, the so-called "comprehension 
hypothesis" (Clark, 1973a) states that unmarked adjectives should be 
comprehended more easily than their marked counterparts. Although there 
is again substantial evidence in support of this hypothesis, the 
explanation of these findings as being due to differences in semantic 
complexity also runs into problems. Most of these studies use full 
comparative sentences as materials. In these constructions unmarked and 
marked adjectives should not differ in semantic complexity. Rather, 
unmarked as well as marked adjectives imply a neutral interpretation; 
"A is smaller than B' is not normrelated, just as *B is bigger than A' 
is not (cf. Bierwisch, 1984; Bierwisch et al., 1984). 
The latter observation additionally shows that marked adjectives 
do not exclusively have a contrastive interpretation as assumed in 
earlier studies on semantic markedness. So neither the distinction 
between contrastive and neutral meaning, nor the assumption that 
unmarked adjectives have an additional interpretation (namely a neutral 
one) that marked ones do not have, can account for the typical 
markedness effects in acquisition and comprehension. 
The third prominent field of research on semantic markedness 
concerns the picture-sentence verification paradigm, with the most 
extensive work in this field having been done by Clark and his 
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colleagues. The basic assumption underlying this work, as captured in 
the "correlation hypothesis" (Clark 1973a) gives the markedness 
asymmetry some kind of anchoring in the properties and structure of 
perception. In particular, it is assumed that the markedness asymmetry 
is paralleled by corresponding asymmetries of dimensions in man's 
perceptual space. This parallelism is in turn assumed to be reflected 
in a preference for coding pictures in unmarked terms in the absence of 
other influences. 
So in Clark's theory of picture-sentence verification it is stated 
that observers generally prefer to code perceptual comparisons between 
objects or relative locations of objects in space in a positive, i.e. 
unmarked form on the underlying dimension. It is important to note that 
by this formulation it is assumed that a goal, i.e. a preference for a 
certain representational format, determines the processing in such a 
way that it leads to this preferred representational format. But what 
showed up in Experiment 1 of the present study was not a preference for 
a certain representational format, but rather a preference for 
processing a picture from the point of view of one of the objects. 
These preferences may - just like the assumed preferences for certain 
representational formats - be induced by asymmetries of P-space (though 
there seem also to be other preferences, like the left-to-right 
preference which showed up in Experiment 3). The important point, 
however, is that by these processing preferences it is not granted that 
the picture will be coded in unmarked terms. This will only be the case 
if the object which has been selected as the "starting point" of 
perceptual processing has a higher value on the dimension on which the 
picture is coded than the other object (see Experiment 1). But this 
need not necessarily be the case. That is, it is not preferences for 
certain representations which determine processing, but rather 
preferences for interpreting pictures from a certain point of view 
which determine the resulting representational format. In positing 
this, it was tried to make explicit the processes which determine the 
format of mental representations instead of just talking about what 
such representations have to look like in order to be able to account 
for the data. This position agrees with the critique of Trabasso (1973) 
in reviewing the work reported in Clark et al. (1973): 
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"Polarity, reference points, underlying dimensions and conditions 
of application are abstract notions which implicitly assume several 
processes. .. While the organizing hypotheses and abstract principles 
are useful for summarizing the set of findings by Clark, Carpenter & 
Just, we now need more mechanism and less taxonomy." (Trabasso, 1973, 
p.446; see also Allport 1975 for a similar critique). 
Furthermore, factors which could be labeled "intuitive 
correlations" between the spatial arrangement of the objects and 
dimensions of physical extent of these objects, might play a role. As 
an example there is the very small, but over experiments and 
presentation conditions surprisingly consistent advantage in RT for 
pictures with the left figure being the smaller (or shorter) one (see 
Experiments 2 and 5). This advantage holds independent of which object 
is marked as the topic, and independent of whether marking the topic 
precedes or follows picture processing. This can be interpreted as 
evidence for an intuitive correlation between the left-right 
arrangement of the figures and the bigger-smaller (and longer-shorter) 
dimension; points more to the right on the spatial dimension are 
associated with higher values on the dimensions of physical extent. 
And finally, one and the same perceptual attribute might influence 
perceptual coding in different ways, depending on the dimension on 
which two objects are to be coded relative to each other. So, for the 
underlying dimension "size" the bigger of two objects might be regarded 
as the object to be located relative to the smaller one, whereas for 
the underlying dimension "relative location" the bigger object might be 
regarded as an immobile stable reference point, thus the smaller object 
being to be located (cf. Clark & Chase 1974). 
Besides the possibility of an interplay of different processing 
preferences, it was shown that subjects will make use of a topic 
neutral coding strategy if they do not encode a perceptual event under 
time pressure. By this strategy a perceiver copea constructively with 
his lack of information about which figure is going to be the topic by 
neutrally coding the picture with respect to the still possible topics. 
In contrast, the Clarkian default coding principle assumes that the 
perceiver already makes a commitment to one of the figures being the 
topic, irrespective of the fact that he does not yet know whether this 
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commitment turns out as to be correct or not. It became apparent that 
such a topic neutral coding strategy can account for some unexplained 
results reported in the literature (e.g. Flores d'Arcáis, 1974). 
The results of picture-sentence verification studies, then, allow 
for the following conclusions about the theoretical status of semantic 
markedness. 
First, the experiments of Clark & Chase (1972, 1974) show 
markedness effects for the locative pair above. below. Note that the 
asymmetry of this pair does not fall under the distributional criteria 
as defined in Chapter 1, nor under the concept of contrastive versus 
neutral meaning. This gives further evidence that it is not these 
distinctions which account for markedness effects. 
Second, the results of Experiment 1 show that an interpretation of 
markedness asymmetries in terms of corresponding asymmetries of 
perceptual dimensions, though tempting on intuitive grounds, cannot be 
maintained if one is dealing with concrete processes of perceptual 
encoding. Rather, there is neither a preference for mental 
representations of pictures in unmarked terms (cf. Experiment 1) nor 
any evidence for faster coding of perceptual events in unmarked than in 
marked terms. The latter point has been explicitly tested and confirmed 
by Clark & Chase (1972) (see also Experiment 3). Experiment 1 also 
gives indirect evidence for this view. There it was shown that under 
certain conditions the perceptual event was coded about equally often 
in unmarked and marked terms on the underlying dimension. If 
differences in speed of perceptual encoding were responsible for 
markedness effects, there should be no markedness effect under these 
conditions. But this was not found (see right panel of Figure 6c). 
Markedness effects, then, seem to be a phenomenon on the linguistic 
level. 
Taken together, then, an interpretation of markedness effects as 
being due to the difference between contrastive and neutral meaning can 
be excluded. Furthermore, markedness effects are not reflected in the 
processes of perceptual coding. The latter point holds for the aspect 
of preferences for certain representational formats, as well as for the 
aspect of the speed of perceptual encoding. 
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An alternative candidate for accounting for markedness effects 
might be natural language frequency effects, since semantic markedness 
goes along with distributional markedness (see above Chapter 1). 
However, frequency effects tend to vanish with repetition of lexical 
items (e.g. Scarborough, Cortese & Scarborough, 1977). Since markedness 
effects show up even if one and the same pair of comparatives or 
locatives is used over and over again in an experiment (e.g. Clark & 
Chase, 1972, 1974; Clark, 1969a,b), these effects cannot be explained 
as frequency effects. 
A more plausible candidate might be the inherent polarity of 
adjectives as introduced in Bierwisch's theory of gradation (Bierwisch, 
1984; Bierwisch et al., 1964, see also Chapter 1). Bierwisch conceives 
of relative adjectives as three place predicates relating an individual 
2, a standard of comparison γ, and a difference ç. The variable jr can 
either take the value of an implicit norm N, or the value of 0, or the 
value of an explicitly specified standard of comparison. The 
concatenation of y and £ can take either a positive or a negative sign. 
Bierwisch informally suggests that a higher complexity of the negative 
concatenation of χ and £ might give rise to the typical markedness 
effects. This permits an interpretation of markedness effects which is 
independent of the issue of normrelatedness, thereby circumventing the 
problems which show up with an interpretation of markedness effects in 
terms of concepts like neutral vs contrastive reading (A translation of 
Bierwisch's conception in a more process-oriented psychological theory 
could be achieved in the framework of procedural semantics where the 
meaning of dimensional adjectives would be conceived of as a sequence 
of test procedures on, among others, the values of s. and y and the 
polarity of their concatenation). 
Furthermore, this explanation also seems to be applicable to 
locative pairs like above• below. "A above B", then, specifies that the 
position of A on the vertical dimension is given by the position of В 
Plus some distance on the vertical dimension. 'B below A", in contrast, 
specifies the position of В as the position of A minus some distance on 
the vertical dimension. This interpretation gives markedness the status 
of a polarity feature, the polarity being an inherent property of the 
semantics of the adjectives or locatives. 
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However, markedness effects have also been found with evaluation 
adjectives as good, bad (e.g. Clark 1969a,b). The question then 
becomes, whether a polarity interpretation of markedness can also be 
applied to this domain of adjectives. As Bierwisch et al. (19Θ4) point 
out, the dimensions underlying such evaluation adjectives do not extend 
from a natural zero point outwards, but rather from an origin in the 
middle of the dimension infinitely in both directions. Good as well as 
bad specify that the "goodness" of an individual я is the positive 
concatenation of a standard у and a difference ç. But marked adjectives 
imply that the resulting amount of goodness takes a negative sign 
whereas, unmarked adjectives imply a positive sign. That is, again a 
difference in polarity follows the markedness asymmetry. 
But polarity only plays a role if both members of a pair of 
antonyms are interpreted as belonging to one underlying dimension. If 
each member sets up a dimension on its own, each of the two dimensions 
will be conceived of as extending from zero in positive direction. So 
for the pair deep versus high, deep establishes the dimension of depth 
(with deep and shallow as poles) and high establishes the dimension of 
height (with high and low as poles). Thus, "A is deeper than B" states 
that the amount of depth of A is composed of the amount of depth of В 
plus a difference £, just as "A is higher than B" states that the 
amount of height of A is composed of the amount of height of В plus a 
difference £. To put it in more general terms, markedness effects 
should only show up if the members of an antonym pair imply opposite 
inherent polarity. This can only be the case if the two members do not 
set up independent underlying dimensions, both extending from a 
(common) zero point outwards. 
The results of the relation naming experiments of Chapter 4 are 
compatible with the points made thus far. First, they give evidence for 
a "production hypothesis" paralleling the "comprehension hypothesis". 
Second, this effect only shows up for naming responses, but not for 
motoric responses. This is compatible with the view that markedness 
effects are due to the inherent polarity of lexical items. In 
particular, none of the experiments showed a reflection of the 
markedness asymmetry on the level of perceptual encoding. That is, 
markedness is not a property of comparison or relative location in 
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general, but a property inherent to the lexical items covering this 
domain. If one further accepts the view that the lexicalization stage 
is composed of two substages, namely the activation of a so-called 
lemma followed by the activation of the corresponding phonological form 
(as proposed by Kempen & Huijbers 1963, Levelt 1983a, LeveIt & Naassen 
1981), then the present view suggests an attribution of the markedness 
effect to the lemma-activation substage. 
The pattern of errors in Experiments 2 and 5, however, suggest 
that the translation of the Clarkian models in more process oriented 
terms, and the interpretation of markedness as inherent polarity of 
lexical items is not yet the whole story. Rather it appears that there 
is an additional layer of information which plays a role, namely 
information on the absolute value of each of the objects on the 
relevant dimension. 
7.2 Conoruitv 
In the second part of the present study it was shown that in 
comparisons both types of information (absolute and relative) play a 
role. This implies a different account of congruity effects than is 
given in existing models. This interpretation gives congruity effects 
the status of interference effects. Whenever the two kinds of 
information set up divergent tendencies for lexicalization (or other 
types of responses), this shows up as an increase in RTs if the 
selection of the task relevant information is included in the measured 
RT. This is in clear contrast with the usual interpretation of this 
type of congruity effects as being due to necessary recodings of one 
type of information. 
This means that it is not sufficient to conceive of mental 
representations of dimensions and values of objects on these dimensions 
exclusively in terms of discrete absolute codes, with relations between 
objects being a derived second order product. Nor is it sufficient to 
conceive of dimensions and values on these dimensions as purely 
relative codes, absolute values being captured by the type of relation 
(unmarked vs marked) being used. Rather, both types of information play 
a role in the mental representation of dimensions and values on these 
dimensions. 
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With respect to the interpretation of congruity effects as 
interference effects it should be noted that the relation naming task 
used in the above experiments forces the speaker to select the task 
relevant information before giving the answer. If the speaker has more 
freedom in his description of the picture, he could of course mention 
both types of information instead of selecting the task relevant one. 
For descriptions of the pictures used in the experiments reported in 
Chapter 6 such a description could, for example, take the form "There 
are two big circles, the left one being bigger than the right one". The 
fact that this is also a plausible description gives further intuitive 
support to the assumption that both types of information are available 
in the conceptual representation. Which parts of the conceptual 
representation a speaker is really going to express in his utterance 
will crucially depend on the demands of the communicative situation and 
his communicative goals. 
Though congruity effects appear to be a nonlinguistic phenomenon, 
a final point will be made on the consequences of the concept of 
absolute information for Bierwisch's theory of gradation. Bierwisch et 
al. (1984) argue that a comparative sentence like "Bill is taller than 
John" is not normrelated and that this can be seen by the acceptability 
of "but both are short" as a continuation. But this does not seem to 
hold for sentences like "Tokyo is bigger than New York, but both are 
small". Of course, the deviant nature of the continuation is due to its 
factual incorrectness with respect to the class of cities on earth. But 
this factual incorrectness can only occur because "Tokyo" and "New 
York" introduce a comparison class ("the cities in the world") as well 
as the encyclopedical knowledge on the relative size of these two 
cities within this comparison class. That is, though the standard of 
comparison ν is explicitly specified by the size of New York, the 
comparative sentence seems to be in some sense normrelated. This view 
coincides with Clark's notion that a tertiary reference point specified 
by the complement of the comparative sentence, together with a 
secondary reference point, simultaneously influence the interpretation 
of a comparative sentence (though Clark assumes that the position of 
SRP is determined by the type of comparative and not by the relevant 
comparison class). 
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Within Bierwisch's theory of gradation this could be explained by 
assuming that the value of the nouns on the relevant underlying 
dimension is in itself composed of a class-specific standard N, and a 
deviation £ from this standard in positive or negative direction. This 
could be labeled "indirect normrelatedness" of comparative 
constructions. The acceptability of the corresponding continuations is 
then a reflection of whether the deviation from the implicit standard 
has the same direction in the comparative sentence and in its 
continuation (for a similar argument on the influence of absolute size 
on the acceptability of constructions expressing gradation see 
Cantrall, 1971). If the objects mentioned in the comparative sentence 
do not establish a comparison class (and thus a standard N) or if they 
do not deviate too much from this standard, both continuations (e.g. 
"both are big/small') are acceptable. But if the objects mentioned in 
the comparative sentence are interpreted as clearly deviating from N in 
positive or negative direction, the continuation must either express 
deviation from N in the same direction, or a different norm must 
explicitly be introduced in the continuation (e.g. "Tokyo is bigger 
than New York, but both are small as compared to the universe') or be 
infered by the listener. These considerations could indicate that also 
on the linguistic level absolute and relative information are 
independent from each other, though they can enter certain 
interactions. 
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SUMMARY 
The present study is concerned with the concept of semantic markedness 
of dimensional adjectives. 
Three major topics are pursued: (1) Does the effect of semantic 
markedness, as found in research on language comprehension and language 
acquisition, also show up for language production? (2) Is such a 
markedness effect paralleled by, or even reducible to, an effect on the 
level of (visual) perception? (3) How does the relation between two 
objects on an underlying dimension interact with their absolute values 
(or positions) on this dimension? 
Chapter 1 discusses the linguistic background and the 
psychological interpretations of semantic markedness. It turns out 
that, though there appear to be clear intuitions about the distinction 
between semantically unmarked and marked dimensional adjectives, the 
usual interpretation of the unmarked/marked asymmetry in acquisition 
and comprehension studies as being due to normrelatedness cannot be 
held up. A more plausible candidate appears to be the implicit polarity 
of such adjectives as captured in Bierwisch's theory of the semantics 
of gradation (cf., Bierwisch et al. 1984). In particular, this 
framework allows to treat the markedness issue independent of the issue 
of normrelatedness. 
Chapter 2 discusses one of the most prominent fields of research 
on semantic markedness, namely the picture-sentence verification task. 
A picture-sentence verification experiment is reported the results of 
which disconfirm the assumption that the distinction between 
semantically unmarked and marked adjectives is paralleled by a 
corresponding preference for a mental representation of a picture in 
unmarked terms. 
In Chapter 3 an experimental paradigm for investigating the 
production of unmarked vs marked dimensional adjectives is derived. 
This experimental paradigm can be viewed as a production variant of 
picture-sentence verification tasks. 
In Chapter 4, five experiments based on this experimental paradigm 
are reported. In two of these experiments subjects were presented with 
pictures of two geometric figures which had either identical or 
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different values on an underlying dimension of comparison (size in one 
experiment, length in the other one). Subjects had to name the relation 
between the figure marked by a cross and the other figure of the 
picture by means of the vocal responses "bigger", "smaller", "same" or 
"longer", "shorter", "same". There were two presentation conditions: 
either the cross was presented 1.5 sec before appearance of the figures 
(so-called PRE-condition), or the cross was added to the picture 1.5 
sec after onset of the figures (so-called POST-condition). Latencies 
were measured from the moment that the complete picture (figures and 
cross) was available to speech onset. In both presentation conditions 
responses using the unmarked comparative were given faster than 
réponses using the marked comparative. Furthermore, RTs in the 
POST-condition were clearly shorter than in the PRE-condition, showing 
that subjects are able to profit from perceptual preprocessing of the 
figures before appearance of the cross. Together with the findings of 
three control experiments, the results give rise to the following 
conclusions: (1) Semantic markedness does play a role in language 
production. (2) This effect is neither explainable by processes 
operating on the perceptual level, nor as an effect on the level of 
articulatory response execution. (3) The observed markedness effect is 
most likely due to the lexicalization process, i.e. to the process of 
mapping the representation of the perceptual event onto the 
corresponding lexical items. 
But the pattern of errors in the relation naming experiments 
indicated that subjects sometimes tend to name the absolute size of the 
figure marked by the cross instead of the relation between the two 
figures. This issue is taken up in Chapters 5 and 6. A direct test of 
the notion of potential conflicts between the absolute position of two 
objects on an underlying dimension and their relation to each other on 
this dimension is provided by relation naming experiments in which 
subjects were either presented with two quite small figures of 
different size or with two quite big figures of different size. Again, 
a PRE- and a POST-condition were realized. In the PRE-condition, a 
congruity interaction showed up, with "smaller'-responses being faster 
than "bigger"-responses for two quite small figures, and 
"bigger'-responses being faster than "smaller'-responses for two quite 
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big figures Additionally, there was a main effect of markedness In 
the POST-condition, the congruity effect was clearly reduced (or even 
completely eliminated), while the markedness effect was still obtained 
Taken together, these experiments give rise to the following 
theoretical considerations (1) The lexicalization process is preceded 
by a "conceptual selection stage" In this stage, the conceptual 
information to be mapped onto lexical items has to be selected If the 
conceptual representation of the to-be-described event contains 
conflicting information (e g , conflicting information on absolute and 
relative size), then this selection process will be prolonged This 
will show up in the naming latencies if the selection stage is included 
in the measured RT (as it is the case in the PRE-condition) (2) The 
mapping of the selected conceptual information onto the corresponding 
lexical items shows the same type of markedness effect as found in 
language comprehension 
In Chapter 7 the issues raised in Chapter 1 are taken up again 
against the background of the empirical findings It is argued that 
markedness effects appear to be due to properties of the lexical 
semantics of adjectives The polarity of dimensional adjectives as 
introduced in Bierwisch's theory of gradation can be viewed as such a 
property This means that the issue of semantic markedness should be 
treated independently of the issue of normrelatedness Furthermore, it 
is argued that the concept of potential conflicts between absolute 
positions/values of objects on an underlying dimension and their 
relation to each other on this dimension has to be integrated into 
theories of the semantics of gradation This can be accomplished by 
assuming that two types of standards or norms can play a role in 
gradation constructions, one of them being specified by the standard 
against which a certain object is compared, and one of them being 
specified by the class of objects to which the to-be-compared objects 
belong Even if the first type of standard is explicitly given (as in a 
full comparative sentence like "A is bigger than B" by the size of B), 
A and В can introduce a comparison class which defines a secondary 
standard on the underlying dimension The size of the deviation of A 
and В from this secondary standard can then be regarded as a measure of 
the absolute size (within the relevant comparison class) of A and В 
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SAMENVATTING 
Centraal in deze dissertatie staat het concept van semantische 
gemarkeerdheid van adjectieven die tot eenzelfde onderliggende dimensie 
behoren. 
Drie vragen komen aan de orde: (1) bestaat het in taaiverstaans-
en taalverwervingsstudies aangetoonde effect van semantische 
gemarkeerdheid ook aan de productiezijde? (2) wordt dit effect 
vergezeld door, of is het zelfs terug te brengen tot, een effect op het 
niveau van de (visuele) perceptie? (3) op welke wijze hangt de relatie 
tussen twee objecten op een onderliggende dimensie samen met hun 
absolute waarde (of positie) op die dimensie? 
In hoofdstuk 1 komen de linguistische achtergrond en de 
psychologische interpretaties van het verschijnsel semantische 
gemarkeerdheid aan de orde. Hoewel er sprake is van duidelijke 
intuïties omtrent het verschil tussen ongemarkeerde en gemarkeerde 
dimensionele adjectieven, lijkt de verklaring van de asymmetrie tussen 
ongemarkeerd en gemarkeerd in termen van normgerelateerdheid, zoals die 
wordt gegeven in de taalverstaans- en taalverwervingsstudies, niet de 
juiste. Het concept van de impliciete polariteit van dit type 
adjectieven uit Bierwisch's "Theory of the semantics of gradation" 
(Bierwisch et al.,1984) lijkt een aannemelijker kandidaat. Binnen dit 
theoretisch kader kan semantische gemarkeerdheid bestudeerd worden 
onafhankelijk van normgerelateerdheid. 
In hoofdstuk 2 staat de "picture-sentence verification task" 
centraal, een van de belangrijkste methoden binnen het onderzoek naar 
semantische gemarkeerdheid. De resultaten van een hier gerapporteerd 
"picture-sentence verification" experiment zijn niet in overeenstemming 
met de aanname dat het onderscheid tussen ongemarkeerde en gemarkeerde 
adjectieven gekoppeld is aan een overeenkomstige voorkeur voor een 
mentale representatie van een plaatje in termen van de ongemarkeerde 
relatie. 
In hoofdstuk 3 wordt een experimenteel paradigma besproken ter 
bestudering van de productie van ongemarkeerde vs. gemarkeerde 
dimensionele adjectieven. Dit paradigma kan beschouwd worden als een 
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variant aan de productiezijde van de "picture-sentence verification" 
taak. 
In hoofdstuk 4 wordt verslag gedaan van een vijftal experimenten 
die gebruik maken van dit experimentele paradigma. In twee van deze 
experimenten werden plaatjes aangeboden waarop twee geometrische 
figuren stonden afgebeeld, die gelijke of verschillende waarden hadden 
op een onderliggende dimensie van vergelijking (grootte in het ene, 
lengte in het andere experiment). De proefpersonen moesten de relatie 
benoemen tussen de figuur die met een kruisje gemerkt was en de andere 
figuur, door hardop te antwoorden met "groter","kleiner" en "gelijk", 
of "langer", "korter" en "gelijk". De experimenten kenden twee 
aanbiedingcondities. In de PRE-conditie werd het kruisje aangeboden 1.5 
seconden voordat de figuren verschenen. In de POST-conditie werd het 
kruisje aan het plaatje toegevoegd 1.5 seconden na het verschijnen van 
de figuren. Reactietijden werden gemeten vanaf het moment dat het hele 
plaatje (figuren en kruisje) ter beschikking was, tot de aanvang van de 
vocale respons. In beide aanbiedingscondities waren de gevallen waarin 
de ongemarkeerde term werd gebruikt sneller dan de responses met de 
gemarkeerde term. Bovendien waren de reactietijden in de POST-conditie 
sneller dan in de PRE-conditie. Uit dit laatste blijkt dat de 
proefpersonen voordeel hadden van de mogelijkheid tot perceptuele 
verwerking van de figuren voordat het kruisje werd aangeboden. Samen 
met de data van de drie controle experimenten laten de resultaten de 
volgende conclusies toe: (1) semantische gemarkeerdheid speelt een rol 
in taaiproductie (2) dit effect kan niet verklaard worden door 
processen op het niveau van de waarneming of van responsuitvoering (3) 
het geobserveerde effect van gemarkeerdheid is zeer waarschijnlijk het 
gevolg van het proces van lexicalisatie, i.e. het proces dat zorgdraagt 
voor de verbinding tussen de representatie van de perceptuele 
gebeurtenis en de overeenkomstige lexicale elementen. 
Een analyse van de fouten in de experimenten waarin de relatie 
tussen de figuren benoemd werd gaf te zien dat de proefpersonen soms de 
absolute grootte/afmeting van de met en kruisje gemerkte figuur 
benoemden in plaats van de relatie tussen de twee figuren. Deze 
bevinding werd nader uitgediept in hoofdstuk 5 en 6. In een aantal 
experimenten werd het mogelijke conflict tussen de absolute positie van 
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twee objecten op een onderliggende dimensie en hun onderlinge relatie 
op die dimensie onderzocht. In deze experimenten werd de relatie 
benoemd tussen twee figuren die ofwel beide klein waren, maar onderling 
in afmeting verschilden, ofwel beide groot waren maar in afmeting 
verschilden. Deze experimenten kenden ook de PRE- en POST-condities. In 
de PRE-conditie was sprake van een congruentie-interactie: voor de 
kleine figuren waren de 'kleiner' responses sneller dan de "groter' 
responses, voor de grote figuren was "groter* sneller dan "kleiner". 
Bovendien was er sprake van een hoofdeffect van semantische 
gemarkeerdheid. In de POST conditie was het effect van congruentie veel 
kleiner ( of zelfs geheel afwezig), terwijl er wel sprake was van het 
effect van gemarkeerdheid. 
Samenvattend geven de experimenten aanleiding tot de volgende 
theoretische overwegingen: (1) het proces van lexicalisatie wordt 
voorafgegaan door een fase van conceptuele selectie. In deze fase moet 
de conceptuele informatie geselecteerd worden die vervolgens in contact 
gebracht wordt met lexicale eenheden. Wanneer de conceptuele 
representatie van de te beschrijven gebeurtenis conflicterende 
informatie bevat ( bv. absolute vs. relatieve afmeting), wordt het 
selectieproces vertraagd. Dit blijkt uit de reactietijden, indien de 
selectiefase in de gemeten reactietijd inbegrepen is (zoals in de PRE-
conditie). (2) Het in verband brengen van de geselecteerde conceptuele 
informatie met de bijbehorende lexicale elementen vertoont een effect 
van gemarkeerdheid dat te vergelijken is met het effect dat gevonden 
wordt aan de taalverstaanszijde. 
In hoofdstuk 7 worden de kwesties uit hoofdstuk 1 opnieuw bezien 
in het licht van de experimentele bevindingen. Effecten van semantische 
gemarkeerdheid worden toegeschreven aan eigenschappen van adjectieven 
op het niveau van de lexicale semantiek. Voorbeeld van een dergelijke 
eigenschap is de polariteit van adjectieven op een dimensie uit 
Bierwisch's graderingstheorie. Als gevolg hiervan moet semantische 
gemarkeerdheid losgekoppeld worden van het concept van 
normgerelateerdheid. Bovendien zal de kwestie van het mogelijke 
conflict tussen de onderlinge relatie tussen objecten en hun absolute 
waarde op een onderliggende dimensie geïntegreerd moeten worden in 
theorieën over de semantiek van gradering. Dit kan worden 
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bewerkstelligd door aan te nemen dat twee verschillende maatstaven of 
normen een rol spelen bij graderingsconstructies. De eerste wordt 
gedefinieerd door de standaard waarmee een object wordt vergeleken, de 
tweede door de klasse van objecten waartoe de objecten onder 
vergelijking behoren. Zelfs in het geval dat de eerste standaard 
gegeven is (i.e. de grootte/afmeting van В in een vergelijkende zin als 
"A is groter dan B"), kunnen A en В een klasse voor vergelijking 
oproepen en daarmee een tweede naatstaf op een onderliggende dimensie 
introduceren. De mate waarin λ en В afwijken van deze tweede maatstaf 
kan beschouwd worden als de maat voor de absolute grootte van A en В 
binnen deze klasse. 
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STELLINGEN 
1. The effect of semantic markedness of dimensional adjectives, as 
shown in studies on language acquisition and language comprehension, 
can also be observed in language production. The locus of this effect 
is at the lexicalization stage, (this dissertation) 
2. Standard speed-accuracy tradeoff analyses of reaction time data 
assume that the probability for a correct response is a function only 
of the time Τ between stimulus onset and response, λ comparison of 
classical speed-accuracy tradeoff functions with conditional accuracy 
functions reveals, however, that this probability also depends on a 
response execution criterion. This criterion varies with the degree of 
emphasis on speed or accuracy in a given experiment. 
(Grice, G.R. and Spiker. V.A. Speed-accuracy tradeoff in choice 
reaction time: Within conditions, between conditions and between 
subjects. Perception & Psychophysics, 1979, 26, 118-126. 
Schriefers, H. Geschwindigkeits-Genauigkeits Austausch bei komplexeren 
kognitiven Leistungen. Diplomarbeit, Universität Bonn, 1961.) 
3. Research demonstrating a consistent preference for certain 
prenominai adjective orders (e.g., size before color) almost 
exclusively makes use of metalinguistic judgments. What remains unclear 
is to what extent speakers do follow these preference rules in their 
production of referential descriptions, as well as under which 
circumstances they possibly deviate from these rules. 
(Pechmann, Th. Überspezifizierung und Betonung in referentieller 
Kommunikation. Dissertation, Universität Mannheim, 1984.) 
4. Manipulating the symbolic distance between the terms of a three-term 
series problem by means of the adverbials "much" and 'slightly" (e.g., 
'B is much/slightly bigger than C, λ is much/slightly bigger than B. Is 
A bigger than C?") systematically affects solution times for the 
problem. If the two premisses have to be reordered by the subjects in 
order to arrive at a continuous ordering of the three terms (e.g., A > 
В > С), the introduction of greater symbolic distance by means of the 
adverbial 'much' has a facilitatory effect. 
(Fuchs, A. and Schriefers, Η. Symbolische Distanz der Reihenglieder und 
Formulierungsvarianten beim Lösen dreigliedriger Reihenprobleme. 
Zeitschrift fur experimentelle und angewandte Psychologie, 1982, 24, 
46-61. ) 

5. Subjects are faster in determining the antonymy relation between two 
adjectives than in determining the common underlying dimension of those 
adjectives. This presents problems for an account of semantic relations 
between lexical entities which assumes that semantic relations are 
computed by a comparison of semantic features. Such an account predicts 
that judgments of semantic relations will be faster when less features 
have to be compared. 
6. Speech and gesture - in particular deictic expressions and pointing 
- appear to be independent during the phase of motor execution but not 
during the planning phase. Studying the temporal interdependency of 
speech and gesture in stutterers should, therefore, give some idea as 
to whether the phenomenon of stuttering is located in the planning 
phase or in the execution phase. 
(Levelt, W.J.M., Richardson, G. and LaHeij, W. Pointing and voicing in 
deictic expressions. Journal of Memory and Language, 19Θ5, 24, 
133-164. ) 
7. There has been extensive experimental and theoretical work on 
lexical processing in the field of language comprehension. 
unfortunately, this is not the case for the field of language 
production. By conséquence, our knowledge of one of the most central 
building blocks of the language production system is too restricted to 
construct a comprehensive theory of language production. 
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